The Air War Against the Islamic State

Online Description

Airpower played a pivotal role in the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State from 2014 to 2019 and contributed to the success of Operation Inherent Resolve, but airpower alone would not have been likely to defeat the militant organization.

🔫 Author Background

Becca Wasser is a defense analyst who has worked at RAND Project AIR FORCE and later at CNAS, focusing on U.S. defense strategy, wargaming, and force posture in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific.
Stacie L. Pettyjohn is a former RAND senior political scientist and director in Project AIR FORCE whose work centers on airpower, basing, and operational concepts; she has written extensively on coercion and air campaigns.
Karl P. Mueller is a longtime RAND political scientist and airpower theorist specializing in coercive air campaigns, including editing Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War.
Jeffrey Martini is a RAND Middle East specialist whose research covers regional politics, security forces, and civil conflict, grounding the report’s treatment of Iraqi and Syrian partners.
The broader author team blends quantitative analysts, Middle East regional experts, and airpower practitioners, reflecting RAND’s role as a policy-relevant, empirically grounded think tank closely linked to USAF and OSD.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

The authors ask how airpower was actually used in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), how effective it was in achieving the goal of ISIS’s “enduring defeat,” and what limits shaped that effectiveness. They respond directly to claims that the air war was “unserious” or overly constrained and that a more aggressive campaign would have quickly destroyed ISIS. (p. 6, p. 12)
Using new data sets on strikes, targets, and sorties, they argue that airpower was indispensable to defeating ISIS but not sufficient on its own; local ground partners and a political strategy were central to the coalition’s theory of victory. (p. 10, p. 298)
They show that the close fight (CAS and immediate counterland) had far more direct impact on ISIS’s center of gravity—territorial control—than the deep fight (strategic attack and interdiction), although deep strikes degraded ISIS finances and constrained maneuver. (p. 299)
They conclude that while less restrictive rules or faster escalation might have modestly accelerated ISIS’s defeat, political, partner-capacity, and urban terrain constraints meant airpower could not deliver a Desert Storm–style quick victory against a dug-in proto-state. (p. 298–299)
The book ultimately frames OIR as an archetype of limited-liability, partner-centric air campaigns likely to characterize future U.S. wars.

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

This RAND study provides a strategic and operational history of the air war against ISIS from 2014–2019, organized around three campaign phases (degrade, counterattack, and defeat) and three types of air activity: the close fight, the deep fight, and enabling functions like DCA and mobility. Chapters 2–3 narrate how U.S. and coalition airpower supported a “by, with, and through” strategy to roll back ISIS’s caliphate, tracing changing sortie levels, targets, and partner operations. Chapters 4–6 dive into case studies of six major battles (Mosul Dam, Kobani, Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul, Raqqa), four deliberate deep operations (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank, logistics and GLOC interdiction), and enabling missions (DCA against Russia/Assad/Iranian aircraft, and air mobility, especially tankers). Using large strike and sortie data sets plus ~50 interviews, the authors assess what airpower actually did, how limits (political, legal, partner-dependent, and logistical) shaped its employment, and where debates about “underutilized” airpower are supported—or contradicted—by the evidence. The conclusion distills lessons and recommendations for future air wars against both nonstate and near-peer adversaries, emphasizing the need to integrate close and deep fights, strengthen C2 and data systems, and plan for long-duration, coalition, partner-led campaigns.

🎯 Course Themes Tracker

Limits on airpower – Political risk tolerance, legal/ROE constraints, partner capacity, and ISR/PGM/tanker bottlenecks all shaped tempo, target sets, and campaign design.
Expectations vs. reality – Pre-OIR expectations of rapid, coercive air success met the realities of urban warfare, fragile partners, and a partner-centric strategy.
Adaptation & learning – Strike cells, devolved targeting authority, deep-strike design (Tidal Wave II/Point Blank), and DCA tactics evolved over time.
Efficacy – Tactical success (targets destroyed) did not always translate into rapid operational or political gains; territory became the central measure of success. (p. 299)
Alliance/coalition dynamics – Coalition politics and basing access constrained some options but also broadened legitimacy and resources.
Domain interplay – Air/land integration was decisive; DCA, space-enabled ISR, and information flows underpinned both close and deep fights.

🔑 Top Takeaways

Airpower was central but not sovereign. OIR confirms that even very capable air forces cannot substitute for competent ground forces in destroying a proto-state; airpower’s greatest effects came when tightly integrated with Iraqi, Kurdish, and SDF ground offensives. (p. 298–299)
The close fight mattered more than the deep fight for ISIS’s center of gravity. Deep strikes badly damaged ISIS’s finances and some operational systems, but territorial control—ISIS’s core source of power and legitimacy—was broken primarily through CAS and immediate counterland in support of local ground forces. (p. 299)
A limited-liability, partner-centric strategy was the real constraint. The “slow” pace of OIR reflected deliberate political choices to minimize U.S. casualties and avoid large ground deployments, not simply underusing airpower. (p. 6, p. 299)
Urban warfare blurs CAS and strategic attack. Mosul and Raqqa show how precision airpower in dense cities becomes an attritional, street-by-street endeavor, consuming vast amounts of ISR, PGMs, and tankers while raising acute civilian-harm dilemmas.
C2 and authority design are critical. Strike cells, devolved targeting engagement authority (TEA), and CJTF–CFACC coordination evolved over time, improving responsiveness but also highlighting persistent seams between land-centric and air-centric headquarters. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134)
Enablers are often the tightest bottleneck. Tankers (“No Kick Ass Without Tanker Gas”), ISR platforms, and airlift were more binding constraints than bombers or fighters, shaping sortie patterns and campaign tempo. (p. 293)
OIR extends post-1991 trends. As in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, airpower enabled local partners and managed escalation but did not deliver a decisive quick victory; it functioned as an instrument of limited war, bounded by domestic politics and coalition dynamics.
Data for assessing airpower remain messy. Even with tens of thousands of strike and sortie records, the authors stress that “criteria for military effectiveness are fuzzy and subject to interpretation,” a caution against over-confident claims about what airpower “could have” done. (p. 8)

📒 Sections

Chapter One: Airpower and the War Against the Islamic State

Summary:

Chapter One introduces the political and strategic context of the fight against ISIS and situates OIR within broader debates about airpower’s potential and limits. It highlights competing narratives: critics who saw the air war as “unserious” and overly constrained, and others who argued that constraints and a partner-centric approach were appropriate to U.S. interests. (p. 6, p. 12) The authors explain that their goal is not a definitive history but an initial, data-driven assessment of how airpower was used and what it accomplished under real-world constraints. (p. 6) They frame the campaign around the U.S. objective of ISIS’s “enduring defeat,” emphasizing that this meant dismantling its territorial caliphate and proto-state institutions, not just attriting fighters. (p. 9) The chapter introduces their analytical focus on the close versus deep fight, arguing that the prioritization of the close fight reflected both strategic aims and partner needs. (p. 10, p. 35–36) It also previews the report’s structure, methods, and appendices.

Key Points:

OIR is set against a backdrop of longstanding debates about airpower’s decisive potential, including criticism of the campaign as too limited. (p. 6, p. 12)
The overriding objective was the enduring defeat of ISIS’s caliphate, making territorial control and governance institutions central targets. (p. 9)
The authors explicitly differentiate between the close fight (inside the FSCL, mostly CAS) and the deep fight (strategic attack and interdiction beyond it) as their organizing framework. (p. 35–36)
The study focuses on airpower’s contribution to a partner-led, limited-liability strategy, rather than hypothesizing about a U.S-led ground invasion that did not occur. (p. 9–10)
They stress that political and legal constraints, as well as coalition dynamics, shaped the campaign design from the outset. (p. 6)
The chapter positions OIR as part of a longer trend of air-centric, coalition campaigns in the post–Cold War era.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Airpower effectiveness is inseparable from strategy and war aims, not just sortie counts.
Early expectations vs reality: promises of rapid coercion vs the realities of a grinding urban campaign.
The importance of coalition management and legitimacy in contemporary air wars.
OIR as a continuation of post-1991 limited war patterns: by/with/through partners, risk aversion, and tight ROE.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Domestic aversion to large-scale ground deployments; insistence on a limited-liability strategy. Source: exogenous (U.S. politics), largely fixed at strategic level.
Legal/Normative: Strong LOAC and civilian-casualty concerns; coalition legitimacy requirements. Largely fixed but sometimes relaxable via refined weaponeering and better ISR.
Intelligence/Information: Initial uncertainty about ISIS strengths and target systems; improved over time through data and partners. Adjustable via ISR investment.
Strategic: Goal of “enduring defeat” tied to territory, which inherently privileged the close fight over deep attack. (p. 9, p. 299)

Section 1.1: Purpose of This Report

Summary:

This section clarifies the report’s purpose: to provide a strategic and operational assessment of airpower in OIR that moves beyond polemics. It sets out key questions about how airpower was employed, its contributions to major ground battles, and how it shaped ISIS’s finances, logistics, and freedom of movement. The authors emphasize that they seek to inform future USAF and joint doctrine debates, not to adjudicate service-centric turf wars. (p. 6, p. 12) They explicitly state that the report’s claims are circumscribed due to classification and data gaps, particularly regarding SOF and some intelligence-driven operations. (p. 6, p. 8) The purpose is to ground the debate over “underused” airpower in a documented record of what actually happened.

Key Points:

Provide an initial, unclassified history of airpower in OIR with emphasis on counterland missions and key enabling functions. (p. 12, p. 35–36)
Evaluate airpower’s contribution to the defeat of ISIS’s caliphate and territorial rollback. (p. 9–10)
Address whether political/ROE constraints materially limited the air campaign’s effectiveness. (p. 6)
Inform future operational planning and doctrinal debates about air operations in limited wars.
Clarify limits: not a comprehensive SOF or interagency history; focus is on airpower’s role.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Evidence vs advocacy: replacing anecdotal claims with data-driven analysis.
Emphasis on operational and strategic levels, not sharp tactical adjudications.
Awareness of limits in knowledge and the danger of overclaiming for or against airpower.

Limits Map (mini):

Intelligence/Information: Authors face incomplete, non-uniform data, especially for early phases and SOF operations. (p. 8, p. 393–397)
Resource/Time (analytic): Finite ability to interview all participants; reliance on selected cases. (p. 8)
Legal/Security: Classification restricts access to some operations, especially in Syria and involving SOF—endogenous limit, not easily adjustable.

Section 1.2: Methodology and Study Scope

Summary:

The methodology section explains that the study combines historiographical analysis, two large custom data sets (CJTF-OIR strike releases and AFCENT airpower summaries), and more than 50 interviews with U.S. and coalition personnel. (p. 8, p. 393–394) The authors treat interviews as subjective perspectives to be triangulated with other sources, not as definitive accounts. (p. 8) They describe how they aggregated nearly 33,000 strikes and >81,000 targets, grouped them into meaningful categories (military forces, facilities/resources, terrain/LOCs, vehicles), and correlated this with campaign phases and major operations. (p. 398–400, p. 405) They also spell out the limitations in the data—such as changing definitions of “strike,” the inclusion of artillery after 2017, and lack of explicit mapping between specific strikes and operations like Tidal Wave II—underscoring that effectiveness judgments must be cautious. (p. 395–397, p. 401–403) The scope is confined to the Iraq/Syria theater from August 2014 to March 2019.

Key Points:

Two core data sets: RAND CJTF-OIR strike data (by city, targets, effects) and RAND AFCENT airpower summaries (sorties, weapons, fuel, cargo). (p. 393–395)
Targets grouped into four main bins: facilities/resources, military forces, terrain/LOCs, and vehicles. (p. 398–399)
Data inconsistencies: evolving reporting practices, addition of artillery to “strikes,” limited aircraft-type reporting after early 2017. (p. 395–397)
Methodological rules to standardize ambiguous entries (e.g., “multiple” targets, multi-day releases, border cities). (p. 397–398)
Use of interviews from USAF, Army, and coalition officers, including CFACCs and CJTF-OIR staff, cross-checked against documents and data. (p. 8)
The assessment is strategic/operational, not tactical weapon-system performance.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

The inherent messiness of war data and implications for measuring airpower effectiveness.
Attention to joint and coalition perspectives in constructing the narrative.
Methodological humility: “Even when there are enormous amounts of data and clearly defined operational goals, the criteria for military effectiveness are fuzzy and subject to interpretation.” (p. 8)

Limits Map (mini):

Information: Non-uniform strike and sortie data; missing links between specific operations and strikes (e.g., Tidal Wave II). (p. 395–397, p. 399–400)
Resource/Time: Limited interviews and non-exhaustive sampling of participants; adjustable only marginally. (p. 8)
Analytic/Conceptual: “Strike” as a variable magnitude measure; imperfect mapping from tactical actions to strategic outcomes. (p. 396–397)

Section 1.3: Airpower’s Contribution to OIR

Summary:

This section advances the core claim that airpower was “indispensable to defeating ISIS” yet operated within and in support of a broader political and partner-centric strategy. (p. 10, p. 298) The authors explain that Obama’s and then Trump’s approaches sought an “enduring defeat” at limited U.S. cost, prioritizing recapture of territory over punishment of ISIS leadership or coercive strategic bombing. (p. 9–10, p. 299) This made the close fight—supporting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga, and the SDF—the main locus of effort, with the deep fight (e.g., Tidal Wave II) playing a supporting role by constraining ISIS resources. (p. 35–36, p. 299) Airpower enabled local forces to conduct major offensives by delivering CAS, ISR, mobility, and precision fires, especially in urban fights like Mosul and Raqqa. It also provided critical enablers: ISR, tankers, DCA, and airlift allowed long-range, continuous strikes from Gulf bases and carriers. The authors stress that airpower alone could not clear and hold territory, but without it the partner strategy likely would have failed or required far greater ground casualties. (p. 10, p. 298–299)

Key Points:

“Airpower was indispensable to defeating ISIS,” particularly as the primary U.S. combat contribution under a no-large-ground-forces policy. (p. 10)
The close fight (CAS/counterland) received priority because ISIS’s center of gravity was its control of territory and population. (p. 35–36, p. 299)
Deep operations targeted ISIS’s finances (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank), logistics, and GLOCs, but played a secondary role in achieving territorial rollback. (p. 204–205, p. 299)
Airpower enabled coalition and partner ground forces while minimizing U.S. casualties, aligning with domestic political constraints. (p. 6, p. 9–10)
Enabling functions—ISR, refueling, and airlift—were critical and often more stressed than strike capacity. (p. 257–260, p. 273–285, p. 293)
The overall verdict: OIR was successful and airpower was critical to that success, though not decisive by itself. (p. 298)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Airpower as enabler of local partners, not substitute for them.
The primacy of the close fight when territorial control is the main strategic objective.
Limits of strategic attack in counter-protostate wars.
Alignment (and tension) between political constraints and operational design.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Limited-liability strategy; by/with/through partners; no U.S. large ground combat units—exogenous and fixed at political level. (p. 9–10)
Operational: Dependence on partner ground tempo; basing distances from Gulf and carrier decks; urban terrain. Adjustable through basing improvements and increased enabling assets but not fully overcome. (p. 39–40, p. 273–288)
Legal/Normative: Strict ROE and LOAC standards shaped munitions, target sets, and tolerance for collateral damage, especially in cities. Partially adjustable via better ISR and weaponeering.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS dispersed, embedded in civilians, and shifted to tunnels and VBIED tactics, reducing the deep fight’s leverage.

Chapter Two: The Air War Against the Islamic State, Phase I, August 2014–March 2016

Summary:

Chapter Two covers Phase I (“degrade”), from the initial decision to intervene through March 2016. The authors show how ISIS’s rapid territorial gains in Iraq and Syria, especially the fall of Mosul and the Yazidi crisis on Sinjar, forced the U.S. to re-engage militarily, beginning with narrowly scoped air strikes to protect U.S. personnel and avert humanitarian catastrophe. (p. 15–17, p. 23–25) A broader multilateral strategy emerged in late 2014, formalizing OIR and creating CJTF-OIR, but political caution and the absence of capable local ground forces limited early offensive action. (p. 27–33, p. 49) Airpower began to ramp up as coalition partners joined, but drop rates were initially low due to stringent ROE, vetting requirements, and target scarcity. (p. 54, p. 78–82) By late 2015–early 2016, improved partner capacity and institutional innovations like strike cells allowed more effective use of CAS and interdiction, contributing to key victories (e.g., Ramadi) and halting ISIS’s momentum. (p. 25–26, p. 63–65, p. 157–162) The chapter concludes that Phase I succeeded in stabilizing the front and setting conditions for later counteroffensives, but did not significantly roll back ISIS territory.

Key Points:

Phase I begins with reactive, narrowly scoped air operations around Sinjar and Erbil, with humanitarian and force-protection objectives. (p. 23–25)
A global coalition coalesces in late 2014, and OIR is formally named; CJTF-OIR is created under ARCENT leadership, with CFACC as supporting commander. (p. 27–33, p. 49–50)
Early strike patterns emphasize dynamic targeting and mobile ISIS forces, with low weapons-release rates due to ROE and partner weaknesses. (p. 54, p. 63–65, p. 78–82)
Strike cells emerge as a key adaptation for CAS when JTACs cannot accompany partners at the front. (p. 25–26)
Phase I culminates in operations like Kobani and Ramadi, which demonstrate how improved partner forces plus heavier air support can turn the tide locally. (p. 142–147, p. 157–162)
Overall effect: ISIS’s expansion is halted and degraded, but territorial rollback remains limited by partner capacity and political constraints.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Crisis-driven intervention under tight political limits.
Early mismatch between American expectations of “shock and awe” airpower and the realities of a dispersed, urbanized adversary.
Innovation under constraint (strike cells, coalition C2).
The importance of time: Phase I buys time to build partner forces at the cost of a prolonged campaign.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: No large U.S. combat ground forces; narrow initial objectives focused on protection and humanitarian relief. Fixed, exogenous. (p. 15–17, p. 23–27)
Operational: Limited basing and access early on; long ranges from Gulf bases; initially weak partner ground forces. Partly adjustable via coalition basing and train-and-equip programs. (p. 39–40)
Legal/Normative: A high premium on civilian protection and host-nation consent constrained target sets and drop rates.
Intelligence: Rapidly evolving situation and initially thin ISR picture slowed transition from reactive to offensive air employment.

Section 2.1: The Decision to Intervene, June–August 2014

Summary:

This section traces how ISIS’s June 2014 offensive, culminating in the fall of Mosul and rapid advances toward Baghdad and Erbil, forced U.S. leaders to reconsider their post-2011 disengagement. (p. 15–17) The administration framed early air operations as limited actions to protect U.S. personnel and prevent genocide against the Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar. U.S. cargo aircraft, escorted by F-15s and F-16s, conducted airdrops—e.g., on August 7 a C-17 and two C-130s dropped 72 bundles of supplies to Yazidis—illustrating early blending of humanitarian and kinetic missions. (p. 23–25) The White House established “red lines” for strikes (e.g., protecting Erbil and U.S. facilities, defending critical infrastructure such as Mosul Dam), reflecting a desire to avoid being drawn into Iraq’s internal politics. (p. 23–27) CENTCOM designated ARCENT as JFLCC on June 24, 2014, to coordinate security cooperation and later direct dynamic air strikes. (Appendix B, p. 349–350) The section shows that the initial design of OIR was defensive and constrained, not a pre-planned counteroffensive campaign.

Key Points:

ISIS’s capture of Mosul and rapid advances toward Baghdad and Erbil are the strategic shock that triggers U.S. re-engagement. (p. 15–17)
Initial U.S. objectives: protect Americans and facilities; avert genocide; defend critical infrastructure and major cities. (p. 23–27)
Humanitarian airdrops on Mount Sinjar are enabled and protected by combat aircraft, foreshadowing air mobility’s central role. (p. 23–25)
ARCENT becomes JFLCC and later morphs into CJTF-OIR, giving the Army the lead in early C2. (Appendix B, p. 349–350)
Air operations initially focus on dynamic CAS/interdiction against ISIS forces threatening predefined red lines.
The U.S. remains reluctant to re-enter Iraq’s politics, shaping narrow initial aims and rules.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Limited war logic: narrow objectives, careful escalation management.
Humanitarian triggers for air intervention, reminiscent of Kosovo and Libya.
Early expectation that airpower can “buy time” rather than immediately win.
Civil-military interplay: presidential red lines bound CENTCOM’s options.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Strong domestic resistance to “another Iraq war”; explicit presidential lines about no “combat mission” for U.S. troops. Fixed, exogenous.
Legal/Normative: Justification framed around R2P-like humanitarian grounds and defense of U.S. personnel; limits on operations inside Syria at first.
Operational: Absence of U.S. advisers at the front, limited JTAC presence, forcing improvisations like remote strike cells. (p. 25–26)
Intelligence: Limited visibility into ISIS’s deeper organization; focus on visible tactical formations.

Section 2.2: A Multilateral Strategy to Defeat ISIS, September 2014

Summary:

This section describes the pivot from ad hoc strikes to a more structured, coalition-based strategy. In September 2014, a broad international coalition forms, and the U.S. publicly articulates an objective to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, not just contain it. (p. 27–33) CENTCOM stands up CJTF-OIR and, on October 15, designates the campaign Operation Inherent Resolve, explicitly highlighting coalition resolve and a whole-of-government approach. (p. 49–50, p. 71) The coalition approach divides labor across lines of effort (military, foreign fighters, finance, counter-messaging), with air operations as the primary kinetic tool for the U.S. and many partners. The section notes that different coalition members adopted their own national operation names (Chammal, Shader, Okra, etc.), reflecting both unity and political caution. (Appendix B, p. 350) Yet the underlying U.S. strategy remains limited liability and partner-centric, with Iraqi forces expected to do most ground fighting, supported by airpower, advisors, and security assistance. (p. 9–10, p. 27–33)

Key Points:

Public shift in rhetoric from narrow protection to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS. (p. 27–33)
Formation of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, with contributions of aircraft, trainers, and funding. (p. 33, fig. 2.2)
Formal naming of OIR on October 15 and establishment of CJTF-OIR under LTG Terry; CFACC remains a separate, supporting commander. (p. 49–50, p. 71)
Coalition partners use national operation names, highlighting domestic political needs for distance and control. (Appendix B, p. 350)
Air operations expand into Syria, but host-nation consent issues and Syrian air defenses complicate planning. (p. 42–44)
Strategy remains tied to local ground partners, not a U.S.-led invasion.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Coalition politics as both enabler and constraint on air employment.
Strategic ambiguity between “destroy” vs “degrade” reflected in evolving targeting priorities.
Institutionalization of the campaign: naming, CJTF, and formal command relationships.

Limits Map (mini):

Alliance/Political: Need for broad coalition support and varying national caveats; Turkish sensitivities over Kurdish partners; Gulf states’ priorities.
Legal: Operations in Syria conducted without Assad regime consent, raising legality and escalation concerns; constraints on targeting regime assets.
Operational: Multiple coalition air forces with different ROE and capabilities; airspace deconfliction challenges.
Strategic: Lack of a clearly defined end state beyond “destroy ISIS,” complicating alignment of air efforts with political aims.

Section 2.3: Going on the Offensive: Degrading ISIS, September 2014–March 2016

Summary:

Here the authors chart the gradual shift from reactive protection to more offensive air operations aimed at degrading ISIS forces, infrastructure, and leadership. Early operations in Kobani, Sinjar, and around Mosul demonstrate that when paired with determined local fighters, airpower can halt and reverse ISIS’s advances. (p. 142–147, p. 134–140) Strike and sortie data show that coalition air activity ramps up steadily, but low drop rates persist for much of 2014 due to target-vetting constraints, ISR shortfalls, and cautious ROE. (p. 54, p. 78–82) Over time, the creation of strike cells, better use of ISR, and increased partner competencegenerate more effective CAS and interdiction. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134) However, without large-scale coordinated offensives, the net effect is attrition and containment rather than decisive territorial rollback. The authors note ISIS’s adaptation—dispersal, avoidance of large formations, and embedding in urban areas—which further limits the effectiveness of deep strikes against fixed targets. (p. 63–65)

Key Points:

Offensive air operations expand across Iraq and Syria, focusing on ISIS fighters, vehicles, and key facilities. (p. 63–65)
Drop rates for air-to-ground sorties gradually increase but remain lower than in earlier wars due to strict vetting and partner-dependent targeting. (p. 54, p. 78–82)
Strike cells and improved ISR integration allow more responsive CAS and dynamic targeting. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134)
ISIS adapts by avoiding massed formations, dispersing assets, and using complex urban terrain and human shields. (p. 63–65)
Despite more intense air effort, net territorial changes are modest; major urban centers like Mosul and Raqqa remain under ISIS control.
The period sets conditions for later counteroffensives by reducing ISIS mobility and attriting mid-level leadership and heavy weapons.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Attrition vs maneuver: Airpower excels at attrition but needs ground maneuver to translate into territorial gains.
Adversary adaptation and the diminishing returns of deep strike absent a maneuver partner.
Incremental learning in C2, strike processes, and ISR exploitation.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Limited ground tempo and fragmented partner offensives; slow clearing of urban areas.
Intelligence: Persistent difficulty in locating high-value targets and differentiating civilians from fighters in dense terrain.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS’s shift to concealment, tunnels, and VBIEDs reduces the payoff from traditional interdiction.
Resource/Time: Slow build-up of coalition capabilities and train-and-equip programs delays robust offensive operations.

Section 2.4: Assessment of Phase I

Summary:

The assessment argues that Phase I succeeded in stopping ISIS’s expansion and degrading its capabilities, but fell short of rapidly reversing its territorial gains. (p. 79–82) Airpower was effective at blunting offensives and supporting key localized counterattacks when paired with motivated partners, yet the lack of coherent, large-scale ground operations limited strategic results. The authors emphasize that this is not primarily an indictment of airpower; rather, it reflects broader constraints: political reluctance to reintroduce U.S. ground forces, Iraqi political dysfunction, and the time required to regenerate partner capabilities. (p. 79–82) Air operations also wrestled with early ISR and targeting constraints and evolving C2 constructs. Nonetheless, by the end of Phase I, ISIS’s momentum had been broken, and the coalition had established a functioning, if imperfect, joint and combined air campaign structure. (p. 82)

Key Points:

Phase I degrades ISIS’s conventional military strength and halts expansion but does not collapse the caliphate. (p. 79–82)
Airpower is necessary but not sufficient; the absence of synchronized ground offensives is key.
C2 innovations (CJTF-OIR, strike cells) and coalition integration lay groundwork for later phases. (p. 25–26, p. 49–50)
Drop rates rise over time, indicating improved confidence and target development. (p. 78–82)
ISIS suffers attrition in heavy weapons and mid-level leadership, hollowing out some offensive capacity.
The authors push back on narratives that Phase I’s slowness was solely due to overly restrictive ROE.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Expectations vs reality: The idea that airpower alone could quickly crush ISIS is not supported by Phase I outcomes.
Path dependence: The structures, habits, and ROE of Phase I shape later phases’ possibilities.
Limits of deep strike: Without ground gains, degraded ISIS still holds key cities.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Continued adherence to limited-liability strategy; no U.S. large ground force remains non-negotiable.
Operational: Partner weakness; competing priorities across CENTCOM (Afghanistan, Gulf, Yemen) stretch air assets. (Appendix B, p. 352)
Resource/Time: Building partner capacity and coalition processes is inherently slow; not easily compressible.
Legal/Normative: Ongoing civilian-casualty concerns constrain certain targeting options in urban areas.

Chapter Three: The Air War Against the Islamic State, Phases II and III, April 2016–March 2019

Summary:

Chapter Three covers Phase II (“counterattack”) and Phase III (“defeat & MERV clearance”), when ISIS’s territorial caliphate is rolled back and ultimately destroyed. (p. 87–88) Phase II sees intensified coalition support to major ground offensives—Ramadi, Fallujah, Mosul, Raqqa—driven by more capable ISF, Peshmerga, and SDF forces and maturing C2 and strike processes. Airpower activity peaks in this period, with high sortie and weapon-release counts and an elevated emphasis on CAS in dense urban terrain. (p. 87–108, p. 170–187) Phase III involves mopping up ISIS remnants in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) and the transition to counterinsurgency and stabilization tasks; air activity declines and shifts toward overwatch and targeted strikes. (p. 114–121) Across both phases, the authors highlight how the close fight, enabled by airpower, systematically dismantled ISIS control of major population centers, while deep operations constrained ISIS resource flows and movement. By March 2019, ISIS has lost all territorial claims, though a residual insurgent threat persists. (Appendix A, p. 348–349)

Key Points:

Phase II marks the transition to large-scale, partner-led offensives with heavy CAS and artillery support. (p. 87–108)
Mosul and Raqqa become archetypal urban air–land battles, with intense demand for ISR, precision munitions, and tankers. (p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
Deep operations (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank, logistics and GLOC interdiction) peak in Phase II, further stressing ISIS resources. (p. 199–252)
Phase III focuses on clearing ISIS pockets in the MERV and supporting SDF operations, with decreasing but still meaningful air activity. (p. 114–121)
ISIS’s revenue drops significantly between 2014 and 2017, reflecting both territorial loss and deep-strike pressure. (p. 108)
By March 23, 2019, ISIS has lost its last territory at Baghouz, but the coalition recognizes a continuing terrorist/insurgent threat. (Appendix A, p. 348–349)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

The centrality of urban CAS in breaking a proto-state.
Deep strike as a supporting effort that complements but cannot replace ground-centric operations.
Learning over time in authority delegation, joint fires, and integration of surface and air fires. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157)
OIR as a model for future partner-centric campaigns against entrenched nonstate actors.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Difficulties coordinating multi-axis offensives; air–surface deconfliction with artillery and HIMARS. (p. 134–135, p. 156–157)
Technological/Resource: Strain on PGM inventories and tankers during peak operations; partially alleviated by procurement and management adjustments. (p. 273–290, p. 293)
Adversary Adaptation: Extensive use of human shields, tunnels, VBIED belts in Mosul and Raqqa; reduces options for high-yield munitions.
Political: Pressure to minimize civilian casualties and avoid destruction reminiscent of earlier Iraq wars, particularly in Mosul.

Section 3.1: Phase II – Counterattack, April 2016–August 2017

Summary:

Phase II is characterized by a sequence of offensive operations—Ramadi completion, Fallujah, Mosul, Raqqa—enabled by increasingly competent ISF and SDF formations and heavy air support. (p. 87–108, p. 157–187) The coalition shifts from piecemeal strikes to supporting deliberate, multi-month campaigns with detailed targeting plans. Air activity peaks: CAS sorties, weapons released, and ISR coverage all rise substantially compared to Phase I. (p. 87–108, p. 294–295) The authors detail how airpower shapes the urban environment: destroying VBIED factories, breaking defensive belts, and providing precision fires in close proximity to partner forces. Yet these victories are slow and costly in partner and civilian casualties; LTG Townsend calls Mosul “the most extended and brutal combat I have ever witnessed.” (p. 107) Strategic attack operations like Tidal Wave II and Point Blank also intensify, hitting oil infrastructure and cash-storage sites, further eroding ISIS’s financial base. (p. 204–230)

Key Points:

Major offensive operations in Anbar, Mosul, and Raqqa drive the campaign’s turning point; airpower is heavily committed to these battles. (p. 157–187)
CAS, interdiction, and surface fires are tightly integrated, with strike cells managing a dense fires environment. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157)
Sortie and weapon-release data show peak air effort during 2016–2017. (p. 294–295)
Deep operations against oil and finance (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank) expand and refine target sets, reducing ISIS revenues. (p. 204–230, p. 108)
Urban combat in Mosul and Raqqa demonstrates both the power and limits of precision airpower in dense terrain and among civilians. (p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
The coalition and partners accept higher risks and casualties in order to retake key cities.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Integration of close and deep fights at scale.
Airpower as an attritional tool in decisive urban battles, not a quick shock weapon.
The interplay of civilian protection concerns and high-intensity urban fires.
Increased delegation of TEA to lower echelons to enable tempo. (p. 133–134)

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Complex urban terrain and densely packed civilians; need for extensive ISR and careful weaponeering.
Legal/Normative: Civilian casualties and destruction of cities raise strategic legitimacy concerns, especially in Mosul and Raqqa.
Resource: High PGM expenditure and tanker demand; partial mitigation through logistics management. (p. 273–290, p. 293)
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS’s shift to fortified urban defenses and suicide attacks; reduces efficacy of interdiction and necessitates close-quarters support.

Section 3.2: Phase III – Defeating ISIS and Rounding Up Stragglers in the MERV, August 2017–March 2019

Summary:

Phase III focuses on clearing remaining ISIS pockets, primarily in the Middle Euphrates River Valley along the Iraq–Syria border, and transitioning from high-intensity combat to stabilization and counterterrorism. (p. 114–121) Airpower’s role shifts from continuous heavy CAS to episodic, targeted strikes and overwatch, supporting SDF and ISF operations to clear villages and desert areas. Sorties and weapons released decline from Phase II peaks, reflecting both ISIS’s reduced footprint and coalition priorities shifting to other missions. (p. 114–121, p. 294–295) Deep operations remain relevant but at a reduced level, focused on interdiction against residual logistics and leadership hideouts. The section highlights persistent concerns that ISIS will revert to an insurgency and use the MERV and borderlands as sanctuaries; airpower remains a key tool for surveillance and rapid strikes against emerging cells. (p. 114–121) The territorial “end” of the caliphate in March 2019 is thus a milestone, not a final defeat.

Key Points:

Phase III completes the territorial destruction of ISIS’s caliphate, especially in the MERV, culminating at Baghouz in March 2019. (Appendix A, p. 348–349)
Air operations downshift from constant urban CAS to targeted strikes and ISR overwatch. (p. 114–121)
Remaining ISIS forces operate in small, mobile cells, complicating targeting and limiting air penetration.
Coalition concerns shift toward stabilization and preventing resurgence, where airpower is necessary but not central.
Political decisions about U.S. force levels in Syria (e.g., Trump’s withdrawal announcements) create uncertainty for campaign planners. (Appendix A, p. 348–349)
Airpower remains an essential component of a long-term counterterrorism posture.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Transition from warfighting to security assistance and CT, with airpower as a backstop.
The persistence of the adversary despite loss of territory.
Balancing resource prioritization as ISIS declines and other theaters (e.g., great-power competition) rise in importance.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: U.S. decisions on troop withdrawals and changing priorities create planning uncertainty; exogenous.
Operational: Reduced target density and more diffuse insurgent cells; ISR becomes harder and more critical.
Resource/Time: Pressure to draw down high-end assets (ISR, tankers) as other theaters demand attention.
Strategic: Enduring risk that territorial defeat does not equate to ideological or organizational defeat.

Section 3.3: Conclusion

Summary:

The chapter concludes that Phases II and III achieved the coalition’s main objective of destroying ISIS’s territorial caliphate, with airpower playing a central enabling role. (p. 121) The authors highlight that the tempo and character of the air war changed dramatically from Phase I attrition to Phase II high-intensity urban CAS and then to Phase III CT/overwatch. Airpower’s ability to sustain partners over multi-year battles without large U.S. ground deployments vindicates the limited-liability, partner-centric strategy in operational terms, but not necessarily in terms of long-term regional stability. (p. 121) The conclusion also notes that ISIS’s ability to survive as an insurgent network, despite the destruction of its state, underscores the limits of what airpower and even successful campaigns can achieve politically. Finally, it sets up Part II by pointing to the need to examine specific battles and deep operations to understand how airpower worked in practice.

Key Points:

Territorial defeat of ISIS is accomplished, but an insurgent threat persists. (p. 121)
Airpower’s roles evolve from containment to decisive urban enabler to overwatch and CT support.
The limited-liability strategy—heavy air, light ground—achieves its immediate objective but leaves unresolved questions about the postwar order.
The chapter motivates closer examination of the close fight, deep fight, and enabling missions in Part II.
Campaign outcomes support the idea that territory, not leadership decapitation alone, was ISIS’s main center of gravity. (p. 299)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Efficacy vs sufficiency: The campaign was militarily effective in its own terms, but politically partial.
Learning over time: Doctrinal and procedural adaptations in targeting, C2, and partner integration.
Continuity with prior air wars: Airpower again proves central but bounded in its ability to deliver political outcomes.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Airpower cannot resolve underlying political grievances or governance failures in Iraq and Syria.
Operational: Even at peak effectiveness, air–land integration is constrained by local partner capacity and urban complexity.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS’s transition to insurgency demonstrates resilience beyond territorial collapse.

Chapter Four: The Close Fight – Air-to-Ground Coordination

Summary:

Chapter Four focuses on the close fight, examining six case studies—Mosul Dam, Kobani, Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul, and Raqqa—to assess how air and ground forces were integrated. (p. 125, p. 129) The authors show how early restrictions on advisers and JTACs created a gap that strike cells filled, evolving over time in sophistication, size, and delegated authority. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134) Across cases, they highlight how airpower provided critical firepower, ISR, and command-and-control support to partners often outmatched on the ground. The chapter tracks growing complexity: from relatively simple combined operations at Mosul Dam to massive, multi-month urban fights at Mosul and Raqqa with integrated artillery and HIMARS. (p. 134–187, p. 157–187) It concludes that while close air support was highly effective tactically and operationally, its success depended on sufficient partner quality, clear C2 arrangements, and adequate enabling assets. (p. 195)

Key Points:

Case studies selected to represent different phases, partners, and levels of complexity in the close fight. (p. 129–132)
Strike cells become the central tool for air–ground integration when JTACs cannot accompany partners, staffed with legal, ISR, and weaponeering experts. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134)
Devolution of TEA in Tactical Directive 1 empowers advisory commanders and increases responsiveness for CAS. (p. 133–134, p. 156)
Introduction of coalition surface fires (HIMARS, artillery) adds firepower but complicates deconfliction with air. (p. 156–157)
Close fight operations evolve from small-scale, short-duration actions to months-long urban campaigns requiring immense fires coordination. (p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
The chapter concludes that CAS and counterland missions were crucial to partner success but did not remove the need for costly ground fighting. (p. 195)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Institutional learning in air–ground integration under political constraints.
The extent to which ROE, TEA, and strike-cell design affected tempo and effectiveness.
CAS as the primary vector of airpower’s strategic impact when territory is the main MoE. (p. 299)

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Limits on adviser proximity and JTAC deployment shape the need for strike cells. (p. 25–26)
Operational: Complex airspace and fires deconfliction, especially in urban battles with surface fires. (p. 156–157)
Technological/Resource: Demand for ISR, precision munitions, and tankers to sustain close fight operations.
Adversary Adaptation: Use of civilians, tunnels, and fortified positions complicates CAS.

Section 4.1: Case Study Selection

Summary:

The authors explain that they chose six close-fight cases to represent the temporal evolution of OIR, variation in partner forces, and different operational challenges. (p. 129–132) Mosul Dam and Kobani showcase early improvised integration with relatively weak partners; Tikrit and Ramadi illustrate mid-campaign operations where airpower had to navigate Iraqi political sensitivities and varied partner competence; Mosul and Raqqa show fully developed, large-scale urban operations. The selection allows comparison of dynamic vs deliberate targeting, different C2 arrangements (CJOC-based vs SOF strike cells), and how changes in TEA and surface fires affected operations. The section makes clear that these are illustrative, not exhaustive, but they capture the main patterns in the close fight.

Key Points:

Six cases selected: Mosul Dam, Kobani, Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul, Raqqa. (p. 129)
Cases span from early Phase I through Phase II, tracking increasing complexity and maturity in air–ground coordination. (p. 129–132)
Variation in partners: KRG Peshmerga, Kurdish YPG/SDF, ISF, CTS, and coalition artillery units.
Differences in C2: CJOC-based strike cells in Iraq vs SOF-run strike cells in Syria. (p. 133–134)
Cases chosen to highlight both successes and warning signs (e.g., Tikrit’s coordination problems).
Aim is to generate generalizable insights into CAS and close fight employment in partner-centric campaigns.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Case-based learning as a tool for doctrine and training.
Recognition that context matters: same airpower, different partners, different outcomes.
Implicit critique of simplistic “sorties = effectiveness” thinking.

Limits Map (mini):

Analytic: Limited number of case studies; not all important operations (e.g., Tal Afar) included.
Information: Data and interviews richer for some cases than others.
Operational: Variation in partner quality and C2 arrangements make cross-case comparison challenging but instructive.

Section 4.2: Evolution in Coalition Processes and Capabilities

Summary:

This section traces the evolution of air–ground coordination processes, focusing on strike cells, TEA delegation, and integration of surface fires. Early in OIR, with advisers restricted from front lines, strike cells emerged as a nondoctrinal innovation: command posts led by a one-star U.S. officer with TEA, collocated with Iraqi/Kurdish officers (though physically separated sections) and supported by JTACs, ISR liaisons, lawyers, and other specialists. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134) Over time, strike cells were refined, SOF strike cells supporting SDF in Syria operated with smaller staffs and more agile processes, and TEA was devolved via Tactical Directive 1 to allow advisory commanders to approve defensive and some offensive strikes. (p. 133–134, p. 156) The integration of surface fires like HIMARS and coalition artillery increased firepower but added complexity to deconfliction and airspace management, particularly when using long-range systems like ATACMS. (p. 156–157) These changes are presented as key learning points for future joint operations.

Key Points:

Strike cells replace front-line JTACs in many cases, centralizing TEA and integrating ISR, legal review, and weaponeering. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134)
Iraqi and Kurdish officers participate in strike cells and must approve every bomb in Iraq, embedding host-nation control in the process. (p. 25–26)
SOF-run strike cells in Syria operate with smaller staffs but continuous coverage for SDF units. (p. 133–134)
Tactical Directive 1 devolves TEA, allowing advisory commanders with terminal control capabilities to approve certain strikes, increasing responsiveness. (p. 133–134, p. 156)
Surface fires (HIMARS, artillery) become integral, requiring careful deconfliction with air strikes, especially with long-range systems. (p. 156–157)
Differences in training (e.g., lack of formal JAGICs) and non-standardized strike-cell practices lead to variable proficiency. (p. 25–26, p. 133–134)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Joint and coalition integration as a central determinant of close fight effectiveness.
The importance of organizational design (who holds TEA, where? with what staff?) under political limits on advisers.
Learning under fire: nondoctrinal structures (strike cells) become normalized.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: No doctrinal template for strike cells; variability in training and staffing.
Political: Adviser and JTAC restrictions persist, preventing full doctrinal CAS employment.
Legal: Embedded legal officers and host-nation approval processes add time but are necessary for legitimacy.
Resource: Limited personnel to fully man all strike cells and JAGIC-like capabilities.

Section 4.3: Averting Humanitarian Crises – Mosul Dam, August 2014

Summary:

The Mosul Dam operation is presented as an early example of effective air–ground coordination to avert a potentially catastrophic humanitarian and infrastructure disaster. (p. 134–140) ISIS had captured the dam, described as “the most dangerous dam in the world,” raising fears that sabotage or mismanagement could flood downstream cities. (p. 134) U.S. airpower supported Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi CTS forces in a rapid offensive to retake the dam, using strike cells at CJOC-B and CJOC-E to approve and deconflict strikes. (p. 25–26, p. 134–135) CAS and interdiction strikes destroyed ISIS defensive positions and vehicles and disrupted their ability to counterattack, while minimizing damage to the dam itself. The operation demonstrates that, even early in OIR, airpower could deliver decisive operational effects when combined with motivated local forces and focused objectives. It also highlights the role of host-nation approval and legal oversight in target selection.

Key Points:

Mosul Dam is critical infrastructure whose loss posed catastrophic flood risk. (p. 134)
Peshmerga and CTS ground forces, supported by coalition airpower, execute a rapid offensive to retake the dam. (p. 134–140)
Strike cells at CJOC-E and CJOC-B approve fires, integrating ISR and legal review. (p. 25–26, p. 134–135)
CAS targets ISIS fighting positions, vehicles, and heavy weapons while avoiding damage to the dam.
The operation demonstrates early successes in close fight coordination and the utility of airpower in complex infrastructure missions.
It also reinforces the importance of rapid, high-quality ISR to protect critical infrastructure.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Humanitarian and infrastructure protection as missions well suited to air–ground integration.
Airpower enabling rapid, limited objectives within broader political constraints.
Proof-of-concept for strike cells and partner-enabled close fight operations.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Need to avoid striking the dam itself limited munition choice and target sets.
Political/Legal: Iraqi sovereignty concerns and infrastructure protection norms shaped ROE.
Intelligence: Detailed knowledge of dam structure and ISIS positions required robust ISR.
Resource: Relatively small-scale operation—limits not as severe as in later urban battles.

Section 4.4: Stopping ISIS’s Momentum in Syria – Kobani, October 2014–January 2015

Summary:

Kobani illustrates how sustained CAS, even from distance bases, can enable local forces to hold and eventually retake a city under siege. (p. 142–147) ISIS invested significant forces to seize the symbolic Kurdish town on the Syrian–Turkish border; YPG fighters, with limited heavy weapons, faced encirclement. U.S. and coalition aircraft, controlled by SOF-run strike cells, conducted intense CAS and interdiction, destroying ISIS reinforcements, vehicles, and heavy weapons. (p. 142–147) Drop rates and sortie intensity around Kobani significantly exceeded early campaign norms, reflecting the perceived importance of the battle and improved targeting processes. The authors highlight the role of Turkish politics—Ankara’s ambivalence regarding YPG—as a political limit on broader support, though it did eventually allow some reinforcements and resupply. Airpower’s role is portrayed as decisive in preventing Kobani’s fall and inflicting heavy casualties on ISIS, but still dependent on determined local defense.

Key Points:

Kobani becomes an early symbolic battle for both ISIS and the coalition. (p. 142–147)
SOF-run strike cells provide continuous CAS to YPG fighters, despite lack of forward JTACs. (p. 133–134, p. 142–147)
Air strikes focus on ISIS tactical units, VBIEDs, and heavy weapons, leveraging high ISR coverage.
Sortie intensity and weapons releases spike during the battle, showing airpower surge capacity.
Turkish political constraints limit overt coalition support to YPG and complicate logistics.
The battle demonstrates airpower’s ability to compensate for partner shortfalls in heavy weapons and armor.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Airpower as firepower substitution for lightly equipped partners.
Alliance friction (Turkey–U.S.–Kurds) shaping what airpower can do politically, not just militarily.
Reinforces the importance of ISR and dynamic targeting in urban sieges.

Limits Map (mini):

Political/Alliance: Turkey’s concerns about YPG/PKK connections limit broader support; exogenous and hard to adjust.
Operational: Distance from main bases and need to avoid Turkish airspace sensitivities.
Legal/Normative: Care in targeting within a densely populated town to minimize civilian casualties.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS’s willingness to absorb losses for prestige; heavy use of VBIEDs and tunneling.

Section 4.5: Warning Signs in Tikrit, March–April 2015

Summary:

The Tikrit operation reveals shortcomings in early Iraqi–coalition coordination and tensions between local political objectives and coalition standards. (p. 151–156) Initial efforts to retake Tikrit were dominated by Shia militias and Iranian-backed elements, with the Iraqi government initially resisting heavy coalition air support. Concerns about potential sectarian abuses and targeting practices led the coalition to withhold some assistance until command and force-composition issues were resolved. When coalition airpower was eventually applied more fully, it helped break ISIS defenses and enable the city’s recapture. The authors present Tikrit as a warning that success requires not just firepower but compatible partners and acceptable conduct on the ground, shaping later insistence on CTS and ISF leadership in operations like Ramadi and Mosul. (p. 151–157)

Key Points:

Tikrit’s initial offensive is led by Shia militias and Iranian advisors, raising coalition concerns. (p. 151–156)
Coalition airpower is initially limited due to doubts about C2, LOAC compliance, and the political optics of aiding militias.
Once ISF and CTS play a more prominent role and coordination improves, air support increases and helps tip the battle.
Operation highlights the need for alignment between partner behavior and coalition norms.
Provides lessons for later operations where CTS leads and is viewed as more reliable.
Tikrit demonstrates that airpower cannot fully compensate for political and ethnic fissures in partner forces.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Partner suitability as a key determinant for air employment.
The interplay between civilian protection norms and operational effectiveness.
Early learning that shaping who leads on the ground matters as much as how much airpower is provided.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Iraqi domestic politics and Iranian influence; coalition’s desire to avoid supporting abusive militias.
Legal/Normative: Concerns about sectarian violence and LOAC compliance limit air support.
Operational: Fragmented command structures and unclear TEA hamper air–ground integration.
Strategic: The risk that military success in Tikrit could exacerbate sectarian tensions and fuel future conflict.

Section 4.6: Regaining Lost Ground – The Ramadi Liberation, July 2015–January 2016

Summary:

Ramadi is presented as a turning point where a more coherent ISF–CTS–coalition campaign, with robust air and surface fires, retakes a major city from ISIS. (p. 157–162) The operation features sustained CAS and interdiction, with strike cells coordinating air and artillery fires to dismantle ISIS defensive belts, VBIED factories, and command posts. The authors show that sortie and target data indicate concentrated air effort in support of this campaign, though still limited by ROE and urban terrain. (p. 160–161) Ramadi demonstrates the benefits of stronger ISF leadership and better pre-planned coordination, in contrast to Tikrit. It also foreshadows later urban fights at Mosul and Raqqa, including the need to combine airpower with bridging assets and engineering support to cross rivers and obstacles. The operation’s success helps restore some ISF confidence and political legitimacy in Baghdad.

Key Points:

Ramadi is retaken through a coordinated ISF–CTS–coalition campaign, heavily supported by CAS. (p. 157–162)
Strike cells integrate air and surface fires to target ISIS defensive systems and VBIED infrastructure. (p. 160–161)
OIR data show a concentration of strikes and targets on Ramadi during the operation. (p. 160–161)
The operation benefits from clearer ISF leadership and better political alignment with the coalition.
Ramadi serves as a template for later large-scale urban operations.
It also highlights ongoing civilian-harm and destruction concerns in urban warfare.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Improved partner performance and its impact on airpower effectiveness.
The move toward more deliberate, campaign-level planning for the close fight.
Airpower as a force multiplier for regained confidence and legitimacy of ISF.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Urban terrain, IED/VBIED threats, and river crossings complicate operations.
Legal/Normative: Pressure to protect civilians and infrastructure while clearing ISIS.
Resource: High use of PGMs and ISR assets; some constraints in availability.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS’s defensive belts and booby-trapped buildings slow progress.

Section 4.7: Reclaiming ISIS’s Iraqi Capital – Mosul, October 2016–July 2017

Summary:

Mosul is the largest and most complex urban battle in OIR, with airpower providing massive, sustained support to CTS, ISF, and Peshmerga forces. (p. 166–175) CAS, interdiction, and artillery fires must be tightly coordinated to break ISIS’s layered defenses while minimizing civilian casualties in a city of over a million residents. TEA delegation and mature strike cells enable rapid support, and the introduction of surface fires increases overall firepower. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157, p. 170–171) Air strikes focus on VBIED factories, command nodes, sniper nests, and defensive strongpoints. The battle is prolonged and brutal; LTG Townsend calls it “the most extended and brutal combat I have ever witnessed.” (p. 107) Despite extensive destruction, the operation ultimately succeeds in recapturing the city and dealing a decisive blow to ISIS’s legitimacy. The authors emphasize that airpower was crucial but had to operate under tight LOAC scrutiny and with constant political attention to civilian harm.

Key Points:

Mosul operation is the largest close fight of OIR, involving months of dense urban combat. (p. 166–175)
Strike cells and devolved TEA enable rapid CAS and counterbattery fires, though most strikes still run through strike cells. (p. 133–134, p. 170–171)
Surface fires (artillery, HIMARS) are integrated, increasing complexity of deconfliction. (p. 156–157)
Coalition airpower systematically targets VBIED factories, defensive nodes, and ISIS leadership in the city. (p. 170–171)
Civilian casualties and extensive urban destruction are significant; balancing speed and protection is a constant tension.
Mosul’s recapture is a decisive blow to ISIS’s caliphate but comes at high human and infrastructural cost.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Limits of “surgical” airpower in mega-city warfare.
Civil–military politics of casualty tolerance and media scrutiny.
CAS and urban operations as the actual main effort of the air war. (p. 299)

Limits Map (mini):

Legal/Normative: Strong emphasis on minimizing civilian casualties; necessity to choose lower-yield munitions and accept slower progress in some areas.
Operational: Intense airspace/fires deconfliction, communications, and ISR demands.
Resource: Massive consumption of PGMs and ISR sorties; tanker support critical to maintain coverage.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS extensive tunnel networks, snipers, VBIED waves, and use of human shields.

Section 4.8: Taking Down the Heart of the “Caliphate” – Raqqa, June 2017–October 2017

Summary:

Raqqa, ISIS’s Syrian capital, showcases the mature integration of SDF ground forces and coalition airpower under SOF leadership. (p. 180–187) The SDF conducts multi-pronged assaults into the city while SOF-run strike cells provide continuous CAS, with devolved TEA enabling quick responses. (p. 133–134, p. 180–187) Air strikes target ISIS defensive networks, VBIED production, and command hubs, with significant reliance on precision munitions. At the same time, extensive destruction and civilian casualties occur, raising questions about proportionality and reconstruction. Target and level-of-effort data show heavy concentration of coalition strikes on Raqqa during this period. (p. 184–187) The operation underscores both the effectiveness and the destructive potential of modern CAS in urban environments when the adversary is embedded among civilians and uses coercive control over the population.

Key Points:

Raqqa is retaken by SDF forces with intensive coalition air and artillery support. (p. 180–187)
SOF strike cells and devolved TEA enable high-tempo CAS and responsive fires. (p. 133–134, p. 180–187)
Extensive targeting of VBIED facilities, command posts, and fighting positions. (p. 184–187)
Level-of-effort figures highlight the concentration of strikes and targets on Raqqa. (p. 184–187)
Civilian harm and urban destruction are significant, with long-term political and humanitarian implications.
Raqqa’s fall, combined with Mosul’s, effectively ends ISIS’s control of major urban centers.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

CAS as city-shaping tool, not just troop-protection fires.
Trade-offs between speed of clearing and civilian harm/physical destruction.
SOF–air integration as a flexible model for partner-enabled urban operations.

Limits Map (mini):

Legal/Normative: High scrutiny on civilian casualties; need for detailed CDE processes.
Operational: Difficulty evacuating civilians; heavy ISIS use of human shields.
Alliance/Political: Need to manage Turkish reactions to SDF gains and U.S. support.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS prepared defenses and willingness to fight to the last, slowing progress and driving higher fire usage.

Section 4.9: The Close Fight – Conclusions

Summary:

The conclusions of Chapter Four synthesize the close-fight cases to argue that airpower’s most decisive effects in OIR came through CAS and close counterland operations in support of partner ground forces. (p. 195) Strike cells, TEA delegation, and integration of surface fires are identified as key institutional innovations that increased responsiveness and effectiveness over time, albeit with uneven proficiency. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157) The authors emphasize that close fight effectiveness hinged on partner quality, political alignment, and adequate enablers; where these were lacking (early Tikrit), airpower delivered less. They also highlight the enduring challenge of civilian protection and urban destruction, suggesting that future operations must invest more in urban ISR, scalable munitions, and post-conflict planning. Finally, they argue that the prominence of CAS in OIR reflects the centrality of territorial control as the measure of success. (p. 299)

Key Points:

CAS and close counterland are the main vectors of airpower’s strategic contribution in OIR. (p. 195, p. 299)
Strike cells and devolved TEA significantly improved responsiveness but required training and standardization. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157)
Partner quality and political alignment strongly shaped what airpower could achieve.
Urban battles exposed limits of precision and the difficulty of minimizing civilian harm under intense fires.
The close fight’s primacy is tied to territory being the key measure of success. (p. 299)
Lessons point to the need for better doctrine, training, and capabilities for urban CAS and joint fires.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Efficacy: Strong tactical and operational results when conditions are right; limited ability to offset weak partners.
Limits: Airpower cannot write on a blank slate; it operates through and with partners.
Learning: Institutional changes (strike cells, TEA) as building blocks for future campaigns.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Territory as MoE privileges close fight and can overshadow deep operations. (p. 299)
Operational: Strain on ISR, C2, and logistics in protracted urban battles.
Legal/Normative: Civilian protection as a limiting factor on munitions and tactics.
Adversary Adaptation: Urban fortifications and human shields reduce air’s ability to achieve rapid, low-cost success.

Chapter Five: The Deep Fight – Deliberate-Targeting Operations

Summary:

Chapter Five examines four deep operations—Tidal Wave II, Point Blank, logistics interdiction between Syria and Iraq, and GLOC interdiction around Mosul—to assess how deliberate targeting of ISIS strategic systems affected the campaign. (p. 199–204, p. 226–245) The authors show that deep operations were designed to erode ISIS finances, logistics, and freedom of movement, thereby shaping the battlefield for the close fight. Using the strike data, they reconstruct patterns of targeting and effort, and compare these with public statements about progress. (p. 211–215, p. 229–231, p. 244–248) They find that deep attacks significantly reduced ISIS oil revenue and disrupted some logistics, but had limited direct impact on ISIS’s center of gravity—territorial control—because these systems were resilient and ISIS could rely on taxation, looting, and external funding. (p. 108, p. 299) Overall, the deep fight is portrayed as important but secondary: it extended the duration and cost of ISIS resistance but could not by itself deliver strategic victory.

Key Points:

Four major deep operations: Tidal Wave II (oil), Point Blank (cash depots), logistics interdiction between Syria/Iraq, and GLOC interdiction near Mosul. (p. 199–204, p. 226–245)
RAND data show concentrated strikes on oil and gas infrastructure and cash depots, with target groupings and validation against official counts. (p. 211–215, p. 229–231, p. 398–401)
ISIS revenues decline substantially, but mainly due to territorial losses; deep strikes accelerated but did not cause this alone. (p. 108, p. 299)
Logistics and GLOC interdiction campaigns cause tactical friction and delays but are limited by ISIS adaptation and the need to avoid excessive collateral damage. (p. 235–248)
Deep operations required significant ISR, planning, and specialized munitions, competing with close fight priorities.
The deep fight’s limited strategic payoff relative to its cost underscores the centrality of the close fight in this campaign. (p. 299)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Strategic attack vs counterland debate revisited: deep strikes important but not decisive in this context.
Metrics illusion: Counting trucks or cash depots destroyed does not necessarily translate into clear political effects.
Integration: Deep operations that support imminent ground offensives (e.g., Mosul GLOC interdiction) have more evident payoff.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Center of gravity is territory, not just finances; strategic attack has limited leverage. (p. 299)
Operational: Need to preserve infrastructure for postwar use and minimize civilian harm; limited target sets in some periods.
Intelligence: Difficulty in identifying true high-value nodes vs redundant or easily replaced assets.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS disperses, hides, re-routes logistics, and develops alternative revenue streams.

Section 5.1: Case Study Selection

Summary:

The authors chose four deep operations to illustrate different types of deliberate targeting: economic infrastructure (Tidal Wave II), cash holdings (Point Blank), cross-border logistics, and GLOCs near Mosul. (p. 202–204) The cases span different phases and operational contexts and allow analysis of how deliberate targeting evolved as the coalition’s intelligence and strike capabilities matured. They provide an opportunity to compare effects across different target systems and to see how deep operations interacted with close-fight campaigns. The selection is explicitly framed as representative, not comprehensive, but it captures the primary logic and limits of deep operations in OIR.

Key Points:

Four cases designed to reflect distinct target systems: oil, cash, logistics, and GLOCs. (p. 202–204)
Cases span Phase II primarily, when deep operations peak. (p. 199–204)
Allow comparison of operations that are loosely vs tightly linked to ground offensives.
Provide rich data for analysis of targeting patterns, strike intensity, and claimed effects. (p. 211–215, p. 229–231, p. 244–248)
Highlight the interplay between coalition intelligence improvements and deep-strike design.
Show how deep operations required coordination between CJTF, CFACC, and national capitals.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Use of case studies for strategic attack evaluation.
Importance of system-level thinking (oil system, cash system, logistics network).
Role of coalition politics and classification in shaping what can be targeted.

Limits Map (mini):

Analytic: Precise mapping of strikes to specific operations is imperfect; assumptions and approximations are needed. (p. 399–401)
Information: Incomplete visibility into ISIS financial flows and logistics networks.
Operational: Some high-value targets located in dense urban or politically sensitive areas; constrained.

Section 5.2: Evolution in Coalition Targeting Processes

Summary:

This section details how coalition targeting processes matured to support deep operations. Early on, target development for strategic systems was slow, constrained by limited intelligence and cautious ROE. Over time, the coalition developed better pattern-of-life analysis, network diagrams, and system-level targeting plans, particularly for oil and cash infrastructure. (p. 203–205) The authors explain how the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) process, combined with improved intelligence sharing and data fusion, enabled more sophisticated sequencing of strikes. They also note that classification and national caveats complicated targeting, as some allies could not access certain intelligence. (p. 203–205) The evolution mirrors improvements seen in the close fight—more delegation, better data—but deep targeting remained constrained by the requirement to limit civilian harm and preserve some infrastructure.

Key Points:

Targeting processes evolve from ad hoc to systemic, especially for oil and cash networks. (p. 203–205)
JIPTL and improved intelligence sharing allow more coherent deep campaigns.
Systemic targeting requires substantial ISR and analytical capacity, competing with close fight needs.
Classification and national caveats limit full coalition integration in some cases.
Deep operations increasingly synchronized with planned ground offensives to maximize operational payoff.
Legal and normative standards continue to limit strikes on certain facilities and urban targets.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Institutional learning in targeting and intelligence fusion.
Trade-offs between depth of analysis and speed of campaign execution.
Ongoing tension between transparency and secrecy in coalition operations.

Limits Map (mini):

Intelligence: Limited or uneven intelligence on financial and logistics networks; analysts must make assumptions.
Legal/Normative: Concerns about hitting oil infrastructure that supports civilian livelihoods; LOAC constraints.
Resource: Limited analytic manpower and ISR for complex system-targeting; prioritized against close fight needs.
Alliance/Political: Differing national appetites for risk and legal interpretations shape target approval.

Section 5.3: Starving ISIS’s Resource Base – Operation Tidal Wave II, October 2015–October 2017

Summary:

Tidal Wave II sought to degrade ISIS’s oil and gas infrastructure to reduce its revenue and warfighting capacity. (p. 204–215) Drawing on the CJTF-OIR data, the authors categorize oil and gas targets into production, processing/refining, and distribution/storage, and show a concentrated pattern of strikes near key oil fields and facilities, especially around Deir ez-Zur. (p. 398–400) Strike and target counts from their analysis closely match publicly released metrics, validating their methodology. (p. 399–401) Tidal Wave II destroyed hundreds of tanker trucks and numerous oil facilities, and ISIS’s oil revenue dropped significantly, though the authors note that territorial losses also played a major role. (p. 108, p. 399–401) They conclude that Tidal Wave II was operationally successful in reducing ISIS resource flows but had limited independent impact on territorial control; it made the fight harder for ISIS, not impossible.

Key Points:

Tidal Wave II targets oil production, processing, and distribution infrastructure and tanker fleets. (p. 204–215, p. 398–400)
RAND methodology groups >170 oil/gas target descriptions into system-related bins. (p. 398–400, Table D.3)
Strike and target counts for Tidal Wave II closely align with official figures, suggesting data validity. (p. 399–401, Table D.4)
ISIS oil revenues decline markedly, but territorial loss is also a major factor. (p. 108, p. 299)
The operation required careful weaponeering to limit environmental and civilian impact.
Tidal Wave II illustrates both the potential and the limits of economic warfare by air.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Economic coercion via airpower: how effective is it without simultaneous territorial loss?
Importance of data and validation for assessing strategic attack campaigns.
Deep operations often have indirect, lagged effects on battlefield outcomes.

Limits Map (mini):

Legal/Normative: Concerns about hitting civilian-dependent economic infrastructure; LOAC and postwar reconstruction considerations.
Intelligence: Need for precise knowledge of oil system nodes; risk of hitting empty or low-value facilities.
Adversary Adaptation: ISIS shifts to smaller, more dispersed oil production and alternative revenue streams.
Strategic: Financial pressure alone cannot break a territorially entrenched adversary.

Section 5.4: Finding, Fixing, and Finishing ISIS Finances – Operation Point Blank, January 2016–September 2017

Summary:

Point Blank targeted ISIS cash-storage sites and financial infrastructure, aiming to constrain its ability to pay fighters, buy supplies, and fund operations. (p. 226–231) Using intelligence on cash depots and associated facilities, the coalition conducted precision strikes on buildings believed to house large sums of currency. Strike and target data show a smaller but focused set of attacks, often in dense urban environments where CDE had to be carefully managed. (p. 229–231) The authors note that while Point Blank likely reduced ISIS’s liquidity and forced shifts in payment practices, its overall effect was limited by alternative revenue sources and the organization’s ability to adjust. They also highlight the difficulty of measuring success: claims about “millions of dollars destroyed” are inherently approximate. The operation underscores the challenges of financial targeting by air and the need for robust intelligence to avoid hitting empty or low-value sites.

Key Points:

Point Blank focused on cash depots and financial facilities, often in urban areas. (p. 226–231)
Strikes had to balance potential financial gains against risks to civilians and infrastructure.
RAND data show a relatively small number of targeted strikes with high claimed impact. (p. 229–231)
Effects included temporary salary delays and adaptation in ISIS payment mechanisms.
Measuring effectiveness is hard; estimates of money destroyed are uncertain.
The campaign demonstrates both promise and limitations of financial warfare from the air.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

The difficulty of linking economic damage to operational outcomes.
Limits of strategic attack metrics (e.g., dollars destroyed) for evaluating success.
Importance of interagency and financial-intelligence integration for such operations.

Limits Map (mini):

Intelligence: High uncertainty about actual cash volumes and locations; risk of hitting empty buildings.
Legal/Normative: Strikes in urban centers raise civilian-casualty risk; high CDE standards.
Strategic: ISIS ability to adapt financially; dependence on taxation and extortion rather than central cash depots alone.
Resource: High ISR and planning costs for a relatively small number of targets.

Section 5.5: Stopping ISIS Resupply – Interdicting Logistics and Supporting Networks Between Syria and Iraq, October 2015–February 2016

Summary:

This case examines efforts to interdict ISIS logistics flows and supporting networks across the Syria–Iraq border. (p. 235–239) The coalition targeted bridges, roads, culverts, and logistics hubs used by ISIS to move fighters, weapons, and supplies. RAND’s strike data show patterns of attacks on terrain and LOC targets in specific corridors, especially around Abu Kamal and Al-Qaim. (p. 235–239, p. 405–408) The authors conclude that these operations imposed friction and delays but could not fully isolate ISIS due to the porous border, alternative routes, and ISIS adaptation. Deep interdiction had some tactical and operational benefits (e.g., slowing reinforcements), particularly when synchronized with ground actions, but its strategic impact remained modest compared to the close fight.

Key Points:

Logistics interdiction targeted bridges, roads, and logistics nodes between Syria and Iraq. (p. 235–239)
Target group data show a focus on terrain and LOCs along key routes. (p. 405–408)
ISIS adapted by using alternate routes, smaller convoys, and night movement.
Operations were more effective when tied to specific ground offensives.
Deep interdiction required significant ISR and compete with other priorities.
Net effect: friction, not decisive isolation.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Classic air interdiction challenges in a permissive air environment but complex ground terrain.
Importance of linking deep operations to the close fight for meaningful results.
Adversary adaptation limits the long-term value of fixed-target interdiction.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Porous borders and numerous alternate routes; limited ability to “seal” the theater with air alone.
Intelligence: Difficulty mapping entire logistics network and anticipating alternate routes.
Adversary Adaptation: Dispersal and mobility reduce vulnerability to interdiction.
Resource: ISR and strike assets diverted from other missions for modest payoff.

Section 5.6: Disrupting ISIS Freedom of Maneuver – Interdiction of GLOCs Near Mosul, September 2016–June 2017

Summary:

This campaign aimed to interdict GLOCs around Mosul to isolate ISIS forces in the city and shape the battlefield for the urban offensive. (p. 240–248) The coalition targeted roads, bridges, VBIED factories, and tactical vehicles in the approaches to Mosul, with strikes increasing in intensity leading up to the offensive. (p. 242–245, p. 248) RAND data show a focus on VBIED targets and LOCs, with a noticeable spike in strikes in late 2016–early 2017. (p. 244–248) The authors assess that this interdiction had more direct operational payoff than earlier logistics campaigns because it was tightly tied to a major ground offensive, reducing ISIS’s ability to reinforce or exfiltrate. Nonetheless, ISIS still managed some resupply and movement through alternative routes and tunnels; airpower did not entirely seal Mosul. The campaign illustrates the best-case scenario for interdiction: closely integrated with the close fight.

Key Points:

GLOC interdiction around Mosul targeted roads, bridges, and VBIED infrastructure. (p. 240–245)
RAND data show increased strikes on VBIEDs and LOCs before and during the Mosul offensive. (p. 244–248)
Operations helped reduce ISIS mobility and VBIED threat but did not entirely isolate Mosul.
Interdiction effectiveness was enhanced by tight integration with the Mosul ground plan.
The case illustrates how deep and close fights can reinforce one another.
Constraints on hitting urban infrastructure and civilian-use roads limited the extent of interdiction.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Synergy between deep and close fights when deliberately planned together.
Limits of air isolation in modern urban campaigns.
Importance of VBIED-focused targeting in contemporary urban warfare.

Limits Map (mini):

Legal/Normative: Constraints on attacking infrastructure with civilian uses; need for careful CDE.
Operational: ISIS’s ability to use secondary roads and tunnels; impossible to fully seal the city from the air.
Adversary Adaptation: Rapid repair, use of ferries, and nighttime movement.
Resource: Sustaining high sortie rates for interdiction while supporting intense CAS in Mosul.

Section 5.7: The Deep Fight – Conclusions

Summary:

The authors conclude that the deep fight in OIR produced meaningful but limited strategic effects, especially compared to its impact in traditional industrial wars. (p. 252, p. 299) Economic and financial targeting (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank) constrained ISIS’s resources and increased the cost of operations, while logistics and GLOC interdiction created friction and shaped ground battles. However, because ISIS’s main source of power was territorial control and coercive governance, deep operations could not by themselves break the caliphate. (p. 299) Deep strikes were most effective when tightly linked to the close fight (e.g., Mosul GLOC interdiction) or when targeting clearly irreplaceable nodes; otherwise, they faced diminishing returns due to redundancy and adaptation. The chapter suggests that future campaigns must be realistic about what deep operations can achieve in proto-state conflicts and prioritize integration with ground maneuver.

Key Points:

Deep operations had operational but limited strategic impact in destroying the caliphate. (p. 252, p. 299)
Economic and financial strikes reduced ISIS revenues but did not independently end its territorial control. (p. 108, p. 299)
Interdiction worked best when synchronized with major ground operations. (p. 240–248)
ISIS adapted to deep strikes, reducing their marginal utility over time.
Deep operations consumed significant ISR and strike capacity, posing opportunity costs vis-à-vis CAS.
The authors advocate for realistic expectations of strategic attack in similar conflicts.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Confirms critiques (e.g., Pape, etc.) that strategic bombing alone rarely yields decisive political outcomes, especially against nonstate actors.
Highlights need to reframe deep operations as shaping, not decisive, tools.
Emphasizes integration and prioritization in resource-limited campaigns.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Territory and local governance as core centers of gravity limit deep strike leverage. (p. 299)
Operational: Limited target systems that are both high value and low collateral; redundancy in ISIS networks.
Adversary Adaptation: Rapid dispersal and evolutionary tactics.
Resource/Time: Deep operations compete with the close fight for scarce ISR, PGMs, and planning capacity.

Chapter Six: Enabling the Fight – Defensive Counterair and Air Mobility Operations

Summary:

Chapter Six examines enabling air missions—DCA and air mobility (airlift and aerial refueling)—that underpinned both close and deep fights. (p. 257–260, p. 273–285) The DCA section describes how the presence of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian aircraft in the theater created a rare context where U.S. forces had to manage contested airspace without a full-scale SEAD campaign, culminating in incidents such as the June 18, 2017 shootdown of a Syrian Su-22, the first U.S. air-to-air kill of a manned aircraft since Operation Allied Force. (p. 267–268, p. 298) Air mobility analysis shows that tankers and airlift were critical to sustaining long-range operations from Gulf bases and carriers, moving cargo and personnel, and allowing persistent CAS and ISR coverage; tankers, in particular, emerged as a key limiting factor, captured in the slogan “No Kick Ass Without Tanker Gas.” (p. 273–290, p. 293) The chapter argues that these enabling missions were often the tightest bottlenecks in OIR and will be even more critical in future contested environments.

Key Points:

DCA missions involved managing complex, multi-actor airspace with Russian, Syrian, Iranian, and coalition aircraft. (p. 260–268)
The June 18 Su-22 shootdown marks the first U.S. manned-aircraft kill since Kosovo, underscoring the re-emergence of contested airspace issues. (p. 267–268, p. 298)
Tanker sorties and fuel offloaded were essential to enabling long-range CAS, ISR, and deep strikes; tanker demand often outstripped other capacities. (p. 273–290, p. 293)
Airlift moved substantial cargo and personnel, especially into Iraq, and supported humanitarian missions like Mount Sinjar. (p. 273–285, p. 282)
AFCENT airpower summaries reveal fluctuations and data inconsistencies, but overall show sustained high levels of enabling activity during Phase II. (p. 401–403, p. 294–295)
The chapter highlights that enabling functions are foundational, not ancillary, and require deliberate planning and investment.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Domain interplay: Air superiority is not automatic; DCA and airspace management are key even against weak air defenses.
Enablers as constraints: Tankers and airlift as primary limits on airpower employment.
The importance of logistics and sustainment in long-distance, partner-centric campaigns.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Complex, contested airspace; need to avoid incidents with Russian and Syrian forces; must manage deconfliction and escalation. (p. 263–268)
Resource: Tanker and airlift fleets are finite; demand from multiple theaters stretches capacity. (p. 273–290, p. 293)
Technological: Reliance on vulnerable basing and tanker tracks in permissive but geographically constrained environments.
Political: Avoiding escalation with Russia and Iran constrains DCA ROE and tactics.

Section 6.1: Analytic Approach

Summary:

The analytic approach section explains how the authors use AFCENT airpower summaries to study DCA and mobility. (p. 257–260, p. 401–403) Because the summaries report cumulative yearly totals, RAND had to derive monthly figures by differencing sequential reports and correct for discrepancies where recalculated totals created spikes or dips. (p. 401–403) They assume that CAS/strike sorties and weapon-release statistics reflect coalition aircraft under CFACC control and that reporting changes (e.g., classification of artillery as “strikes”) need to be considered when comparing across time. (p. 395–397, p. 401–403) For mobility, they pay particular attention to tanker sorties, fuel offloaded, and airlift tonnage for Iraq. This methodology provides a macro-level picture of enabling activity across OIR’s phases, supporting their argument about the centrality of enablers.

Key Points:

AFCENT summaries are cumulative; RAND derived monthly totals by differencing. (p. 401–403)
Data inconsistencies required assumptions regarding delayed reporting and recalculations. (p. 401–403)
CAS/strike and weapons-release statistics assumed to include coalition aircraft under CFACC, manned and unmanned (with noted labeling changes). (p. 403)
Tanker and airlift data extracted to track enabling activity across phases. (p. 273–285, p. 290)
The analysis uses these metrics to compare enabling effort with combat activity over time.
Limitations acknowledged, but data still valuable for understanding overall patterns.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Measurement of effort vs effect; metrics as proxies.
Importance of understanding data definitions when using official statistics.
The challenge of integrating enabling metrics into overall assessments of airpower.

Limits Map (mini):

Information: Recalculation and delayed reporting cause apparent anomalies; require assumptions to interpret. (p. 401–403)
Analytic: CAS vs strike sortie definitions shift over time; comparability issues. (p. 403)
Resource: Data exclude some non-CFACC-controlled aircraft, giving incomplete picture.
Methodological: Cannot fully disaggregate mobility effort by specific operation.

Section 6.2: DCA

Summary:

The DCA section examines the coalition’s approach to managing contested Syrian airspace, especially after Russian intervention in 2015. (p. 260–268) The coalition had to balance freedom of action with avoidance of escalation and incidents; deconfliction channels with Russia became crucial. Complex patterns of aircraft tracks, ordnance delivery, and “no-go” deconfliction bubbles emerged, reflected in maps and timeline graphics. (p. 258, p. 263–268) The authors describe incidents of harassment, near misses, and aggressive behavior by Russian and Syrian aircraft, culminating in the June 18, 2017 Su-22 shootdown after it attacked SDF forces near Tabqah—marking the first U.S. manned-aircraft kill since 1999. (p. 267–268, p. 298) The campaign provided U.S. pilots with rare real-world experience in air-to-air engagements and highlighted the need for robust ROE, clear C2, and flexible DCA tactics in multi-actor environments.

Key Points:

Russian and Syrian air activities in Syria transformed OIR from a purely permissive air environment to a managed contested one. (p. 260–268)
Deconfliction lines, communication channels, and rules were established to avoid inadvertent clashes. (p. 263–268)
Incidents of aggressive Russian and Syrian behavior pushed the coalition to refine DCA tactics and ROE.
The June 18 Su-22 shootdown near Tabqah represented a significant DCA engagement and escalation management challenge. (p. 267–268, p. 298)
These experiences allowed aircrews to practice air-to-air tactics under real conditions, albeit against less capable adversaries. (p. 298)
DCA operations must be planned even in “permissive” environments where rival major powers operate.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Escalation control and signaling in contested airspace.
Training and doctrinal implications for DCA in gray-zone conflicts.
DCA as an underappreciated but essential pillar of air campaigns.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Need to avoid escalation with Russia and a direct clash with the Syrian regime; strong strategic constraint.
Operational: Complex multi-actor airspace; limited ability to sanitize all threats.
Legal/Normative: ROE that only permit engagement under certain conditions, reducing preemptive options.
Technological: Limited number of aircraft and sensors dedicated to DCA given other demands.

Section 6.3: Air Mobility Operations

Summary:

This section details how airlift and aerial refueling enabled OIR’s geographically extended operations. (p. 273–285) Airlift moved cargo and personnel, particularly into Iraq, and supported humanitarian missions like Mount Sinjar, where transport aircraft delivered supplies while fighters provided escort. (p. 282–283) Tanker sorties and fuel offloaded were critical to CAS, ISR, and deep strikes launched from Gulf bases and carriers; RAND’s analysis notes that tanker demand surged during major operations, with OIR air refueling sorties peaking when urban battles and deep operations overlapped. (p. 288–290) The authors highlight tankers as a key constraint, quoting the saying “No Kick Ass Without Tanker Gas.” (p. 293) Air mobility assets faced competing demands from other CENTCOM operations (Afghanistan, Gulf air defense, Yemen), further stressing capacity. (Appendix B, p. 352) The section argues that enablers like tankers may be the true limiting factor in similar future campaigns.

Key Points:

Airlift supported both combat and humanitarian missions, including Mount Sinjar airdrops. (p. 282–283)
Tankers enabled long-range CAS, ISR, and deep strikes from distant bases and carriers; refueling sorties correlate with campaign peaks. (p. 273–290)
Data show substantial tanker activity, with fluctuations that reflect recalculations and operational surges. (p. 401–403, p. 290)
Tankers and airlift had to support multiple operations across CENTCOM, not just OIR. (Appendix B, p. 352)
Air mobility operations were essential to the viability of the limited-liability strategy, allowing distant basing and minimal in-theater footprint.
Tankers, not fighters, often represented the most critical resource constraint. (p. 293)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

The logistical backbone of airpower as a strategic asset.
Importance of global posture and basing to the feasibility of partner-centric campaigns.
Resource competition across theaters for mobility assets.

Limits Map (mini):

Resource: Finite tanker and airlift fleets; high demand from multiple theaters.
Operational: Long distances and limited suitable bases increase reliance on tankers; vulnerability of tanker tracks.
Strategic: Limited-liability strategy depends on mobility; any disruption would force reconsideration of campaign design.
Technological: Aging tanker fleets and limited surge capacity.

Section 6.4: Conclusion

Summary:

The chapter concludes that DCA and air mobility were indispensable enablers of both close and deep fights in OIR and may represent the most critical constraints in similar future campaigns. (p. 292–293) While DCA did not play a central kinetic role, it was crucial for keeping airspace safe and managing escalation with Russia and the Syrian regime. Air mobility—especially tankers—allowed the coalition to apply sustained airpower from distant bases without a large in-theater footprint, aligning with the limited-liability strategy. (p. 273–290, p. 293) The authors argue that debates about airpower effectiveness often overlook these enabling missions, which are vital for campaign feasibility. They recommend that future planning prioritize tanker and airlift capacity and DCA readiness, especially as near-peer competition increases.

Key Points:

Enabling missions are foundational, not ancillary, to air campaign success. (p. 292–293)
DCA provided essential airspace control and escalation management. (p. 260–268, p. 298)
Air mobility enabled partner-centric, limited-footprint strategy; tankers were often the binding constraint. (p. 273–290, p. 293)
Future air campaigns will likely face even greater demands on enablers in contested environments. (p. 292–293)
Assessments of airpower that ignore enablers are incomplete.
The chapter sets up the final lessons and recommendations regarding capability investments.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Limits on airpower often reside in enablers, not shooters.
Strategic posture and logistics as key determinants of operational options.
Continuity with past campaigns (e.g., Kosovo, Libya) where tankers and basing were critical.

Limits Map (mini):

Resource: Enablers as finite and stressed resources; need for investment and prioritization.
Strategic: Reliance on permissive basing and airspace unlikely to hold in future near-peer conflicts.
Operational: Complexity of multi-actor airspace and long lines of communication.
Technological: Aging fleets and limited stealthy or survivable enabler platforms.

Chapter Seven: Airpower Against the Islamic State – Lessons and Recommendations for Future Air Wars

Summary:

The final chapter synthesizes findings and offers lessons and recommendations. It begins by noting that by March 23, 2019, CJTF-OIR had flown roughly 88,000 strike sorties and dropped more than 165,000 munitions, and that “on the whole, OIR was a success, and airpower was critical to this outcome.” (p. 293, p. 298) The authors stress that airpower’s most decisive contribution came in the close fight, where it enabled local partners to retake territory, while deep operations and enabling missions shaped but did not independently determine outcomes. (p. 298–299) They argue that the campaign demonstrates both the possibilities and limits of a limited-liability, partner-centric strategy and that political constraints, not simply underutilization, drove much of the air campaign’s design. (p. 6, p. 299) Recommendations focus on improving CAS and joint fires in urban warfare, strengthening enablers (tankers, ISR, C2), investing in data and assessment tools, and preparing for future campaigns against both nonstate and near-peer adversaries where similar demands will arise—albeit under more contested conditions. (p. 298–308)

Key Points:

OIR achieved its primary objective of destroying ISIS’s territorial caliphate, with airpower central to success. (p. 293, p. 298)
Territory was the key measure of success, which in turn meant the close fight was prioritized over the deep fight. (p. 299)
Political and strategic constraints shaped air campaign design; simply loosening ROE would not have made airpower decisively independent. (p. 6, p. 299)
Recommendations emphasize urban CAS, joint fires integration, improved enablers, and better assessment mechanisms. (p. 298–308)
The chapter situates OIR within a lineage of limited air wars and suggests that its lessons are particularly relevant for future partner-centric operations.
It underscores the need to prepare for air campaigns where air superiority is contested and enablers are vulnerable.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Realism about airpower: strong but bounded instrument.
Importance of MoE choice (territory) in shaping campaign priorities. (p. 299)
Learning and adaptation as continuous processes across campaigns.
Anticipation of future limited wars where similar patterns reappear.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Airpower cannot fully compensate for weak political orders or guarantee long-term stability.
Operational: Enablers and partners as enduring constraints.
Resource: Finite PGM, ISR, and tanker capacity; need for prioritization.
Adversary Adaptation: Expectation that future adversaries will adopt similar tactics (urban sanctuaries, human shields).

Section 7.1: Airpower Findings and Lessons from OIR

Summary:

This section distills key findings. It emphasizes that airpower was indispensable to defeating ISIS’s caliphate, but its effectiveness was inseparable from the limited-liability, partner-centric strategy and the terrain and political context of Iraq and Syria. (p. 298–299) The authors note that the close fight, not the deep fight, was decisive because eliminating ISIS’s proto-state made territory the key measure of success, and thus CAS and counterland operations had the most direct impact. (p. 299) Deep operations against finances and logistics had important but secondary effects. They also highlight that political and ROE constraints, while sometimes slowing operations, were not the primary reason for the campaign’s duration. (p. 6, p. 298–299) Lessons include the importance of enablers, the need to prepare for urban joint fires, and the value of flexible C2 arrangements like strike cells and delegated TEA.

Key Points:

“On the whole, OIR was a success, and airpower was critical to this outcome.” (p. 298)
“Because eliminating ISIS’s protostate was paramount, territory was the key measure of success in OIR, which in turn meant that the close fight was prioritized over the deep fight.” (p. 299)
Deep operations had limited effect on ISIS’s main center of gravity but contributed by degrading finances and freedom of movement. (p. 299)
Political constraints shaped, but did not cripple, airpower; the campaign’s length reflected politics, partner capacity, and urban terrain. (p. 6, p. 298–299)
Key lessons: invest in urban CAS, improve joint fires and strike-cell-like constructs, reinforce enablers, and develop better assessment tools. (p. 298–308)
The experience underscores the need to integrate close, deep, and enabling operations in future conflicts.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Limit-aware airpower: working effectively within political and legal bounds.
MoE-driven priorities: territory as central measure shapes resource allocation.
Learning across domains: CAS, deep strike, and enablers all refined during OIR.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Territorial destruction as goal; airpower cannot ensure political reconstruction.
Operational: CAS and joint fires in cities remain high-risk, resource-intensive.
Resource: Tankers, ISR, and PGMs as key limiting factors.
Legal/Normative: Civilian protection continues to restrict some high-payoff target options.

Section 7.2: Recommendations

Summary:

The recommendations section translates findings into guidance for USAF, the joint force, and allies. (p. 306–308) It calls for doctrinal development around strike cells and JAGIC-like capabilities, emphasizing standardized training and integration of legal, ISR, and fires expertise. It stresses the need to improve CAS and joint fires for dense urban environments, including better ISR, scalable munitions, and realistic joint training. The authors recommend investments in enablers—particularly tankers, airlift, and resilient C2/ISR architectures—anticipating more contested environments in future wars. (p. 306–308) They also advocate for better data-collection and assessment systems (building on the CJTF-OIR and AFCENT experiences) to allow more rigorous evaluation of air operations in real time. Finally, they suggest planning for air campaigns that support partner-centric operations against both nonstate and near-peer adversaries.

Key Points:

Standardize and train strike-cell-like constructs and JAGICs to improve joint fires integration. (p. 306–308)
Enhance CAS and joint fires for urban operations with improved ISR, munitions, and joint training.
Invest in enablers (tankers, airlift, resilient ISR/C2) as core capabilities, not support extras. (p. 293, p. 306–308)
Develop better metrics and data systems to assess effectiveness and inform decisions in real time. (p. 8, p. 393–403)
Prepare for campaigns where air superiority is contested and enablers are at risk. (p. 306–308)
Strengthen partnerships and build partner capacity to work with airpower.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Institutionalization of lessons via doctrine and training.
Recognizing enablers as main efforts in planning and investment.
Assessment culture: using data and analysis to guide operations, not just narrate them after the fact.

Limits Map (mini):

Resource: Budget and force-structure constraints limit how quickly enabler capacity can grow.
Organizational: Changes in doctrine and training require institutional buy-in.
Strategic: Need to reconcile investments for limited wars with great-power competition priorities.
Information: Building robust data systems demands cultural changes and sustained effort.

Section 7.3: Conclusion

Summary:

The concluding section situates OIR within the broader history of U.S. airpower and looks ahead. (p. 308) It argues that OIR confirms trends seen since 1991: airpower is central to U.S. military strategy, especially in limited wars, but usually operates as part of a broader joint and coalition approach rather than as a standalone strategic tool. (p. 297–298, p. 308) The authors note that debates from earlier campaigns—about the proper balance between CAS and strategic attack, the importance of enablers, and the need for realistic expectations of airpower—have resurfaced in OIR and will likely persist. (p. 6, p. 298–299) They close by emphasizing that OIR’s lessons are particularly relevant as the U.S. prepares for potential conflicts against both nonstate and near-peer adversaries, where airpower will again be asked to deliver results under constraints.

Key Points:

OIR fits into a pattern where airpower is central but not decisive on its own, especially in limited wars. (p. 297–298, p. 308)
Old debates about the roles and limits of airpower remain salient, with OIR providing new empirical grounding. (p. 6, p. 298–299)
Airpower will likely continue to operate in partner-centric, coalition frameworks.
Preparing for future conflicts requires integrating lessons from OIR into doctrine, capability development, and training.
The authors stress continuity and change: much is familiar, but the intensity of urban CAS and the centrality of enablers are growing.
The book positions itself as a starting point for continued study, not the final word. (p. 6)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Continuity with Desert Storm, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya in airpower’s role.
Limits and potential: airpower is powerful but bounded by politics, partners, and context.
Need for ongoing learning and institutional adaptation.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: Airpower cannot fully control political outcomes; must be integrated into broader strategies.
Operational: Urban terrain, partner capacity, and contested airspace remain key constraints.
Resource: Future campaigns may face tighter budgets and more contested enablers.
Adversary Adaptation: Future opponents will likely emulate ISIS’s use of cities and human shields.

Appendix A: Timeline of the Air Campaign in Operation Inherent Resolve

Summary:

Appendix A provides a detailed timeline of political and military events related to OIR, mapping ISIS actions, coalition responses, and key decisions from pre-2014 through 2019. (p. 309–348) It includes ISIS’s seizure of major cities, the start of U.S. air operations, the formal naming of OIR, establishment of CJTF-OIR, major battles (Kobani, Ramadi, Mosul, Raqqa), and key political announcements (e.g., Trump’s withdrawal statement and subsequent partial reversal). (p. 348–349) The timeline also notes events like al-Baghdadi’s death and Turkish operations against the SDF. (p. 348–349) This chronological framework helps connect the detailed campaign analysis to broader political and strategic developments.

Key Points:

Lists major ISIS advances, coalition strikes, and political decisions in chronological order. (p. 309–348)
Includes key inflection points: first U.S. strikes, OIR designation, CJTF-OIR establishment, major battles, and final territorial defeat. (p. 348–349)
Captures post-2019 developments like Turkish incursions and al-Baghdadi’s death. (p. 348–349)
Provides context for understanding changes in campaign phases and air activity.
Illustrates the interweaving of tactical, operational, and political events.
Useful for mapping specific case studies to broader campaign milestones.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

The campaign’s multi-year, multi-phase character.
The interplay of domestic and international politics with operational decisions.
Reinforces the idea that timing matters: when decisions are taken greatly affects campaign dynamics.

Limits Map (mini):

Analytic: Timeline is descriptive; it does not analyze causality.
Information: Some events are summarized; not all relevant episodes are listed.
Strategic: Highlights how political announcements can disrupt or reorient operations (e.g., withdrawal decisions).

Appendix B: Commanding and Controlling Airpower Against the Islamic State

Summary:

Appendix B describes the evolving C2 structure for OIR, including CENTCOM, CJTF-OIR, CFACC/AFCENT, CJFLCC, and SOJTF, and how their relationships changed over time. (p. 349–357) Early in the campaign, ARCENT was designated JFLCC, later becoming CJFLCC and then CJTF-OIR under LTG Terry, with CFACC as a supporting, not subordinate, commander. (p. 349–352, p. 71–72) The appendix explains the use of Joint Air Component Coordination Elements (JACCEs), CJOCs in Baghdad and Erbil, and SOJTF structures in Syria, illustrating a complex web of supported/supporting relationships. (p. 350–355) It notes tensions and inefficiencies, such as the challenge of having the CFACC as a theater-level commander supporting CJTF-OIR rather than acting as an embedded JFACC. By 2018, CJFLCC is deactivated and its staff integrated into CJTF-OIR, further simplifying C2. (p. 356–357) The appendix underscores that C2 design had significant implications for air–ground integration and targeting.

Key Points:

ARCENT initially leads as JFLCC, then CJFLCC, before CJTF-OIR is formally established under LTG Terry. (p. 349–352, p. 71–72)
CFACC/AFCENT remains a theater-level supporting commander, not directly subordinate to CJTF-OIR; this is unusual relative to some doctrinal models. (p. 352, p. 71–72)
Command relationships are depicted in diagrams for 2014–2015, 2015–2017, and 2018–2019, showing evolving structures. (p. 351–355)
JACCEs link CJTF-OIR HQ in Kuwait with CAOC in Qatar; CJOCs in Baghdad and Erbil oversee Iraqi and Kurdish operations. (p. 350–352)
SOJTF and CJSOTFs manage special operations, including SOF-run strike cells and leadership targeting campaigns. (p. 354–355)
Deactivation of CJFLCC in 2018 and merging its staff into CJTF-OIR reflect the campaign’s transition and COD streamlining. (p. 356–357)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

C2 design as a major determinant of airpower effectiveness.
Army-dominant leadership in a largely air-centric combat role due to political limits on U.S. ground fighting. (p. 49–50, p. 71–72, p. 49–50)
The complexity of integrating SOF, land, and air in coalition campaigns.

Limits Map (mini):

Organizational: CFACC as supporting but not subordinate to CJTF creates seams; doctrine vs practice tension. (p. 352)
Operational: Complexity of multiple CJOCs, SOJTF, and CAOC; potential for coordination gaps.
Political: Preference for ground-service leadership of CJTF reflects CENTCOM culture and political emphasis on an “Iraqi and Syrian war.” (p. 49–50)
Information: Different commands have different visibility into intelligence and operations.

Appendix C: Operation Inherent Resolve Air Order of Battle

Summary:

Appendix C lists fixed-wing aircraft participating in or supporting OIR and the deployment timelines of aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. (p. 357–392) It provides an unclassified air order of battle, identifying aircraft types, roles (fighters, bombers, ISR, tankers, airlift, etc.), and coalition contributions, along with dates and locations of major naval deployments. (p. 357–359, p. 415) This appendix underscores the breadth of coalition airpower, including U.S., European, and regional partners, and highlights the rotation of carrier strike groups in the Arabian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean. (p. 415) It provides useful context for understanding the range of capabilities available and the burden of sustaining long-term operations.

Key Points:

Lists fixed-wing aircraft by type and participating nation. (p. 357–359)
Includes both combat and enabling platforms (fighters, bombers, ISR, tankers, airlift).
Provides a table of carrier and amphibious ship deployments and their locations and dates. (p. 415)
Highlights the global and multi-service nature of the air component.
Shows rotation patterns that affect surge capacity and cover for different campaigns phases.
Illustrates the heavy reliance on U.S. carriers and allied contributions.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Coalition burden-sharing and the reality that U.S. enablers remain central.
Relationship between force structure and campaign design, including the ability to surge airpower.
Provides empirical grounding for discussions about fleet mix and readiness.

Limits Map (mini):

Resource: Sustained deployments stress aircraft and crews; limits on how many high-demand platforms can be committed.
Strategic: Naval deployments convey political messages beyond OIR; balancing global commitments.
Operational: The OOB is static; it does not reveal sortie rates or availability, only presence.

Appendix D: Data Collection, Assumptions, and Application

Summary:

Appendix D elaborates on the data methodology summarized in Chapter One. (p. 393–403) It explains the construction of the RAND CJTF-OIR strike-release data set and the AFCENT airpower summary data set, detailing their scope, limitations, and grouping strategies. (p. 393–397, p. 395–401) The authors describe how they aggregated nearly 33,000 strikes and >81,000 targets, grouped targets into four main categories (facilities/resources, military forces, terrain/LOCs, vehicles), and created additional bins for oil and gas targets in Tidal Wave II. (p. 398–400, p. 405–408) They discuss inconsistencies such as changes in the definition of “strike” (e.g., inclusion of artillery in 2017) and cumulative reporting in AFCENT summaries, as well as assumptions made to standardize data. (p. 395–397, p. 401–403) The appendix ends with snapshot figures summarizing strikes and targets by city and category, and weapons released over time. (p. 405–410, p. 427–428)

Key Points:

CJTF-OIR strike releases provide daily strike and target data by city; AFCENT summaries provide monthly sortie and weapons data. (p. 393–395)
Strike releases initially included only air-delivered strikes; later they included rocket artillery and eventually all ground-based tactical artillery. (p. 395–397)
RAND grouped ~1,000 target descriptions into 773 types and then into four main bins. (p. 398–399)
Additional bins for oil and gas targets (production; processing/refining; distribution/storage) support Tidal Wave II analysis. (p. 398–400)
Assumptions were needed to handle multi-day releases, ambiguous entries, and recalculated AFCENT statistics. (p. 397–398, p. 401–403)
Summary snapshots show that military-force targets were the most common (35% of total), and that strikes were distributed across many cities, with Mosul and Raqqa receiving the largest shares. (p. 405–408, p. 427–428)

Cross-Cutting Themes:

The difficulty of measuring airpower with imperfect data.
Necessity of clear assumptions and transparency in defense analysis.
Importance of target categorization and MoE selection for interpreting strike data.

Limits Map (mini):

Information: Data inconsistencies and evolving definitions; results must be interpreted cautiously. (p. 395–397, p. 401–403)
Analytic: Aggregation and binning obscure some nuance but are necessary for tractability.
Methodological: Cannot fully tie strikes to specific operations or distinguish primary vs incidental targets. (p. 396–397)
Resource: Data collection and coding are labor-intensive and dependent on open sources.

🧱 Limits Typology (case-specific)

For OIR’s air war:

Political Limits:
- No large-scale U.S. ground combat units; reliance on limited-liability, partner-centric strategy. Fixed at the strategic level by domestic politics and presidential decisions. (p. 9–10)
- Need to maintain a broad coalition, balance Turkish concerns over Kurdish partners, and avoid escalation with Russia/Iran constrained basing, targeting, and partner choices.
- Adjustability: limited; some flexibility in adviser placement and national caveats, but basic structure fixed.
Legal/Normative Limits:
- Strong LOAC and civilian-protection standards constrained target selection and munitions, especially in urban battles (Mosul, Raqqa).
- Requirement for Iraqi and Kurdish officers in strike cells to approve every bomb in Iraq added a host-nation legitimacy layer. (p. 25–26)
- Largely fixed; partially mitigated by better ISR, weaponeering, and CDE tools.
Strategic Limits:
- Goal of “enduring defeat” defined as territorial destruction of the caliphate, which privileged the close fight over deep strategic attack. (p. 9, p. 299)
- Desire to avoid long-term occupation and nation-building restricted options to shape post-conflict governance.
- Mostly fixed; could adjust emphasis (close vs deep) but not underlying ends.
Operational Limits:
- Basing distances from main Gulf sites and carriers increased reliance on tankers and limited responsiveness in some areas. (p. 39–40, p. 273–290)
- Complex C2 with Army-led CJTF and supporting CFACC created seams in targeting and air–ground integration. (Appendix B, p. 352–355)
- Urban terrain and partner capability ceilings limited achievable tempo.
- Adjustability: moderate via improved C2, TEA, strike cells, additional bases (Q-West, etc.), and better partner training.
Technological/Capability Limits:
- Finite stocks of PGMs, ISR platforms, and tankers; ability to surge limited by global force structure. (p. 273–290, p. 293)
- Limited availability of scalable, low-collateral munitions for dense urban environments drove tough trade-offs.
- Adjustability: partial via procurement, surge policies, and innovation, but constrained in the near term.
Intelligence/Information Limits:
- Weak early knowledge of ISIS networks and urban layouts; incomplete data on finances and logistics; imperfect strike-release and sortie data. (p. 8, p. 393–403)
- Could not always distinguish primary vs incidental targets; uncertain MoE. (p. 396–397, p. 418)
- Adjustability: improved through ISR, data fusion, and learning but never fully eliminated.
Adversary Adaptation Limits:
- ISIS dispersed forces, used tunnels, human shields, and urban sanctuaries, reducing the payoff from deep strikes and complicating CAS. (p. 63–65, p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
- Adapted financially and logistically to Tidal Wave II/Point Blank and interdiction. (p. 108, p. 299)
- Partly adjustable by changing tactics (e.g., VBIED-focused targeting, urban ISR), but structural.
Resource/Time Limits:
- Protracted campaign required sustained sortie, PGM, and tanker output; global demand for air assets (Afghanistan, Gulf air defense, Yemen) constrained OIR. (Appendix B, p. 352)
- Political patience and coalition cohesion limited tolerance for extended, high-casualty operations.
- Adjustability: some via improved efficiency and reprioritization, but not unlimited.

For each limit, adaptations included: strike cells and TEA devolution for ROE and adviser constraints; Tidal Wave II and GLOC interdiction for financial/logistics limitations; increased investment in ISR and PGMs for intelligence/legal needs; and refined C2 to mitigate Army–air seams.

📏 Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)

What they tracked then:
- Territory: City and district control; the key MoE—“Because eliminating ISIS’s protostate was paramount, territory was the key measure of success in OIR.” (p. 299)
- Sorties & weapons released: AFCENT summaries, often used as proxies for effort. (p. 294–295)
- Targets destroyed: CJTF-OIR strike releases, grouped by target type (military forces, facilities/resources, terrain/LOCs, vehicles). (p. 398–399)
- ISIS revenue: Estimated oil and non-oil revenue, used to assess effectiveness of Tidal Wave II and Point Blank. (p. 108, p. 204–230)
- Civilian casualties: Monitored through internal processes and external reporting; a key political and normative indicator.
- Partner force performance: Qualitative assessments of ISF, CTS, Peshmerga, and SDF effectiveness.
Better MoE today (with rationale):
- Integrated territorial & governance metrics: Not just km² but functioning local governance and security, to capture “enduring” defeat.
- Civilian harm ratio: Civilian casualties per ISIS fighter or per objective achieved, to link tactical choices to strategic legitimacy.
- Partner capacity indices: Training levels, C2, and corruption metrics to gauge sustainability of gains.
- System disruption indices: Degree of resilience in ISIS logistical and financial networks after deep operations, beyond simple counts of trucks or cash depots.
- Campaign efficiency metrics: Effects (territory reclaimed, ISIS units destroyed) per unit of PGM, sortie, and tanker output, to assess resource use.
- Time-to-effect: Lag between deep operations and observable impacts on ISIS operational behavior and territorial defense.
Evidence summary:
- RAND’s data show ~33,000 strikes and >81,000 targets engaged, distributed across ~30 main areas, with military forces as the largest target group (35%). (p. 405–408, p. 427–428)
- Overall, Mosul and Raqqa received the largest share of strikes, aligning with their centrality as ISIS capitals. (p. 427–428)
- Airpower activity peaked during Phase II and declined in Phase III, matching territorial trends. (p. 294–295)
- Deep operations reduced ISIS’s oil revenue but did not independently determine territorial outcomes. (p. 108, p. 299)
- The authors emphasize that even with robust data, causal attribution remains difficult and must be approached cautiously. (p. 8, p. 396–397, p. 418)

🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives

U.S. Political Leadership (Obama and Trump Administrations)

Role / position: Set strategic objectives (“degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS,” later “enduring defeat”) and constraints on force employment. (p. 9, p. 27–33)
Key perspectives / assumptions: Avoid large ground wars; use airpower and local partners to fight ISIS; maintain coalition legitimacy; avoid escalation with Russia/Iran.
Evolution of stance: Obama moves from limited protection/humanitarian missions to a broader but still limited-liability strategy; Trump emphasizes accelerating ISIS’s defeat and loosening some constraints while also announcing withdrawals that complicate operations. (Appendix A, p. 348–349)
Influence on outcomes: Strategic constraints (no large ground force, partner-centric approach) fundamentally shape the air campaign design and tempo.

CENTCOM & CJTF-OIR Commanders (Austin, Votel, McKenzie; Terry, MacFarland, Townsend, Funk, LaCamera)

Role / position: Operational command of the campaign; CJTF-OIR as supported command for OIR, CFACC as supporting. (Appendix B, p. 350–352)
Key perspectives / assumptions: By/with/through partners; need to balance multiple theaters (Afghanistan, Gulf, Yemen); reliance on airpower as primary U.S. kinetic contribution; emphasize civil–military coordination with Iraqi/Syrian partners.
Evolution of stance: Early focus on halting ISIS advance and building partners; later emphasis on major offensives and urban operations; eventual shift to stabilization and CT. (p. 15–17, p. 87–121)
Influence on outcomes: Decisions on C2 design, TEA delegation, and integration of strike cells significantly affect CAS effectiveness and campaign tempo.

CFACC / AFCENT (Hesterman, Brown, Harrigian, Guastella, etc.)

Role / position: Theater-level CFACC and Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central; responsible for planning and executing air operations in OIR and other CENTCOM missions. (Appendix B, p. 352)
Key perspectives / assumptions: Need to manage limited assets (PGMs, ISR, tankers) across multiple operations; emphasize joint and coalition integration; mindful of civilian harm and political constraints.
Evolution of stance: Initially adapt to Army-led CJTF; over time push for better integration and representation through JACCEs and staff billets. (p. 71–72, Appendix B, p. 350–352)
Influence on outcomes: Control of sorties, targeting priorities, and enabler allocation; key advocate for enabler investment and deep operations (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank).

CJFLCC, ISF, CTS, and Iraqi Government

Role / position: Primary Iraqi land forces and political leadership; CJFLCC as land component for OIR; CTS as elite Iraqi special forces. (p. 49–50, p. 157–175)
Key perspectives / assumptions: Regain territory, especially major Sunni cities; maintain regime legitimacy; balance Shia militias, Iranian influence, and coalition support.
Evolution of stance: Early struggles and dependence on militias (Tikrit) give way to more assertive CTS and ISF leadership in Ramadi and Mosul; gradual improvement in coordination with coalition. (p. 151–162, p. 166–175)
Influence on outcomes: Partner quality and political decisions (e.g., who leads operations) significantly shape airpower’s effectiveness and coalition willingness to provide CAS.

Kurdish Forces (KRG Peshmerga, YPG/SDF)

Role / position: Pivotal local partners in northern Iraq (Mosul Dam, Sinjar) and northeastern Syria (Kobani, Raqqa).
Key perspectives / assumptions: Secure Kurdish territories, expand influence; willing to cooperate with coalition for mutual benefit but in tension with Turkish interests.
Evolution of stance: Peshmerga and YPG become increasingly integrated with coalition airpower and advisers; SDF emerges as main Syrian ground partner. (p. 134–140, p. 142–147, p. 180–187)
Influence on outcomes: Their tenacity and effectiveness, combined with airpower, are decisive in early and late battles; political friction with Turkey complicates long-term stability.

SOJTF & Special Operations Forces

Role / position: Conduct leadership targeting, run SOF strike cells in Syria, and advise/assist SDF and other partners; manage high-end raids and CT operations. (Appendix B, p. 354–355)
Key perspectives / assumptions: Value agile, small-footprint operations; emphasize precision, partner-enabled actions, and deep intelligence.
Evolution of stance: Initially focus on leadership and rebel-training missions; later central to SDF support and DCA incidents. (p. 133–134, p. 260–268)
Influence on outcomes: Critical to leadership targeting, deep strikes, and high-quality CAS for SDF; also central to managing risk in contested Syrian airspace.

ISIS Leadership and Fighters

Role / position: Adversary; creates and sustains the caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Territorial control and governance as religious and political objectives; belief in resilience under air attack and use of urban sanctuaries and terror tactics.
Evolution of stance: From offensive conventional operations in 2014 to defensive urban warfare in 2016–2017, then insurgency in the MERV and beyond. (p. 15–17, p. 87–121)
Influence on outcomes: Adaptation to airpower (dispersal, tunnels, human shields, VBIEDs) shapes campaign design and limits airpower’s decisive potential.

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

2014-06-10 — ISIS seizes Mosul — Strategic shock that reveals Iraqi security collapse and catalyzes U.S. re-engagement considerations. (p. 17)
2014-08-07 — U.S. begins air operations near Erbil and Mount Sinjar — First U.S. airstrikes and humanitarian airdrops under limited protective objectives. (p. 23–25, Appendix B, p. 349–350)
2014-10-15 — Operation Inherent Resolve named — Formal designation of the campaign and signal of long-term coalition commitment. (p. 71)
2014-10-17 — CJTF-OIR established — ARCENT-led CJTF becomes supported command, institutionalizing C2 for the campaign. (p. 71–72, Appendix B, p. 350–352)
2014-10 to 2015-01 — Battle of Kobani — Intensive CAS and interdiction enable YPG to hold and retake the town, halting ISIS momentum in northern Syria. (p. 142–147)
2015-10 — Operation Tidal Wave II begins — Deep-strike campaign against ISIS oil infrastructure seeks to cut revenue. (p. 204–215)
2015-12 to 2016-01 — Liberation of Ramadi — Combined ISF–CTS–coalition campaign shows improved close-fight integration and sets pattern for later urban operations. (p. 157–162)
2016-10 — Mosul offensive begins — Largest urban battle of the campaign, consuming massive CAS, ISR, and artillery resources. (p. 166–175, p. 294–295)
2017-06-18 — U.S. F/A-18 shoots down Syrian Su-22 — First U.S. manned-aircraft kill since 1999; key DCA escalation-management event. (p. 267–268, p. 298)
2017-06 to 2017-10 — Battle of Raqqa — SDF and coalition air support dismantle ISIS’s Syrian capital, with heavy urban destruction. (p. 180–187)
2019-03-23 — SDF seizes Baghouz — Ends ISIS’s last territorial hold; SDF leadership declares “total destruction” of the so-called caliphate, while ISIS shifts fully to insurgency. (Appendix A, p. 348–349)

(Additional political events like Trump’s withdrawal announcements in late 2018 and early 2019 mark inflection points for future posture rather than the main territorial campaign.)

📖 Historiographical Context

The book intervenes in renewed debates about airpower’s decisive potential sparked by OIR, directly engaging critics who described the air war as “unserious” and argued that more aggressive bombing could rapidly destroy ISIS (e.g., Gunzinger, Lambeth, Deptula). (p. 12, footnote 35)
It aligns with a cautious, empiricist strand of airpower scholarship that emphasizes context and limits (akin to Pape’s skepticism about strategic bombing), but it is more friendly to airpower’s utility, stressing that airpower was indispensable even if not decisive. (p. 298–299)
The report continues RAND’s longstanding tradition (e.g., Lambeth’s Air Power Against Terror, Mueller’s Precision and Purpose) of detailed campaign studies that blend operations research with qualitative history. (p. 25–26, references)
It indirectly challenges simplistic “airpower alone” narratives by showing that even extensive deep operations (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank) could not substitute for the close fight and local ground forces. (p. 204–215, p. 226–231, p. 299)
The study contributes to debates about network-centric warfare and targeting, demonstrating both the power and limits of data-driven, system-level targeting in real campaigns. (p. 203–205, p. 393–403)

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

Levels of War: The analysis is primarily strategic and operational, focusing on how air operations contributed to campaign-level objectives rather than tactical engagements or platform performance. (p. 8)
Mission Types:
- Close fight: CAS and counterland inside the FSCL in support of partner ground forces, particularly in urban battles. (p. 35–36, p. 129–195)
- Deep fight: Deliberate strategic attack and interdiction beyond the FSCL, targeting finances (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank), logistics, and GLOCs. (p. 199–252)
- Enabling missions: DCA, ISR, airlift, and aerial refueling. (p. 257–292)
Data-Driven Approach:
- CJTF-OIR strike releases -> RAND strike data set (strikes, targets by city, target types, effects). (p. 393–399)
- AFCENT airpower summaries -> RAND airpower data set (sorties, weapons, fuel, cargo). (p. 395–401)
- Grouping into target and system categories; linking to phases and operations. (p. 398–400, p. 405–408, p. 427–428)
Qualitative Methods:
- Historiographical method combining official documents, interviews, and data. (p. 8)
- 50 interviews with U.S. and allied personnel, plus AFHRA oral histories; cross-checking perceptions with data. (p. 8)
Conceptual Framework:
- Airpower is analyzed as part of a by/with/through strategy; emphasis on territory as MoE and close vs deep fight lens. (p. 9–10, p. 35–36, p. 299)
- Recognition that effectiveness criteria are fuzzy, requiring mixed-method judgment. (p. 8)

🔄 Learning Over Time (within the book & vs. prior SAASS 628 cases)

What shifted?
- C2: From ad hoc ARCENT-led JFLCC to CJTF-OIR with more integrated strike cells and JACCE; TEA delegated down via Tactical Directive 1. (p. 49–50, p. 133–134, Appendix B, p. 350–355)
- Air–ground integration: Strike cells matured; surface fires integrated; partner forces became more capable, enabling more complex CAS. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157, p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
- Deep operations: Shift from opportunistic strikes on high-value targets to sustained system campaigns against oil and finances. (p. 199–215, p. 226–231)
- Enablers: Greater recognition of tankers and airlift as key constraints; DCA regained importance with Russian intervention. (p. 260–268, p. 273–290, p. 293)
What persisted?
- Limited-liability strategy with no large U.S. ground force; partner-centric approach from start to finish. (p. 9–10, p. 87–121)
- Strong LOAC constraints and political focus on civilian casualties.
- Debates over CAS vs strategic attack priorities and the relative importance of air vs ground components. (p. 6, p. 298–299)
What was (mis)learned?
- Some airpower advocates inferred that political constraints alone explain the campaign’s length, underestimating partner and terrain factors; the book pushes back on that mislearning. (p. 6, p. 298–299)
- There is a risk of overlearning the lesson that deep strike is secondary, potentially underestimating its importance in other contexts (e.g., near-peer wars) where critical nodes may matter more.
- Compared to prior cases like Desert Storm or Allied Force, OIR should reinforce that context determines airpower roles, but there is a tendency to project one campaign’s logic onto others.

🧐 Critical Reflections

Strengths:
- Deep, data-driven analysis with transparent methodology and careful treatment of uncertainties.
- Balanced view that acknowledges both the indispensability and the limits of airpower in OIR. (p. 298–299)
- Rich case studies of close and deep fights, providing concrete material for doctrinal and training discussions.
- Clear articulation of how territory as MoE shaped the campaign and the relative roles of close vs deep operations. (p. 299)
Weaknesses / blind spots:
- Limited discussion of civilian harm and local political perceptions beyond acknowledging constraints; the political narrative in Iraq/Syria is relatively thin compared to the operational detail.
- Less exploration of intra-U.S. civil-military debates over ROE, target approval, and strategy than some readers might desire.
- May underplay the extent to which ISIS ideology and social base persisted despite territorial defeat, focusing more on military outcomes.
- Because it is unclassified, some SOF and intelligence aspects are necessarily underdeveloped.
Unresolved questions:
- To what extent did deep operations accelerate ISIS’s defeat vs simply make fighting more expensive?
- How sustainable is a partner-centric, limited-liability strategy in the face of long-term governance deficits?
- How would OIR lessons translate to future campaigns against near-peer adversaries with robust air defenses?

⚔️ Comparative Insights (link to prior course readings)

Compared to Desert Storm-type models (e.g., Wardenian strategic paralysis), OIR underscores that urban, nonstate adversaries embedded in populations are not susceptible to quick, decisive strategic bombing; the close fight and partner ground forces mattered far more.
Relative to Operation Allied Force or Libya 2011, OIR demonstrates that airpower can support territorial conquest and holding (by partners) over multi-year campaigns, not just coercive bombing from afar, but at the cost of prolonged, resource-intensive operations and complex urban destruction.
In line with Afghanistan 2001/2002 (Lambeth’s work), OIR again validates the model of airpower + small U.S. footprint + local partners, but also shows that as adversaries adapt and fight in cities, the costs and time increase dramatically.
Against more skeptical works (e.g., Pape’s Bombing to Win), the RAND study suggests that while airpower rarely achieves political victory alone, it can be instrumental when integrated into a broader joint strategy and supported by capable partners—a qualified but important pro-airpower finding.
Across cases, OIR reinforces that political constraints and MoE choices (territory vs coercion vs punishment) heavily determine both what airpower is asked to do and how success is judged.

✍️ Key Terms / Acronyms

OIR – Operation Inherent Resolve
CJTF-OIR – Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve
CFACC / AFCENT – Combined Forces Air Component Commander / U.S. Air Forces Central
CJFLCC – Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command
CJOC-B / CJOC-E – Combined Joint Operations Center–Baghdad / –Erbil
SOJTF / CJSOTF-I / CJSOTF-S – Special Operations Joint Task Force / Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Iraq / –Syria
TEA – Target Engagement Authority
Strike Cell – Nondoctrinal command post with TEA coordinating CAS and joint fires
CAS – Close Air Support
GLOC – Ground Line of Communication
MERV – Middle Euphrates River Valley
VBIED – Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
DCA – Defensive Counterair
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
PGM – Precision-Guided Munition
FSCL – Fire Support Coordination Line
CTS – Counter Terrorism Service (Iraq)
SDF – Syrian Democratic Forces

❓ Open Questions (for seminar)

1. What lessons did American strategists draw about air employment from their experiences prior to OIR?

From Desert Storm, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, strategists brought expectations that precision airpower could rapidly incapacitate adversaries, especially in permissive air environments, and that deep strike against critical nodes could generate disproportionate effects.
The post-2001 experience also emphasized CAS in support of special operations and local partners, and reliance on ISR-driven targeting and small-footprint advisory missions.
Strategists expected air superiority, robust coalition participation, and the ability to use deep operations (e.g., against leadership and infrastructure) as key tools in coercing or defeating adversaries.

2. How accurate were those expectations in OIR?

Some expectations held: air superiority was easily achieved, coalition partners contributed meaningfully, and CAS in support of local forces proved highly effective. (p. 298–299)
However, expectations of quick victory via deep strategic attack were not borne out; deep strikes against oil, cash, and logistics had limited independent impact on ISIS’s territorial control. (p. 299)
Urban combat, human shields, and the proto-state’s reliance on territory and coercive governance rather than industrial infrastructure made OIR far more like prolonged urban attrition than “shock-and-awe” coercion.
Enabler demands (tankers, ISR) were higher and more constraining than earlier campaigns, challenging assumptions about resource sufficiency. (p. 273–290, p. 293)

3. How did American strategists apply airpower in OIR?

They designed an air campaign to support a by/with/through strategy, prioritizing CAS and close counterland to enable ISF, Kurds, and SDF to retake territory. (p. 9–10, p. 35–36, p. 299)
Airpower was applied in three main ways: close fight (CAS in battles like Mosul and Raqqa), deep fight (Tidal Wave II, Point Blank, logistics/GLOC interdiction), and enablers (DCA, ISR, mobility). (p. 129–195, p. 199–252, p. 257–292)
Strategists used strike cells, TEA delegation, and integrated fires (air + artillery) to manage complex urban operations under tight ROE. (p. 133–134, p. 156–157)
They employed systemic targeting of ISIS oil and finances to constrain resources, though as a shaping rather than decisive effort. (p. 204–230, p. 299)

4. What limits did air employment face?

Political limits: No large U.S. ground force, heavy reliance on partners, coalition politics, and escalation concerns with Russia/Iran. (p. 6, p. 9–10, p. 260–268)
Legal/normative limits: Strict LOAC and CDE constraints especially in urban environments; host-nation approval required for strikes in Iraq. (p. 25–26, p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
Operational limits: Basing distances, partner capability ceilings, C2 complexity, and enabler shortages (tankers, ISR). (p. 39–40, p. 273–290, Appendix B, p. 350–352)
Adversary adaptation: ISIS use of tunnels, human shields, VBIED belts, and dispersed networks reduced impact of both close and deep operations. (p. 63–65, p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
Information limits: Imperfect intelligence, evolving definitions of “strike,” and difficulty measuring effectiveness. (p. 8, p. 393–403)

5. How does OIR “fit” into the longer story of American airpower since 1945?

OIR extends the post-1991 pattern of air-centric, coalition, limited wars, where airpower is central but not independently decisive. Like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, it involves precision strikes, partner forces, and limited U.S. boots on the ground.
It underscores a shift from large-scale industrial wars to prolonged, urban, counter-protostate campaigns, where CAS and enablers dominate and deep strategic attack plays a shaping role.
It confirms that air superiority is often assumed but increasingly contested politically (Russia) and that enablers (especially tankers and ISR) are the critical bottlenecks. (p. 260–268, p. 273–290, p. 293)
OIR strengthens the lesson that airpower’s effectiveness is deeply contingent on strategy, partners, and MoE choice, reinforcing themes from earlier limited-war cases while updating them for the urban, networked, nonstate context.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“Old debates about how airpower should be employed, what it can achieve, and which domain and service are more important have resurfaced during OIR.” (p. 6) — Highlights continuity of airpower debates across decades.
“Even when there are enormous amounts of data and clearly defined operational goals, the criteria for military effectiveness are fuzzy and subject to interpretation.” (p. 8) — Useful humility quote for MoE discussions and final paper.
“Airpower was indispensable to defeating ISIS.” (p. 10) — Key thesis statement; supports a nuanced pro-airpower argument.
“On the whole, OIR was a success, and airpower was critical to this outcome.” (p. 298) — Anchors evaluation of overall campaign.
“Because eliminating ISIS’s protostate was paramount, territory was the key measure of success in OIR, which in turn meant that the close fight was prioritized over the deep fight.” (p. 299) — Crucial insight linking MoE, campaign design, and CAS vs deep strike debates.
Regarding Mosul: Townsend described it as “the most extended and brutal combat I have ever witnessed.” (p. 107) — Dramatic statement illustrating the human and operational cost of urban campaigns.
“No Kick Ass Without Tanker Gas.” (p. 293) — Memorable encapsulation of enabler centrality.

🧾 Final-Paper Hooks

Claim 1: In OIR, airpower’s decisive effects flowed primarily through the close fight, not the deep fight, because territory—not infrastructure or leadership—was the key center of gravity and measure of success.
- Evidence/quotes/pages:
  - Emphasis on “enduring defeat” defined by territorial loss. (p. 9)
  - Statement that “territory was the key measure of success in OIR, which in turn meant that the close fight was prioritized over the deep fight.” (p. 299)
  - Case studies of Mosul and Raqqa showing massive CAS and joint fires as main effort. (p. 166–187, p. 180–187, p. 195)
- Counterarguments to handle: Deep operations (Tidal Wave II and Point Blank) meaningfully degraded ISIS; argue these shaped but did not replace the need for ground-centric close fight.
Claim 2: Political and normative constraints in OIR shaped but did not cripple airpower; the campaign’s length was more a function of strategic choice (limited liability, partner-centric) and urban terrain than of “underused” airpower.
- Evidence/quotes/pages:
  - Discussion of airpower advocates’ criticism and authors’ response. (p. 6, p. 12, p. 298–299)
  - Demonstration of increased drop rates and heavy CAS in later phases despite constraints. (p. 78–82, p. 294–295)
  - Mosul and Raqqa case studies show aggressive but careful use of airpower. (p. 166–187, p. 180–187)
- Counterarguments: Some may argue that looser ROE or more early deep attack could have shortened the campaign; need to show partner capacity and urban complexity as binding factors.
Claim 3: Enablers—particularly tankers, airlift, and DCA—were the true limiting factors in OIR and will be even more critical in future limited wars against both nonstate and near-peer adversaries.
- Evidence/quotes/pages:
  - Tanker and airlift data and discussion, including “No Kick Ass Without Tanker Gas.” (p. 273–290, p. 293, p. 401–403)
  - DCA section showing contested airspace and Su-22 shootdown. (p. 260–268, p. 298)
  - Argument in Chapter Six and Seven about enabler centrality. (p. 292–293, p. 306–308)
- Counterarguments: Some may claim shooters (fighters/bombers) or intelligence were more limiting; can use RAND’s data to argue relative constraints.
Claim 4: OIR represents the maturation—and exposure of limits—of the “airpower + small U.S. footprint + local partners” model pioneered in Afghanistan 2001; its lessons should temper expectations about airpower’s ability to deliver quick victories but reinforce its centrality in long-duration limited wars.
- Evidence/quotes/pages:
  - Framing of limited-liability, partner-centric strategy. (p. 9–10)
  - Comparison of CAS and deep operations; OIR’s success but at multi-year timescale. (p. 87–121, p. 298–299)
  - Appendices A–C show duration and depth of commitment. (p. 309–392)
- Counterarguments: Need to address claims that OIR’s model is too slow or destructive; discuss trade-offs between speed, partner reliance, and political risk.

These hooks can be combined or re-framed to support a final paper on airpower in limited wars, focusing on how OIR clarifies both the potential and limits of airpower under contemporary political, normative, and operational constraints.