A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics

Online Description

A complete guide for how small states can be strikingly successful and influential—if they assess their situations and adapt their strategies. Small states are crucial actors in world politics. Yet, they have been relegated to a second tier of International Relations scholarship. In A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics, Tom Long shows how small states can identify opportunities and shape effective strategies to achieve their foreign policy goals. To do so, Long puts small states’ relationships at the center of his approach. Although small states are defined by their position as materially weaker actors vis-a-vis large states, Long argues that this condition does not condemn them to impotence or irrelevance. Drawing on typological theory, Long builds an explanation of when and how small states might achieve their goals. The book assesses a global range of cases-both successes and failures-and offers a set of tools for scholars and policymakers to understand how varying international conditions shape small states’ opportunities for influence.

📘 Key Terms & Definitions

Term: Small state

Definition: Long defines a small state relationally: “I define a small state as the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship.”

Role in author’s argument: Moves the project away from “smallness = material capabilities” and toward “smallness = positionality in salient asymmetrical ties,” which then become the unit of analysis for influence diagnostics and strategy selection.

Analytical notes:

Function: Establishes that the “small-state problem” is primarily about asymmetrical relationships, not fixed categories; what matters is who is weaker in a given dyad.
Coercion/deterrence connection: In SAASS terms, “small” usually means low capacity for direct coercion/compellence; the book redirects attention to indirect influence (agenda setting, framing, coalition leverage) and to exploiting great-power attention gaps.
Operationalization: Rather than population/GDP cutoffs, the book selects cases where the focal state is the weaker party in a salient relationship and is pursuing a specific foreign-policy goal.
Divergence from other SAASS readings: Deterrence/coercion readings often assume “major power coercer vs target” as the baseline; Long flips the lens to how targets (small states) can still shape outcomes under asymmetry.

Comparison to other theorists:

Diverges from structural realism’s capability-based ordering; aligns more with relational and dyadic approaches.
Leans on (and acknowledges a debt to) asymmetry theory (Womack) rather than balance-of-power logics.

Term: Influence

Definition: “Influence… refers to the ability of a small state to achieve its goals in relation to other actors.”

Long anchors influence in a classic relational concept of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”

Role in author’s argument: Dependent variable and organizing question: when and how small states achieve goal attainment vis-à-vis larger actors across security, political economy, and institutional/normative arenas.

Analytical notes:

Function: Broadens “influence” beyond coercive threats to include agenda access, framing, institutional leverage, and relational network effects.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Influence can be coercive-like (inducing policy change) but is often achieved via salience management, problem redefinition, or third-party leverage, not brute force.
Operationalization: Each case identifies (1) small-state goal, (2) conditions on the scorecard, (3) strategies used, (4) whether goal was achieved, and (5) process linking action to outcome.
Divergence from SAASS coercion models: More weight on attention and internal preference cohesion than on “credible threat” mechanics; influence is often about getting to the table or changing how the issue is understood.

Comparison to other theorists:

Resonates with bargaining models (preferences, stakes), but layers in agenda-setting and constructivist mechanisms (framing, legitimacy).

Term: Asymmetry

Definition: Asymmetry “creates disparate perceptions, interests, and possibilities for actions,” and “both parties will adjust their policies… The stronger actor should largely determine the broad terms… But the weaker actor’s ability to use certain tactics… may increase… as the weaker actor may be perceived as having greater credibility.”

Role in author’s argument: Core explanatory frame: asymmetry structures what is salient, what gets attention, and what kinds of influence pathways are available.

Analytical notes:

Function: Explains why small states can’t simply “play the same game” as great powers; influence is conditioned by uneven attention, leverage, and credibility dynamics.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Asymmetry shapes coercion credibility and risk: small states’ moves can be seen as more credible (they “must mean it”) while great powers can be inattentive or overconfident.
Operationalization: Asymmetry is baked into case selection (weaker vs stronger actor) and into the logic of salience/attention.
Divergence from other SAASS readings: Moves beyond force-centric coercion and emphasizes perceptual/agenda dynamics as structural features of asymmetry.

Comparison to other theorists:

More Womack-style relational hierarchy than Waltzian anarchy/polarity.

Term: Asymmetry of attention

Definition: Stronger actor “devote[s] only a fraction of [its] attention” to weaker; weaker can be “more adept at predicting” stronger; “stronger actors’ inattention may offer potential advantages for weaker actors.”

Role in author’s argument: Explains why agenda setting is a recurrent small-state challenge and opportunity.

Analytical notes:

Function: Generates both constraint (hard to get attention) and leverage (surprise, niche initiative, framing).
Coercion/deterrence connection: Credibility/perception hinge on what the adversary/partner even notices; “signals” can fail if the great power is inattentive.
Operationalization: Captured through the relational issue salience dimension (is the issue on the great power’s agenda?).
Divergence from SAASS readings: Many deterrence models assume high attention to signals; Long treats inattention as normal.

Comparison to other theorists:

Complements Jervis-style misperception but roots it in structural relational asymmetry rather than episodic cognitive error.

Term: Salient asymmetrical relationship

Definition: “A salient asymmetrical relationship is characterized by historical and cultural links and current geopolitical stakes… Often the number of a small state’s relationships that are meaningful… is much smaller…”

Role in author’s argument: Specifies which relationships matter most for small-state strategy and outcomes.

Analytical notes:

Function: Narrows analysis to the relationships most likely to drive small-state foreign policy constraints/opportunities.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Extended deterrence, coercion, and alliance assurance are most intense in salient ties (e.g., border disputes, basing, dependency).
Operationalization: Case design emphasizes salient dyads in Chapters 5–6; Chapter 7 adds broader multilateral arenas.

Comparison to other theorists:

Closer to alliance/commitment literature than to systemic “one-size” models.

Term: Relational approach

Definition: Chapter 2 frames world politics as “a composite of myriad relationships”; for a small state, “a handful… will be especially salient; usually… asymmetrical.”

Role in author’s argument: Provides the meta-theoretical move: stop treating small states as noise in a system model; treat relationships as primary.

Analytical notes:

Function: Justifies a “diagnostic” approach that policymakers can apply to a specific dyad/issue.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Similar to crisis bargaining’s dyadic focus, but with added emphasis on attention and preference cohesion.
Operationalization: Nested organization of cases by issue-area and region; thematic case chapters.

Comparison to other theorists:

Critiques structuralist theories for missing small states’ diverse goals and contexts.

Term: Analytical scorecard

Definition: The scorecard “classif[ies] cases according to… conditions of an asymmetrical relationship, as perceived by the small state… a snapshot… Over a longer span… a case may change its location.”

Role in author’s argument: Core operational device for diagnosis and for generating the typology.

Analytical notes:

Function: Turns fuzzy “small states punch above their weight” talk into a tractable diagnostic: (1) divergence, (2) salience, (3) cohesion.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Comparable to assessing: stakes (salience), preference conflict (divergence), and resolve/credibility (cohesion).
Operationalization: Each dimension coded high/low; combined into eight types (property space).
Divergence from SAASS: Emphasizes agenda access and great-power internal cohesion as first-order determinants of small-state room for action.

Comparison to other theorists:

Methodologically aligned with typological theory (George & Bennett style) rather than statistical generalization.

Term: Policy divergence

Definition: Compare great-power policy with the small state’s goals: “Is a large change in policy required… or would small adjustments do?… the greater the divergence, the more difficult it will be…”

Role in author’s argument: The most monotonic predictor: more divergence → harder influence.

Analytical notes:

Function: Captures the size of the “ask” in bargaining terms.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Similar to revisionist vs status quo conflict; high divergence often pushes interactions toward coercive pressure or deadlock.
Operationalization: Coded high/low using status quo policy vs small-state goal.
Divergence from SAASS: Treats divergence as necessary but not sufficient; outcomes hinge on how divergence interacts with salience and cohesion.

Comparison to other theorists:

Parallels rationalist models of bargaining range and issue indivisibility but is embedded in relational diagnosis.

Term: Relational issue salience

Definition: “Does the small state’s policy goal matter to the great power?… if a small state’s leader wishes to change a great power’s policy, he or she must first have that power’s attention… agenda setting is a perennial challenge…”

Role in author’s argument: Governs whether influence attempts get traction; salience can amplify or dampen divergence effects.

Analytical notes:

Function: Bridges “attention politics” with bargaining leverage.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Maps onto “stakes” and the credibility of commitments—high salience hardens positions; low salience creates room if attention can be captured.
Operationalization: Coded via whether issue is on decision-makers’ agendas; affected by history/culture/geopolitics.
Divergence from SAASS: Adds a structured way to think about getting noticed as part of coercion/signaling.

Comparison to other theorists:

Connects to agenda-setting literature (Kingdon) and to signaling models where attention is assumed but here is variable.

Term: Preference cohesion

Definition: “Preference cohesion refers to whether great-power preferences on the issue are cohesive… in a cohesive setting… status quo policy is likely to remain stable.” Long also treats it as “degree of problem clarity.”

Role in author’s argument: Captures whether the great power is vulnerable to influence via internal disagreement, bureaucratic fragmentation, or shifting paradigms.

Analytical notes:

Function: Adds “domestic/political cohesion” into a relational model; cohesive preferences create “vested interests” in some types.
Coercion/deterrence connection: A proxy for “resolve” and for the credibility of threats/commitments; fragmentation opens influence opportunities (Type 2, 3, 5).
Operationalization: Assessment of decision-making circle cohesion (executive focus).
Divergence from SAASS: Makes internal cohesion a central structuring variable rather than background noise.

Comparison to other theorists:

Aligns with bureaucratic politics and domestic constraints; challenges unitary-actor assumptions.

Term: Typological theory

Definition: The scorecard yields “eight possible types of cases… This rubric allows us to hypothesize… and… make systematic observations about ‘pathways’…”

Role in author’s argument: The book’s main “portable” framework: diagnose the type → choose strategies appropriate to the relational conditions.

Analytical notes:

Function: Turns conjunctions of conditions into strategy guidance and expectations about opportunity levels.
Coercion/deterrence connection: Comparable to mapping bargaining environments (deadlock vs problem-solving vs drift) and selecting coercive vs cooperative tools.
Operationalization: High/low coding across three dimensions → type classification; summarized alongside strategies and cases in Appendix Table A1.
Divergence from SAASS: Emphasizes non-military pathways and mixed logics (rationalist + ideational).

Comparison to other theorists:

Similar to George & Bennett typological theorizing and pathway analysis.

Term: Equifinality

Definition: Great powers “might change [their] policy for reasons other than a small state’s influence.”

Role in author’s argument: Forces methodological humility and process-tracing discipline.

Analytical notes:

Function: Warns against “small state did it” attribution without tracing mechanism and sequence.
Operationalization: Analytic narratives track statements/actions, diagnose scorecard, follow issue evolution, then assess process-to-outcome linkage.
Divergence from SAASS: Mirrors coercion studies’ attribution problem (did the target comply because of threats or because of independent shifts?).

Comparison to other theorists:

Similar to debates in coercion effectiveness (Pape/George) about causal inference.

Term: Agenda setting

Definition: To change policy, a small state must get attention; “agenda setting is a perennial challenge for small states… in bilateral relations and in international institutions.”

Role in author’s argument: Central mechanism for Types 3 and 6, and a recurring theme across the book.

Analytical notes:

Coercion/deterrence connection: Salience manipulation is an alternative to cost-imposition—changing what’s “worth fighting over” and what decision-makers consider.
Operationalization: Observed in diplomatic initiatives, venue choices, symbolic acts, and issue linkage.

Comparison to other theorists:

Complements signaling theory by insisting attention is not guaranteed.

Term: Problem redefinition

Definition: “Moments of crisis can signal a policy’s failure… shifts in… understanding of a problem… If… preferences are malleable… small states [can] shap[e] the definition of the problem itself.”

Role in author’s argument: Key pathway for Type 2 (“orange”) cases—policy paradigms break; small states can steer what replaces them.

Analytical notes:

Coercion/deterrence connection: Crisis bargaining and escalation create windows for reframing; but also risk miscalculation (Nepal 1989).
Operationalization: Traced through shifts in elite discourse, new policy options, and exploitation of great-power preference fragmentation.

Comparison to other theorists:

More constructivist than classic rationalist deterrence; focuses on meaning and options.

Term: Extraversion

Definition: In the book, extraversion is “a foreign policy strategy that includes drawing in external resources and actors… [and] generally associated with shaping outside influence.”

Role in author’s argument: Type 5 (“blue”) strategy: widen the set of relationships/resources to derive leverage.

Analytical notes:

Coercion/deterrence connection: A substitute for direct coercion—use outside partners, donors, institutions to shift bargaining leverage or limit vulnerability.
Operationalization: Most visible in aid and development diplomacy (Rwanda), and in forum/partner diversification.
Divergence from SAASS: Highlights networked leverage rather than “threat credibility.”

Comparison to other theorists:

Overlaps with soft power and institutional leverage but is framed as a strategic response to relational conditions.

Term: Sources of power

Definition: Long categorizes small-state power resources as particular-intrinsic, derivative, and collective.

Role in author’s argument: Bridges diagnosis (scorecard) to feasible strategy (what tools the small state actually has).

Analytical notes:

Particular-intrinsic: “resources and capacities that small states possess or have the ability to draw on,” which can vary widely (e.g., location).
Derivative: power “derived from their relationships and networks.”
Collective: power via “formal organizations, alliances, and coalitions.”
Coercion/deterrence connection: Derivative and collective power are key to extended deterrence and institutional constraint—small states “borrow” capability and legitimacy.
Operationalization: Case narratives identify which bases are mobilized and how.

Comparison to other theorists:

Extends beyond materialist power metrics; closer to Barnett & Duvall’s plural power forms.

Term: Strategy typology by “color” types

Definition: The eight types describe combinations of (1) divergence, (2) salience, (3) cohesion, and map to different “degrees of opportunity” and pathways.

Role in author’s argument: Turns IR theory into a practical “guide” for diagnosis and action.

Analytical notes:

Strategy mapping (Table 4.2) includes: patience/perseverance, problem redefinition, agenda setting, mutual benefits, extraversion, agenda setting & new alternatives, maintaining status quo, buttressing status quo.
Appendix Table A1 links types to case studies.

Comparison to other theorists:

Comparable to “bargaining situation” typologies in coercion studies, but with more explicit agenda/meaning pathways.

Term: Security through entrapment

Definition: Estonia pursued “security through entrapment” by becoming a “model ally” to deepen NATO ties and raise the credibility of Article 5 protection.

Role in author’s argument: Illustrates derivative power and alliance assurance as influence tools for small states.

Analytical notes:

Coercion/deterrence connection: This is extended deterrence management: increase ally commitment (and costs of abandonment) rather than deter alone.
Operationalization: Traced via Estonia’s policy choices and NATO outcomes.

Comparison to other theorists:

Fits alliance politics (abandonment/entrapment), and complements SAASS deterrence discussions on assurance.

⸻

🔫 Author Background

Long pitches the book in autumn 2015, shortly after publishing his first book and submitting articles on small states; the project aimed for unusual breadth across regions and issue areas.
He frames the book as speaking both to IR scholarship and to policymakers in “the majority of the world’s states.”
He credits Brantly Womack as a major intellectual influence on his approach to asymmetry and small states.
Institutional/professional context: presented work at ISA; mentions time at the University of Reading and affiliation/visits with CIDE (Mexico City).
Prior related scholarship includes work on asymmetry and influence (e.g., Latin America Confronts the United States) and an article on intrinsic/derivative/collective power.

⸻

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Thesis: Small states can gain influence in world politics, but their prospects depend less on “smallness” per se than on relational conditions with salient great powers—especially (1) policy divergence, (2) issue salience, and (3) preference cohesion within the great power. Long uses these to build a typological theory that identifies pathways and strategies for influence across different “types” of relationships and issues.

⸻

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

Long offers a practitioner-friendly, theory-driven guide to how small states can shape outcomes in asymmetric relationships. Treating world politics as a web of relationships rather than a system dominated solely by great powers, he builds a “scorecard” that diagnoses three relationship conditions—divergence, salience, and preference cohesion—then combines them into an eight-type typology (color-coded) that predicts opportunities for influence and suggests strategies (agenda setting, problem redefinition, extraversion, etc.). The book tests and illustrates this framework with nested regional case pairs in security and political economy (success vs failure), plus broader surveys of climate/environment, human rights, regional organizations, and global public health.

⸻

🎯 Course Themes Tracker

Coercion, compellence, deterrence: Security chapter is framed as a “hard case” where “the shadow of coercion looms,” yet small states sometimes still achieve goals.
Credibility & resolve: Preference cohesion operationalizes a slice of “resolve/commitment” on the great-power side; cohesive preferences harden status quo.
Signaling & perception: Asymmetry creates “disparate perceptions” and attention gaps; small states must often win attention before bargaining.
Rational vs. emotional vs. cultural logics: Framework is mostly rationalist-institutional (preferences, stakes) but explicitly incorporates ideational/framing pathways (problem definition, legitimacy).
Theories of victory: “Victory” is goal attainment in specific issue-dyads; success is case-specific, not “successful small state” overall.
Escalation dynamics & thresholds: “Red” cases are deadlocked and risky; crisis can open “orange” windows; miscalculation can be costly (Nepal 1989).
Alliance assurance & extended deterrence: Estonia’s “security through entrapment” and NATO Article 5 illustrate assurance mechanics.
Cost-balancing & risk manipulation: Small states often shift costs indirectly (reputation, legitimacy, venue choice) rather than impose military costs.
Instruments of coercion: Beyond force—aid conditionality, basing rights, recognition politics, institutional voting structures.
Competition continuum: Long flags a shift toward “higher global competition” that can expand small-state maneuver space.

⸻

🔑 Top Takeaways

Small-state influence is conditional, not mystical: diagnose divergence, salience, and great-power preference cohesion first.
Attention is power: many small-state problems are “big” for them but peripheral to great powers; agenda setting is a recurring constraint.
Great-power internal politics matter: preference fragmentation can open windows for small-state influence; cohesion entrenches status quo.
Security is not a total no-go: even where coercion shadows the interaction, some small states achieve security goals (Djibouti diversification; Estonia NATO alignment).
Forum/venue selection changes the game: multilateral arenas (Chapter 7) expand small states’ options compared to bilateral bargaining.

⸻

📒 Sections

Chapter 1: Introduction

Summary: Sets up the puzzle: how do small states gain influence, given systemic bias toward great powers? Introduces the core claim that small states can gain influence through multiple mechanisms, conditioned by divergence, salience, and preference cohesion.

Key Points:

Most states are “small” by many definitions; the book’s ambition is to say something meaningful about the IR of most states.
The book is structured as theory chapters + regional thematic cases + broader issue surveys.

Theory Lens Map:

Relational IR + asymmetry theory (Womack-influenced).
Mixed rationalist/constructivist mechanisms (preferences + framing/legitimacy).

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Influence ≠ only coercion; influence often requires shaping attention and meaning.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Establishes that coercion-like outcomes can occur without coercive means: small states sometimes change great-power policy through indirect leverage.

Limits Map (mini):

Long warns about equifinality—policy change can happen for reasons unrelated to small-state influence.

Chapter 2: Small States, Big World

Summary: Places small states within global context: great-power politics, institutionalization, economic governance, and norms shape the environment. The system is best understood as relationships, with salient asymmetrical ones dominating small-state experience.

Key Points:

Legitimacy and the “outsized normative role” of small states can matter in contemporary politics; the “weak” can build influence through norms.
“Prohibitive” norms around the use of force have “grown stronger over time,” supporting small states’ security and leverage.
Global competition can increase small-state space for maneuver.

Theory Lens Map:

Liberal/institutionalist: norms, institutions, rules.
Constructivist: legitimacy, normative roles.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Structural conditions matter, but mostly by shaping relational contexts.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Normative environment can raise costs of overt coercion (reputational/legitimacy costs), shifting coercion toolkit toward gray-zone/economic tools.

Limits Map (mini):

Great-power conflict can reduce small-state influence by re-hardening security competition.

Chapter 3: Opportunities and Constraints

Summary: Introduces the diagnostic framework: a scorecard of divergence, relational salience, and preference cohesion; combined into an eight-type typology that predicts degrees of opportunity and pathways.

Key Points:

Policy divergence: larger changes harder.
Relational issue salience: attention must be won; agenda setting is perennial.
Preference cohesion: cohesive preferences stabilize status quo; fragmentation opens options.
Eight types provide a “memory aid” and support pathway analysis.

Theory Lens Map:

Rationalist bargaining: preferences (divergence), stakes (salience).
Domestic/bureaucratic politics: cohesion.
Constructivist: crisis-driven paradigm shifts and problem definition.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Asymmetry makes small states highly sensitive; big states often inattentive.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

The scorecard is a coercion “environment map”: it tells you whether threats (or other pressure) will be ignored, resisted, or reframed.

Limits Map (mini):

Causal attribution problem (equifinality).

Chapter 4: Playing Small Ball

Summary: Develops small-state power sources (intrinsic, derivative, collective) and matches strategies to typology types; explains case selection and analytic narrative method.

Key Points:

Three power sources: particular-intrinsic, derivative, collective.
Strategy mapping by type (Table 4.2).
Case method: analytic narrative; identify goal, scorecard, trace process, assess outcome and causal pathway.

Theory Lens Map:

Power: plural sources (material + relational + ideational).
Strategy: contingency, not universal best practice.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Cooperation ≠ compliance; there is “meaningful middle ground” where small states pursue priorities without direct confrontation.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

“Playing small ball” resembles coercion via indirect leverage: agenda manipulation, venue choice, coalition formation, selective compliance, and reputational framing.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategy must match both diagnosis and resources; weak capacity undermines all strategies.

Chapter 5: Small-State Security

Summary: Tests influence under “hard case” security conditions where coercion shadows interactions; uses regional pairs of success/failure cases.

Key Points:

Classic small-state pessimism in realism focused on survival/balancing; but post–WWII predictions of helplessness often “unfounded.”
Security goals can still be achieved through diversification, alliance management, and selective cooperation.

Theory Lens Map:

Alliance politics (assurance, entrapment/abandonment).
Coercion shadows (border disputes, basing, intervention).

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Domestic weakness and corruption repeatedly constrain security influence.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Small states often avoid direct compellence; instead they use: basing rights bargaining, alliance entrapment, multivector strategies, and legitimacy/venue tactics.

Limits Map (mini):

Weak regimes and internal crises reduce bargaining capacity; external pressure can intensify.

Section 5.1: Djibouti and security diversification

Summary: Djibouti leveraged strategic location and shifting conditions to diversify security partners, including U.S. access to Camp Lemonnier, amid regional insecurity and the “war on terror.”

Key Points:

Djibouti offered the U.S. basing access and adapted terms via negotiation (“renewal” of access).
Demonstrates how supposedly zero-sum security issues (basing) can be reframed as positive-sum.

Theory Lens Map: Derivative + intrinsic power (location); agenda setting; problem-solving under low salience.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Basing rights as bargaining chip; indirect leverage rather than threat.

Limits Map (mini): Regional conflict volatility can both increase salience and raise risks.

Section 5.2: Gabon deepens dependence

Summary: Gabon illustrates failure to use diversification opportunities; French preferences for security predominance remained cohesive, limiting Gabon’s room.

Key Points:

French intervention and continued “pivotal” role show entrenched influence; Gabon struggled to shift the relationship.

Theory Lens Map: Type with low opportunity when great-power cohesion/vested interests persist.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Dependence reduces bargaining leverage; coercion risk rises when exits are few.

Limits Map (mini): Internal governance/corruption reduces credibility and bargaining capacity.

Section 5.3: El Salvador gains benefits and action space

Summary: El Salvador’s Comalapa basing negotiations show small states can extract benefits and preserve room for maneuver.

Key Points:

El Salvador renewed U.S. access to Comalapa while gaining benefits; the U.S. sought TPS extension and broader policy goals.
Shows bargaining over benefits inside a broader asymmetric hierarchy.

Theory Lens Map: Agenda setting/new alternatives; derivative power via U.S. interests.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Cooperation as bargaining tool; leverage via providing valued services (basing).

Limits Map (mini): Risks of domestic political backlash and over-dependence.

Section 5.4: Honduras’s declining benefits at a higher cost

Summary: Honduras’ insecurity/corruption and U.S. domestic politics create a tough environment for influence.

Key Points:

U.S. and Honduras face “familiar collective action problems”; corruption and complicity increase costs and reduce benefits.

Theory Lens Map: Status quo drift; weak domestic governance.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Dependency + weak institutions reduce capacity to resist pressure or shape policy.

Limits Map (mini): Domestic institutional weakness is a binding constraint.

Section 5.5: Bhutan benefits from alignment

Summary: Bhutan manages security dependence and gains benefits through alignment with India; limited aspirations reduce risk in seeking attention and treaty adjustment.

Key Points:

Bhutan uses alignment, with India’s support in many sectors; alignment can be productive rather than purely constraining.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Assurance via patron; focus on maintaining supportive status quo while bargaining for benefits.

Section 5.6: Nepal—arms, embargos, and asymmetry

Summary: Nepal’s attempts to adjust security dependence on India through China arms purchases triggered backlash; illustrates high-risk moves in “red” contexts.

Key Points:

India imposed severe pressure; Nepal’s limited leverage made escalation costly.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Classic compellence by a stronger neighbor; small state’s risky signaling can backfire.

Section 5.7: Estonia between Russia and NATO

Summary: Estonia converted vulnerability into alliance assurance by becoming a “model ally,” seeking “security through entrapment,” and shaping U.S./NATO policy on Baltic expansion in a moment of geopolitical change.

Key Points:

NATO membership creates deterrence via Article 5 credibility, buying “the most precious commodity: time.”

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Extended deterrence and assurance; influence via alliance entrapment rather than direct deterrence.

Section 5.8: Moldova between Russia and Europe

Summary: Moldova’s effort to secure autonomy and resolve Transnistria is constrained by multiple salient asymmetries and great-power competition; “limbo” persists.

Key Points:

Moldova faces persistent Russian leverage and competing external pulls; outcomes remain unfavorable.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Coercion/pressure via frozen conflict dynamics; limited exit options.

Chapter 6: Small States in a Global Economy

Summary: Examines influence in economic relationships under globalization and shocks; uses regional success/failure cases.

Key Points:

Globalization has uneven effects; some small states prosper, others struggle.
Economic “conditionality” and debt crises create strong leverage for larger actors (Troika, donors, China).

Theory Lens Map:

Bargaining under interdependence; conditionality; framing of zero-sum vs positive-sum.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Institutional constraints (IMF/EU), donor politics, and domestic coalition stability matter.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Economic coercion via conditionality and liquidity pressure (Greece); counter-strategy via coalition cohesion and reframing (Portugal).

Limits Map (mini):

“Red” cases intensify pressure in crises; small states may accept terms they publicly rejected.

Section 6.1: Rwandan aid and autonomy

Summary: Rwanda managed donor relations to maintain autonomy and shape donor priorities, adapting over time as salience and donor cohesion shifted.

Key Points:

Rwanda leveraged donor guilt and development priorities; masked divergence with convergence zones.
Used donor coordination tools and narratives; Paris Principles help explain why donors were “hesitant to play hardball.”

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Counter-coercion via narrative and coordination; influence without capability.

Section 6.2: Aid and policy dependency in Zambia

Summary: Zambia failed to articulate a coherent position amid donor fragmentation and volatile aid relations, limiting influence.

Key Points: Preference incoherence among donors existed, but Zambia did not exploit it effectively.

Section 6.3: Bolivia, Brazil, and gas

Summary: Bolivia exploited crisis/political change to renegotiate energy terms; Brazil’s preference cohesion fractured, enabling Bolivia’s bold moves.

Key Points: Result “increased state revenues dramatically.”

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Economic compellence by the weak via control over assets and political mandate, exploiting great-power internal splits.

Section 6.4: Paraguay, Brazil, and Itaipú

Summary: Paraguay failed to secure favorable terms in foundational negotiations; Brazil reframed a security boundary dispute into a positive-sum energy project but captured most gains.

Key Points: Treaty expiration offers future renegotiation opportunity.

Section 6.5: Malaysia and the Belt and Road Initiative

Summary: Malaysia renegotiated BRI projects after electoral shift, leveraging China’s strategic interests and Malaysia’s domestic mandate.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Counter-leverage against “debt trap” narratives through renegotiation and credibility of alternative domestic coalition.

Section 6.6: Myanmar and the Belt and Road Initiative

Summary: Myanmar initially resisted China-backed projects, but later alignment increased under international isolation and the Rohingya crisis.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: External legitimacy constraints can collapse small-state bargaining position, increasing dependence.

Section 6.7: Portugal leans into the euro crisis

Summary: Portugal accepted conditionality but built broad coalition support and reframed reforms as stability-enhancing; contrasted with Greece.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Compliance can be strategic when it preserves future autonomy; credibility via domestic coalition cohesion.

Section 6.8: The eurozone’s Greek tragedy

Summary: Greece faced a “red” deadlock under high salience and cohesion in creditor preferences; in 2015, the government reversed after acute pressure.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Classic economic compellence: liquidity and systemic risk pressure force rapid concession.

Chapter 7: Institutions, Law, and Norms

Summary: Moves beyond dyads to show how institutions and norms can be “congenial for weak states” and how small states pursue influence through issue coalitions and venue selection.

Key Points:

Covers four issue surveys: climate/environment, human rights, regional organizations, global public health.

Theory Lens Map: Institutionalism + constructivism; collective power.

Coercion Logic Breakdown: Institutions shift influence from raw coercion to rule-making, agenda-setting, and legitimacy contests.

Limits Map (mini): Big states still shape rules; small states need coalitions and strategic framing.

Section 7.1: Climate and environment

Summary: Small states act as agenda setters and norm entrepreneurs on existential issues; employ symbolism and coalition tactics.

Key Points:

Maldives’ “underwater Cabinet meeting” at Copenhagen illustrated salience engineering.

Section 7.2: Human rights

Summary: Small states can shape human rights agendas via institutions, coalition-building, and legitimacy claims.

Section 7.3: Regional organizations

Summary: Regional organizations provide collective leverage and reduce vulnerability through coordinated action and institutional rules.

Section 7.4: Global public health

Summary: COVID-19 illustrated how small states used organizations and coalitions (e.g., CARICOM) to pool influence and secure resources.

Key Points:

Small countries coalition efforts in WHO-related contexts; CARICOM as a vehicle for coordinated small-state action.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Summary: Synthesizes insights from the typology across cases and issue areas; draws policy applications and theoretical implications; argues small-state IR should be integrated into broader IR theory debates.

Key Points:

Relational conditions with salient great powers have “primary, near-term importance.”
“Red” cases often deadlock and produce acute pressure in crises (Greek 2015; Bhutan-China).
Issue-area comparison: security can be reframed positive-sum (Djibouti basing), and economic issues can be treated zero-sum (Greek crisis); the distinction is not fixed.
Chapter 7 issue areas allow more venue selection than bilateral bargaining, expanding small-state options.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Coercion effectiveness depends on whether the target can reshape salience, fragment cohesion, or change venue; “soft” tools can yield hard outcomes.

Limits Map (mini):

Structuralist theories miss small-state goal diversity; analysts should start empirically from small-state goals.

⸻

🧱 Limits Typology

Coercion-specific constraints implied by Long’s framework:

Type 1 Red constraint: High divergence + high salience + high cohesion → deadlock, high retaliation risk; small state best option is endurance or long-run reshaping.
Attention constraint: Even when divergence is large, low great-power attention prevents traction; agenda setting becomes the binding problem.
Cohesion constraint: Vested interests and cohesive preferences lock in status quo; small state needs high-level attention or new alternatives.
Domestic capacity constraint: Regime weakness/corruption undercuts credibility and strategy execution (e.g., Honduras; Mali).
Forum constraint: Bilateral settings concentrate power; multilateral settings broaden tools through venue selection and coalition leverage.
Attribution constraint: Equifinality complicates claims that “small state caused policy change.”

⸻

📏 Measures of Effectiveness

Primary MoE (book’s implicit DV):

Goal attainment: did the small state achieve its stated goal (policy change or preservation) in that issue/dyad?

Process MoE (for mechanism tracing):

Agenda access: did the issue rise onto the great power’s decision agenda?
Preference shift: did great-power preference cohesion fracture or converge?
Reframing success: did problem definition change (Type 2/3/6 pathways)?
Venue shift: did the small state successfully move the issue to a more favorable forum?

Evaluation rule (method):

Identify goal → diagnose scorecard → trace actions/outcomes → assess linkage, with equifinality in mind.

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🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives

Small state (agency):

Executive leadership and domestic coalition (credibility, mandate, stability).
Bureaucracies that execute strategy; capacity constraints.

Great power (target/partner):

“Decision-making circle” preference cohesion (or fragmentation) is central.
Bureaucratic vested interests (Type 6 dynamic).

Third parties:

Allies (extended deterrence), donors, IOs, regional orgs.

Institutions and publics:

Norm audiences shaping legitimacy; multilateral venues enabling coalition influence.

⸻

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

(Anchored to Appendix Table A1’s case periods and selected case narratives.)

1984–1991: Bhutan–India treaty relationship adjustments and alignment dynamics (security).
1989: Nepal arms purchases from China → Indian pressure/embargo dynamics.
1990–2000: Djibouti seeks security diversification as French salience declines.
1991–2001: Zambia aid dependency dynamics unfold amid donor fragmentation.
1992–1994: Estonia–Russia transition; Russian troop withdrawal bargaining.
1994–2012: Rwanda’s post-genocide donor politics; evolving salience and extraversion.
2000–2003: Djibouti–US early basing relationship formation.
2002–2004: Moldova–Russia negotiations (Transnistria autonomy dynamics).
2003–2006: Bolivia renegotiates gas terms with Brazil; El Salvador–US basing/TPS bargaining.
2006: Rwanda breaks diplomatic relations with France (illustrative of autonomy and donor politics).
2008: Russia–Georgia war; affects Baltic security context.
2010–2015: Greece euro crisis bargaining; retreat in 2015.
2011: Myanmar cancels Myitsone dam (later shifts back toward China).
2011–2015: Portugal Troika conditionality with broader coalition support.
2014–2018: Honduras–US security relations with corruption and declining benefits.
2018–2019: Malaysia renegotiates BRI projects after government change.

⸻

📖 Historiographical Context

Classic small-state studies were shaped by realism and pessimism: survival, balancing/bandwagoning, insecurity. Long notes those dire predictions have often been “unfounded” since WWII and especially post–Cold War.
Long positions the book as part of a broader effort to treat small-state research as “Global IR” rather than marginal niche work.
The book integrates asymmetry theory and argues IR theory should incorporate small states more thoroughly; structuralist theories miss small-state goal diversity.

⸻

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

Framework (diagnose → strategize → trace):

Infer small-state preferences and goal.
Assess divergence vs status quo policy.
Gauge relational salience (agenda attention).
Assess preference cohesion in great power decision circle.
Classify type and apply strategy expectations.

Method:

Case chapters use analytic narratives built from academic/policy literature plus news/documentation; identify goal, scorecard, process, outcome, and causal link.
Case selection uses a “method of difference,” choosing roughly comparable cases with differing outcomes, plus mixed-type and “hard” cases.

Evidence architecture:

Chapters 5–6: nested regional case pairs (success/failure).
Chapter 7: broader surveys with greater multilateral scope.

⸻

🔄 Learning Over Time

The scorecard is explicitly dynamic: a “snapshot,” and cases can shift due to endogenous success or exogenous change.
Rwanda illustrates long-run adaptation: as donor salience declined, Rwanda shaped narratives and preferences over “two decades,” mitigating divergence while using extraversion strategies.

⸻

🧐 Critical Reflections

Strength: The scorecard forces disciplined thinking about what often gets hand-waved (“punching above weight”) and makes attention/cohesion analytically central.
Potential limitation: High/low coding can compress nuance; many cases are “moving targets,” and coding may be sensitive to analyst judgment.
Causal inference: Equifinality is acknowledged, but short case narratives can still struggle to pin down counterfactuals (what would great power have done anyway?).
SAASS lens critique: The book is less explicit about coercion mechanisms (threat credibility, pain thresholds) and more about politics of attention and meaning. For SAASS, the move is to treat “salience engineering” and “cohesion exploitation” as coercion-adjacent tools.

⸻

⚔️ Comparative Insights

Versus Schelling-style coercion: Long’s small states rarely compel through threats of force; they influence by reframing, venue shifting, and borrowing power (alliances/institutions).
Versus Fearon-style rationalism: Long’s divergence/salience look rationalist; preference cohesion adds a thick “domestic politics” layer; problem redefinition and legitimacy add ideational mechanisms.
Versus “soft power” framings: Long makes soft influence conditional and diagnosable (types), not a generic “attractiveness” attribute.

⸻

✍️ Key Terms / Acronyms

A1: Appendix Table A1 (typology + cases)
BRI: Belt and Road Initiative
CARICOM: Caribbean Community (regional coordination on public health, etc.)
EU: European Union
IMF: International Monetary Fund
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Force
TPS: Temporary Protected Status (U.S.)
UN: United Nations
WHO: World Health Organization

⸻

❓ Open Questions

Coercion translation: Under what conditions do Long’s “agenda setting” and “problem redefinition” function like coercion (i.e., inducing reluctant compliance) rather than persuasion?
Extended deterrence: Does “preference cohesion” on the defender side predict extended deterrence credibility better than material capability alone?
Escalation risk: When do small states need to raise salience (Type 6) in ways that risk escalation or retaliation?
Institutional leverage: How do voting rules and coalition structures in IOs convert collective power into policy change, and when do great powers bypass them?
Measuring influence: What intermediate indicators (agenda access, narrative adoption) should count as “influence” short of formal policy change?

⸻

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“I define a small state as the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship.”
“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”
“Agenda setting is a perennial challenge for small states…”
“Moments of crisis can signal a policy’s failure…”
Estonia pursued “security through entrapment.”

⸻

🧾 Final-Paper Hooks

A coercion-compatible scorecard: Recast Long’s (divergence, salience, cohesion) as a coercion diagnostic for small-state compellence attempts; apply to a SAASS-relevant case (e.g., Baltic signaling, Gulf basing politics).
Alliance assurance as influence: Use Estonia as a template to theorize how small states “manufacture” extended deterrence credibility via entrapment and model-ally behavior.
Economic compellence under conditionality: Compare Greece vs Portugal to test how domestic coalition cohesion mediates coercive leverage by creditors.
Salience engineering and escalation: When small states raise salience to gain attention (Type 6), what determines whether they win concessions or trigger retaliation?
Institutions as coercion substitutes: In climate/public health, evaluate whether small states achieve “coercive effects” (policy constraint) through legitimacy, agenda control, and coalition voting rather than threats.