China’s Gambit

Online Description

Emerging from an award-winning article in International Security, China’s Gambit examines when, why, and how China attempts to coerce states over perceived threats to its national security. Since 1990, China has used coercion for territorial disputes and issues related to Taiwan and Tibet, yet China is curiously selective in the timing, target, and tools of coercion. This book offers a new and generalizable cost-balancing theory to explain states’ coercion decisions. It demonstrates that China does not coerce frequently and uses military coercion less when it becomes stronger, resorting primarily to non-militarized tools. Leveraging rich empirical evidence, including primary Chinese documents and interviews with Chinese and foreign officials, this book explains how contemporary rising powers translate their power into influence and offers a new framework for explaining states’ coercion decisions in an era of economic interdependence, particularly how contemporary global economic interdependence affects rising powers’ foreign security policies.

📘 Key Terms & Definitions

Term: Coercion

Definition: “the use or threats of negative means to demand a change in the behavior of a target state.”

Role in author’s argument: Establishes the dependent variable (DV) as state action aimed at political demands (not brute force; not bluffing; not positive inducements).

Analytical notes:

Relation to coercion/deterrence models: Rationalist core (instrumental “means to demand change”), but explicitly attentive to credibility/reputation as perceived by multiple audiences (targets + bystanders).
Operationalization/measures: Coded on a coercion spectrum (inaction → diplomatic → economic → gray-zone → military).
Divergence (within coercion literature): Pushes beyond “military terms” and “military force” privileging in the IR coercion literature.

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling: Zhang uses “coercion” (conventional label) but anchors conceptually in Schelling’s compellence logic.
George/Sechser–Fuhrmann: Whereas “coercive diplomacy” often centers on threats/limited force, Zhang formalizes a multi-tool spectrum and a cost-balancing selection mechanism.

Term: Compellence

Definition: “coercion (or compellence, to be exact)” in the traditional Schelling sense; Zhang adopts “coercion” as the conventional label.

Role in author’s argument: Provides lineage and clarifies that what she studies fits within classic coercion theory even when instruments are nonmilitary.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Bridges strategic studies coercion theory with IPE constraints (economic cost) and alliance/backlash constraints (geopolitical cost).
Operationalization: Embedded in coercion spectrum + “compelling to deter” behavior category.

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling: Zhang extends compellence logic into “gray-zone” and economic/diplomatic statecraft, treating them as meaningful coercive instruments rather than secondary.

Term: Coercive responses to status-quo-changing actions

Definition: The book focuses on China’s “coercive responses to what it considers status-quo-changing actions” and uses coercion “to bolster the status quo” it perceives as under duress.

Role in author’s argument: Narrows the universe of cases: explains coercion as reactive (response to a trigger) rather than opportunistic expansion.

Analytical notes:

Relation to deterrence: Captures a hybrid form: coercion aimed at stopping an ongoing behavior—Schelling’s “compelling to deter.”
Operationalization: Unit of analysis is an incident/challenge that China perceives as threatening; DV is China’s response choice.

Comparison to other theorists:
Deterrence models: Moves beyond dyadic “threat–response” to include bystander reputational consequences and the possibility of selective enforcement.

Term: “Compelling to deter”

Definition: Schelling’s logic to “deter continuance of something the opponent is already doing” implies compellence; Zhang explicitly targets this kind of coercion.

Role in author’s argument: Explains why coercion can be used defensively (status-quo bolstering) rather than revisionist.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Blends compellence and deterrence in a single action; ties directly into reputation/resolve concerns.
Operationalization: Seen in maritime “challenges,” arms sales events, and foreign receptions of the Dalai Lama.

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling: Zhang’s explicit move is to treat “compelling to deter” as a recurring empirical category rather than an implicit footnote to compellence.

Term: Coercion on a spectrum

Definition: Coercion is “a spectrum rather than a binary variable”; states engage in “a range of coercive acts,” so the book examines “the full spectrum of coercion.”

Role in author’s argument: Enables a unified theory of when China coerces and which tool it chooses—especially “nonmilitarized coercion.”

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Challenges war-centric coercion models; treats coercion as continuous competition tool.
Operationalization: Categories: inaction, diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, gray-zone coercion, military coercion.

Comparison to other theorists:
Pape / airpower coercion: Those frameworks are largely “military coercion” subsets; Zhang’s DV includes diplomatic/economic/gray-zone coercion systematically.

Term: Inaction (“forbearance”)

Definition: “inaction is the negative case of coercion decisions – one can think of it as ‘forbearance’”; includes rhetorical protests (not coercive threats), silence, or compromise.

Role in author’s argument: Establishes a genuine alternative to coercion (not just failed coercion) and allows explanation of restraint.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Aligns with rationalist choice: sometimes not worth paying costs; also relates to signaling (inaction can still signal priorities).
Operationalization: Coded as absence of threats/physical action even when capable.

Comparison to other theorists:
Audience costs / credibility: Whereas some models treat non-action as weakness, Zhang treats inaction as a choice shaped by economic/backlash costs.

Term: Diplomatic sanctions

Definition: “deliberate interruptions of bilateral relations with the target state.”

Role in author’s argument: Low-to-mid coercion tool used to signal displeasure and impose costs without high escalation risk.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Signaling + limited cost imposition; can be a credibility device without military mobilization.
Operationalization: Examples include recalling ambassadors, downgrading relations, canceling meetings; coded as part of coercion spectrum.

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling/George: Often under-theorized in coercion literature focused on force; Zhang elevates it to first-class coercion behavior.

Term: Economic sanctions

Definition: “deliberate government-instructed withdrawals of customary trade or financial relations” to coerce policy change.

Role in author’s argument: Central nonmilitary tool whose use is constrained by economic cost to China in an interdependent world.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: IPE-infused coercion: sanctions are coercion but can be self-harming; connects coercion choices to supply chain and finance structures.
Operationalization: Trade sanctions (embargoes, tariff discrimination, MFN withdrawal, blacklists) and financial sanctions (asset freezes, aid suspension, capital controls).

Comparison to other theorists:
Baldwin economic statecraft: Zhang aligns with sanctions as instruments but emphasizes when a rising power uses them, conditional on backlash and reputation needs.

Term: Gray-zone coercion

Definition: “physical and violent use of government organizations and agencies, or threats to use them, to force the target state to change behavior,” carried out by civilian agencies (police, border/customs, Coast Guard).

Role in author’s argument: The signature “middle path” tool: coercive enough to impose pain and signal resolve, but less escalatory than military force.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Risk management and escalation control; especially relevant under alliance/third-party constraints (avoid triggering defense treaties).
Operationalization: Incursions/harassment by maritime law enforcement; detentions by customs/border; denial of access to disputed areas.
Divergence: Narrows “gray-zone” to civilian/violent tools, rejecting overly expansive definitions that include military actions or economic sanctions.

Comparison to other theorists:
Gray-zone literature (Mazarr): Zhang critiques “too expansive” gray-zone concepts and draws sharper instrument boundaries.
Covert action literature: She links gray-zone selection to escalation avoidance logic.

Term: Military coercion

Definition: “displays, threats, and uses of force short of war” (e.g., deployments, exercises, naval visits) and is “expensive and risks escalation.”

Role in author’s argument: The high-escalation endpoint of the spectrum; used selectively—often less as China grows stronger.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Classic coercive signaling (physical, menacing, commitment signals) but costly and escalation-prone.
Operationalization: Shows of force, missile tests, large exercises (e.g., Taiwan Strait Crisis).

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling/Slantchev: Military moves as costly signals; Zhang adds that even “stronger” China may use them less due to backlash and economic constraints.

Term: Nonmilitarized / nonmilitary coercion

Definition (implied by spectrum): Tools below military coercion—diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, gray-zone coercion—lie “in between” inaction and military coercion.

Role in author’s argument: Explains why China “resort[s] primarily to nonmilitarized tools.”

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Coercion without overt force; emphasizes risk control and interdependence constraints.
Operationalization: Coded explicitly as distinct DV categories.

Comparison to other theorists:
Mainstream coercion literature: Zhang argues IR work has privileged “military terms,” and she corrects that bias empirically and theoretically.

Term: Cost-balancing theory

Definition: “coercion decisions are a result of balancing security and economic factors in an era of global economic interdependence.”

Role in author’s argument: The book’s core explanatory mechanism for (1) whether China coerces, (2) which tools it chooses, and (3) which challengers it targets.

Analytical notes:

Relation to coercion/deterrence models: Predominantly rationalist (cost/benefit balancing) but integrates psychological/perception via reputation/resolve and structural/IPE via interdependence.
Operationalization/measures:
- Benefit = need to establish reputation for resolve (high/low)
- Costs = economic cost (high/low) + geopolitical backlash cost (high/low)
- Issue importance conditions decisions when benefit high but economic cost high
  
  Comparison to other theorists:
Offensive realism / power-transition: Contrasts with linear “more power → more coercion/military coercion”; Zhang explicitly finds military coercion can decline as power rises.
Domestic politics explanations: She treats nationalism/leadership as alternative hypotheses, not the primary driver.

Term: Need to establish a reputation for resolve

Definition: The “broader benefit” of coercion is “the need to establish a reputation for resolve and be viewed as strong and credible by other states, not just the coercion target.”

Role in author’s argument: Explains why China sometimes coerces even when immediate compliance is uncertain—coercion is also for audiences beyond the target.

Analytical notes:

Relation to deterrence: Reputation is a deterrence-by-example logic; coercion shapes beliefs of potential challengers.
Operationalization/measures: Visibility and frequency of challenges are used as objective indicators: media coverage and number of incidents.

Comparison to other theorists:
Mercer vs Press vs Yarhi-Milo: Zhang uses a perception-centric reputation definition (Mercer) and operationalizes reputational pressure through visibility.
Fearon audience costs: Shifts focus from domestic punishment for backing down to international reputational incentives before coercion.

Term: Reputation for resolve

Definition: “extent to which a state is perceived as willing to risk war to keep its promises and uphold its threats.”

Role in author’s argument: The reputational “benefit” that coercion can build/maintain.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Credibility/resolution signaling; reputational concerns operate through others’ dispositional inferences.
Operationalization: Media salience (Reuters/AP/AFP), past coercion, and challenger patterns.

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling: Reputation’s value is indirect; Zhang makes that indirect “bystander” logic central.
Mercer: Consistent with dispositional attribution and perception-based reputation.

Term: Resolve

Definition: “a state of firmness or steadfastness of purpose.”

Role in author’s argument: Underpins the reputational benefit concept (resolve reputation) but is not assumed constant across issues and contexts.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Resolve/credibility are endogenous to reputational pressure and issue importance.
Operationalization: Not measured as a psychological trait; proxied through situational indicators that create incentives to demonstrate resolve.

Comparison to other theorists:
Kertzer: Zhang adopts a standard IR definition and shifts the focus to when leaders feel compelled to demonstrate it publicly.

Term: Reputation

Definition: “a judgment of someone’s character or disposition used to predict or explain future behavior,” often shaped by dispositional attributions and past behavior.

Role in author’s argument: The cognitive mechanism connecting past coercion/inaction to future challenger behavior and bystander beliefs.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Explicitly perception-based; bridges rationalist incentives and psychological inference.
Operationalization: Uses observable “visibility” conditions that activate reputational stakes.

Comparison to other theorists:
Reputation debate: Aligns with scholarship emphasizing perception and inference rather than mechanical updating.

Term: Issue importance

Definition: “not all high-stakes issues are created equal”; issue importance “differs across issues but remains constant within the same issue,” and becomes decisive when both need for resolve and economic cost are high.

Role in author’s argument: Conditional variable that explains why China sometimes coerces despite high economic costs—only when the issue is of the “highest importance.”

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Adds an “issue hierarchy” to coercion choice beyond generic resolve.
Operationalization: Treated as constant per issue; Taiwan and Tibet are highest importance; maritime disputes typically lower.

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling: Stakes matter, but Zhang uses stakes as a switch under high economic-cost conditions rather than as a continuous parameter.

Term: Economic cost

Definition: “negative disruption to domestic economic production and foreign economic relations, such as losing markets, supply, or capital.”

Role in author’s argument: One of two main costs that can deter coercion; explains restraint even under reputational pressure.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Integrates IPE into coercion theory: interdependence constrains coercers, not just targets.
Operationalization/measures: Economic cost is evaluated via China’s exposure through (1) foreign trade/markets, (2) domestic production and supply chains, and (3) international finance/capital.

Comparison to other theorists:
Traditional coercion: Often focuses on imposing costs on targets; Zhang centers the coercer’s self-cost calculus.
Weaponized interdependence logic: Compatible with the idea that networks can be both leverage and vulnerability (but Zhang’s emphasis is decision restraint).

Term: Global economic interdependence

Definition (scope assumption): In the contemporary era, states are embedded “through global supply chains and the global financial network”; thus they calculate both direct economic and geopolitical costs of coercion.

Role in author’s argument: Structural condition making economic cost salient and shaping instrument choice (favoring less escalatory tools).

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Adds structural constraints to rational deterrence/coercion logic.
Operationalization: Case chapters operationalize via trade dependence, supply chain roles, FDI/ODA patterns, and financial exposure.

Comparison to other theorists:
Classic coercion (Cold War): Less interdependent baseline; Zhang argues globalization changes coercion calculus.

Term: Geopolitical backlash cost

Definition: Includes “the possibility of other states balancing against China if it chooses coercion” and “the immediate risk of militarized escalation with the coercion target involving a great power.”

Role in author’s argument: Explains (a) why China prefers nonmilitary tools when backlash risk is high, and (b) why China targets challengers selectively to avoid unifying opposition.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Security dilemma and alliance dynamics embedded in coercion choice; backlash cost is a risk-manipulation constraint.
Operationalization/measures: Weighted toward immediate escalation risk and alliance strengthening; uses assessments of balancing capability and great-power involvement.

Comparison to other theorists:
Walt / balance-of-threat: Directly operationalizes balancing reactions as a cost, importing alliance formation logic into coercion selection.

Term: Balancing

Definition: “creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or forging alliances to prevent potential domination.”

Role in author’s argument: The principal long-term geopolitical penalty China seeks to avoid by moderating tools and targeting.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Links coercion actions to coalition dynamics; coercion can be strategically counterproductive if it triggers balancing.
Operationalization: Inferred through target’s alliance options and observed/expected alignment shifts.

Comparison to other theorists:
Realist alliance theory: Zhang makes alliance reaction an explicit part of coercion calculus, not merely an ex post consequence.

Term: Goldilocks choices / “China’s gambits”

Definition: “Goldilocks choices … China’s gambits,” i.e., taking “the middle path” between extremes based on cost-balancing.

Role in author’s argument: Captures the recurring empirical pattern: China often avoids both inaction and military coercion, selecting intermediate tools.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: A practical theory of escalation management under interdependence and alliance constraints.
Operationalization: Observed across cases (e.g., gray-zone in maritime disputes; diplomatic/economic tools in Tibet cases).

Comparison to other theorists:
Schelling: Similar spirit of limited force/threat manipulation; Zhang supplies a cost-based selection rule and adds gray-zone coercion as a distinct tool category.

Term: Selective targeting / “killing the chicken to scare the monkey”

Definition (evidence phrase): Chinese analysts describe coercion as “killing the chicken to scare the monkey,” i.e., punish one to deter others.

Role in author’s argument: Explains why China does not coerce all challengers; selective punishment can build a resolve reputation while limiting backlash.

Analytical notes:

Relation to deterrence: Deterrence by example and reputational spillover.
Operationalization: Paired comparisons (e.g., coercion of Philippines vs restraint toward Malaysia; coercion of some European states vs Australia).

Comparison to other theorists:
Reputation skeptics: Even if reputations are perception-driven, China believes exemplars matter—making this a theory of policy choice under belief.

Term: Media exposure / visibility (reputation pressure indicator)

Definition (measurement logic): The need to establish resolve is measured with objective indicators including visibility, proxied by media coverage in major outlets.

Role in author’s argument: Mechanism that makes reputational stakes acute (more visible challenges → higher pressure to demonstrate resolve).

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Links signaling to information environment; reputational effects depend on what others see.
Operationalization: Factiva searches and counts (Reuters/AP/AFP) in chapter figures.

Comparison to other theorists:
Audience costs: Instead of domestic audience punishment, Zhang uses international audience visibility to operationalize reputational pressure.

Term: Cyclical pattern of coercion

Definition: As the need to establish resolve varies, the theory expects “the frequency of coercion over time should follow a cyclical pattern.”

Role in author’s argument: Counters linear narratives of “China gets stronger → China coerces more/more militarily.”

Analytical notes:

Relation to escalation models: Implies fluctuation tied to incidents/visibility and cost environments rather than monotonic escalation.
Operationalization: Time-series of challenges and coercion cases (1990–2020) and media reporting.

Comparison to other theorists:
Power-transition/offensive realism: Diverges by predicting non-linear coercion patterns.

Term: Scope conditions

Definition: The theory applies when the state is “rational and calculating, not ideologically driven” and “cares about maintaining economic growth,” and is embedded in global interdependence; it does not apply to states like North Korea.

Role in author’s argument: Defines generalizability boundaries and prevents overextension.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Explicit rationalist assumptions plus globalization condition.
Operationalization: China is a plausible case because Chinese strategy integrates economic development (“comprehensive national security” includes economic growth).

Comparison to other theorists:
Ideational/cultural explanations: Zhang brackets ideology as primary driver in the theory’s domain.

Term: Dual deterrence

Definition (policy implication): US/allies should adopt “a dual deterrence strategy of deterring both China and its coercion targets,” to reduce escalation spirals.

Role in author’s argument: Translates cost-balancing insights into alliance crisis-management guidance.

Analytical notes:

Relation to deterrence models: Extended deterrence + restraint signaling to partners; managing both adversary and protégé behavior.
Operationalization: Not directly measured; implied strategic prescription from backlash-cost logic.

Comparison to other theorists:
Alliance assurance literature: Similar to arguments that crisis stability requires managing allies/clients as well as adversaries.

Term: “Coercion is not a magic bullet”

Definition: Coercion “is not a magic bullet,” and escalation spirals can occur if targets respond militarily even when China uses nonmilitary tools.

Role in author’s argument: Limits claim scope; warns that tool choice does not guarantee stability or success.

Analytical notes:

Relation to victory theories: Coercion can fail or produce counter-coercion; victory without war is not assured.
Operationalization: Shown through cases where coercion triggers backlash, balancing, or escalation risks.

Comparison to other theorists:
Coercive diplomacy “limits” tradition: Resonates with George’s emphasis on coercion’s frequent failure; Zhang explains why coercers still try.

Term: China’s coercion dataset (1990–2020)

Definition: “No one has cataloged Chinese nonmilitary or gray-zone coercion yet… creating a new and comprehensive dataset of Chinese coercion since the 1990s.”

Role in author’s argument: Empirical backbone enabling cross-issue, over-time testing of the theory.

Analytical notes:

Relation to models: Enables systematic comparison across instrument choice and target selection (beyond narrative case study).
Operationalization: Content analysis of Chinese/English sources; chapter figures rely on Factiva searches and incident counts.

Comparison to other theorists:
Many coercion works: Rely on coercer threats or militarized disputes datasets; Zhang broadens coercion measurement to include gray-zone and diplomatic/economic tools.

⸻

🔫 Author Background

Position & research focus: Ketian Zhang is an Assistant Professor at George Mason University; studies rising powers’ grand strategies, coercion, economic statecraft, and maritime disputes (China focus).
Publication lineage: The book “emerg[es] from an award-winning article in International Security.”
Training networks / intellectual influences (from acknowledgments): Advising/mentorship influences include Taylor Fravel, Dick Samuels, Steve Van Evera, Vipin Narang.
Methodological orientation signaled by acknowledgments: Emphasis on qualitative rigor (attention to sources; methodology), plus IPE–security bridge.

⸻

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Main issue/puzzle: China has used coercion since 1990 over territorial disputes and Taiwan/Tibet issues, but it is “selective” in timing, target, and tools.

Thesis: A “new and generalizable” cost-balancing theory explains coercion decisions: states weigh the benefit of establishing a reputation for resolve against two costs—economic cost and geopolitical backlash cost—with issue importance conditioning decisions when economic costs are high.

Core empirical punchline: China “does not coerce frequently” and uses “military coercion less when it becomes stronger,” relying “primarily” on nonmilitarized tools.

⸻

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

Zhang builds a general theory of coercion decision-making for a globalized era by treating coercion as a spectrum of tools (inaction through diplomatic/economic/gray-zone to military) and arguing that China’s choices reflect rational cost-balancing under interdependence: Beijing coerces when reputational pressure to demonstrate resolve is high and economic costs are manageable, but it selects less escalatory tools when the geopolitical backlash risk (balancing and great-power escalation) is high, often making “Goldilocks” middle-path moves; across post-1990 cases (South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet/Dalai Lama), this explains why China can be assertive yet selective, why it often avoids military coercion despite greater power, and why it sometimes targets challengers selectively to deter others without triggering unified opposition.

⸻

🎯 Course Themes Tracker

Coercion, compellence, deterrence: Focuses on “compelling to deter” coercive responses to status-quo challenges.
Credibility & resolve: Resolve reputation is the key benefit; credibility is audience-facing, not only dyadic.
Signaling & perception: Visibility/media coverage operationalizes reputational pressure; coercion decisions hinge on what others observe.
Rational vs. emotional vs. cultural logics: Assumes rational, calculating states that care about economic growth; brackets ideology as primary driver (scope condition).
Theories of victory: Not a victory-in-war theory; a theory of influence without war—yet coercion “is not a magic bullet.”
Escalation dynamics & thresholds: Tool choice is driven by escalation risk; gray-zone coercion is attractive for escalation control and plausible deniability.
Alliance assurance & extended deterrence: Backlash cost includes alliance strengthening and great-power involvement; policy implication includes “dual deterrence.”
Cost-balancing & risk manipulation: Core mechanism: balance reputation/resolve benefit against economic + geopolitical costs.
Instruments of coercion: Full spectrum: diplomatic/economic/gray-zone/military.
Competition continuum: Empirically centered on “space between cooperation… and the use of force,” especially nonmilitary/gray-zone behavior.

⸻

🔑 Top Takeaways

China is selective, not uniformly coercive—and not necessarily more militarily coercive as it becomes stronger.
Coercion choice is about three drivers: resolve reputation pressure (benefit), plus economic and geopolitical backlash costs—with issue importance as a conditional switch.
The key reputational logic is multilateral: coercion is for bystanders as much as targets.
Globalization constrains coercers: dependence on markets, supply chains, and capital makes coercion costly even for major powers.
Geopolitical backlash is not abstract: it includes alliance strengthening and immediate escalation risks involving great powers.
Gray-zone coercion is a central “middle path” because it is less likely to trigger defense treaties and can create plausible deniability.
China often uses exemplars—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey”—to deter other challengers without coercing everyone.
The theory predicts cyclical patterns of coercion frequency driven by changing reputational pressure, not simple power trends.
The book provides a new dataset of Chinese coercion across the full tool spectrum since the 1990s.
Policy implication: deterrence strategy should manage both China and its coercion targets to avoid escalation spirals (“dual deterrence”).

⸻

📒 Sections

Chapter 1: Introduction

Summary:

Positions a gap in coercion and China-foreign-policy literature: there is “rich space” between cooperation and force, yet China’s nonmilitary/gray-zone coercion has not been fully cataloged; the book builds a comprehensive dataset and asks when/who China coerces and which tools it uses.

Key Points:

Motivates selectivity puzzle; emphasizes relevance to Asia-Pacific stability.
Claims potential generalizability beyond China and previews non-China implications in Ch. 7.
Defines the book’s empirical scope (post-1990; core/important national security issues) and identifies three issue areas: Taiwan, territorial disputes, Tibet.

Theory Lens Map:

Rationalist coercion choice: Utility calculus under constraints.
Perception/reputation: Resolve reputation as benefit (Mercer/Kertzer framing).
IPE constraints: Global interdependence affects coercion costs.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Why coercion can be both assertive and restrained.
Why “gray-zone” is strategically attractive but escalatory in its own way.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Puzzle: Selectivity (timing/target/tool).
Proposed mechanism: Cost-balancing with issue-importance conditioning.

Limits Map (mini):

Book explicitly prioritizes explaining decisions and tool choice; it is not primarily a coercion success/effectiveness evaluation.

Section 1.2: The Argument

Summary:

Introduces the two primary questions (when/who; tools) and points toward cost-balancing as the answer.

Key Points:

Highlights the under-cataloging of Chinese nonmilitary/gray-zone coercion and fills it with a dataset.
Frames the goal as explaining coercion choices “in this current era of global economic interdependence,” especially nonmilitarized coercion.

Theory Lens Map:

Gap-bridging move: coercion theory + China foreign-policy + IPE interdependence.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Tool taxonomy and decision logic become the scaffold for later case chapters.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Dependent variable is multi-category (not binary).

Limits Map (mini):

Argues for generalizability but centers on China as “excellent opportunity” to study contemporary rising powers.

Chapter 2: The Cost-Balancing Theory

Summary:

Defines coercion as a spectrum and develops cost-balancing theory: China balances the reputational benefit (need to demonstrate resolve) against economic costs and geopolitical backlash costs, with issue importance as a conditioning factor; the theory also predicts selective targeting and nonmilitary tool preference under high backlash risk.

Key Points:

Formalizes DV: inaction, diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, gray-zone coercion, military coercion.
Prediction: when reputational need is high, China coerces if economic costs are low; if economic costs are high, only coerces when issue is of highest importance.
Prediction: when coercion happens, China often chooses nonmilitary tools when geopolitical backlash cost is high.
Prediction: selective targeting of challengers to reduce backlash and still build resolve reputation.

Theory Lens Map:

Benefit: resolve reputation / credibility signaling.
Costs: economic interdependence costs + geopolitical backlash costs.
Conditional: issue importance hierarchy across issues.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Coercion as strategic competition below war, shaped by alliance and market structures.
Gray-zone coercion as risk-managed coercion.

Coercion Logic Breakdown (decision rule skeleton):

If Need for resolve high + Economic cost low → Coerce.
If Need high + Economic cost high → Coerce only if Issue importance highest.
If Geopolitical backlash high → Prefer nonmilitary (esp. gray-zone) to reduce escalation and balancing.

Limits Map (mini):

Scope conditions exclude ideologically driven states and assume leaders care about economic growth and interdependence.

Section 2.1: Coercion on a Spectrum

Summary:

Argues the coercion literature over-privileges military tools; defines the spectrum and clarifies inaction as negative case.

Key Points:

Diplomatic sanctions and economic sanctions can “signal” displeasure and inflict pain; gray-zone coercion is civilian-violent tool; military coercion is most escalatory.
Gray-zone coercion is distinct because it is less likely to trigger defense treaties and reduces escalation risk.

Theory Lens Map:

A taxonomy enabling instrument choice theory (not just “whether coercion”).

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Escalation control; plausible deniability; alliance thresholds.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Instrument selection is tied to expected backlash and escalation pathways.

Limits Map (mini):

Spectrum coding depends on classification choices (notably what counts as gray-zone vs economic/diplomatic).

Section 2.2: The Cost-Balancing Theory (variables & scope)

Summary:

Specifies benefits/costs and scope conditions for theory applicability.

Key Points:

Reputation/resolve benefit is about being viewed credible by other states, not just target.
Economic cost and geopolitical backlash cost jointly constrain coercion; issue importance resolves tradeoffs when costs are high.
Embedded in global supply chains and global financial network.

Theory Lens Map:

Rationalist choice + reputation psychology + IPE structure.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

“Comprehensive national security” = economic growth and national defense intertwined.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Crisis/incident visibility is a reputational amplifier; geopolitics determines how far China can climb escalation ladder.

Limits Map (mini):

Assumption set restricts generalizability; changing globalization levels could change predictions.

Section 2.2.7: Measurement (brief)

Summary:

Binary coding: DV is coercion/inaction; independent variables (IVs) coded high/low; issue importance treated as constant per issue; severity of coercion tool coded on spectrum.

Key Points:

DV: inaction vs coercion; tool severity coded 1–5 (inaction lowest, military highest).
Reputation/resolve need proxied by visibility (Reuters/AP/AFP coverage) and incident counts.
Economic cost proxied by dependence on markets/supply/capital and finance exposure.
Geopolitical backlash cost weighted to immediate escalation and alliance strengthening.

Theory Lens Map:

Translates perception and interdependence into observable indicators.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Visibility becomes a proxy for reputational stakes (audience attention).

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

High visibility → higher reputational need → higher incentive to coerce if costs manageable.

Limits Map (mini):

Binary high/low coding risks masking within-category variation; visibility proxies may conflate attention with importance.

Chapter 3: Coercion in the South China Sea

Summary:

Shows China’s coercion in the South China Sea rose in the 2010s but military coercion did not rise in parallel; instead China often used nonmilitary and especially gray-zone tools, consistent with cost-balancing under high geopolitical backlash risk and varied economic cost exposure.

Key Points:

Philippines and Vietnam challenged more; Malaysia less; China’s coercion is selective among challengers.
Case: Mischief Reef (1994–95) — China used military coercion amid a “geopolitical vacuum” after US withdrawal from Clark/Subic, lowering backlash cost.
Case: Scarborough (2001) — China showed restraint; explanation includes concern over “economic costs,” including WTO entry and ASEAN FTA pursuit.
Case: Scarborough (2012) — China used “moderate coercion, especially gray-zone coercion,” balancing reputational need with backlash costs.

Theory Lens Map:

Reputation: visible maritime challenges raise need for resolve (media/incident counts).
Backlash: US involvement and alliance dynamics limit militarized options.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Gray-zone coercion as dominant tool when escalation risks high.
Selective targeting as wedge strategy: punish one to deter others.

Coercion Logic Breakdown (chapter-specific):

High reputational pressure from repeated/high-visibility challenges + manageable economic cost → coercion.
High backlash (US/alliances) → gray-zone rather than military.

Limits Map (mini):

Distinguishing “opportunistic” expansion vs reactive coercion can be hard in maritime contexts; the book emphasizes reactive responses.

Chapter 4: Sino-Japanese Disputes in the East China Sea

Summary:

Explains why China escalated coercion against Japan in the 2010 Senkaku boat clash and 2012 nationalization crisis: increased visibility raised reputational pressure, while geopolitical backlash risk (US–Japan alliance) encouraged nonmilitary/gray-zone tools rather than military coercion.

Key Points:

2010 boat clash: China used “diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and gray-zone coercion.”
2012 nationalization crisis: China relied on gray-zone coercion and diplomatic sanctions, plus “small-scale economic sanctions.”
Earlier restraint: pre‑2005 low reputational need + high economic cost → little coercion; 1996–97 and 2001–04 saw no coercion when either need low or economic cost high.
Issue importance matters: East China Sea not “high enough” in priority when both reputational need and economic cost were high; Taiwan ranked higher.

Theory Lens Map:

Visibility drives resolve need; economic leverage shifts over time (FDI/ODA patterns).
Backlash cost high → avoid militarized coercion.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Coercion to manage audience beliefs can coincide with “opportunistic” exploitation of crisis windows.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

High publicity → reputational pressure → coercion; alliance constraints push to gray-zone/diplomatic/economic tools.

Limits Map (mini):

Japan is a hard target with high economic and geopolitical salience; instrument choice may reflect bureaucratic or economic-channel constraints beyond the model.

Chapter 5: Coercion in Cross-Strait Relations

Summary:

Taiwan is a highest-importance issue; the model explains why China used military coercion in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis (high reputational pressure + highest issue importance) yet often relied on moderate coercion or restraint in US arms sales episodes depending on economic costs and backlash risks.

Key Points:

Taiwan is treated as “the highest importance issue”; both need for resolve and costs can be high, producing exceptional behavior.
1992 US arms sales: Despite reputational need, high economic cost and US control of global finance made coercion unattractive; China limited response.
1995–96 crisis: China used military coercion because issue importance overrides cost concerns.
Post‑2008: China used “moderate coercion” against US arms sales.
Chapter conclusion: China’s coercion decisions are not simply “resolve,” but complex balancing in global interdependence.

Theory Lens Map:

Issue importance “switch” is most visible here.
Geopolitical backlash includes great-power escalation risk; pushes toward nonmilitary tools unless stakes are maximal.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Extended deterrence dynamics: US as third party; alliance credibility and escalation thresholds structure China’s options.
“Dual deterrence” implication emerges from this kind of case environment.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

High stakes (Taiwan) can justify higher-risk tools, but economic and backlash costs still shape which coercion is chosen at the margins.

Limits Map (mini):

Highly militarized environments risk rapid escalation regardless of cost-balancing intentions.

Chapter 6: Tibet and the Dalai Lama Visits

Summary:

Foreign leaders receiving the Dalai Lama trigger Chinese coercion; the book explains variation in China’s use of diplomatic/economic sanctions and selective targeting (France/Germany vs Australia) through reputational pressure, economic costs, and relatively lower geopolitical backlash risks compared to maritime/Taiwan contexts.

Key Points:

Goal of coercion: deter receptions and restore status quo (punish to avoid future meetings).
Temporal anomaly: China was willing to coerce before 1996 and after 2002, but not 1996–2002; explained as economic development priorities (high economic cost).
Selective targeting: coerced France and Germany but not Australia in a key period.
Tibet is explicitly a “core interest” issue, raising issue importance.

Theory Lens Map:

Issue importance high (core interest) → coercion more likely even with costs.
Economic cost affects which targets are chosen and how severe sanctions become (market/supply/capital exposure).

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Economic interdependence does not eliminate coercion; it channels it into targeted, often reversible measures.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

High reputational need (visible foreign receptions) + manageable costs → diplomatic/economic sanctions; selective targeting to avoid backlash and self-harm.

Limits Map (mini):

Attribution: isolating coercion’s causal effect on leaders’ future meeting decisions can be difficult (endogeneity of anticipation).

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Summary:

Reiterates that China’s coercion is rational and calculating; highlights broader implications for coercion theory under interdependence, explains why stronger states may use less military coercion, and proposes policy implications including dual deterrence and caution against treating coercion as a “magic bullet.”

Key Points:

“China is a rational and calculating coercer.”
Coercion choices are “complex balancing of costs and benefits in an era of global economic interdependence.”
Policy: manage escalation by deterring both China and targets (“dual deterrence”).
Warning: coercion can produce escalation spirals and is not inherently stabilizing.

Theory Lens Map:

Generalizable coercion decision theory conditioned by interdependence and backlash risk.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Competition below war; gray-zone dynamics; alliance management.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Even “Goldilocks” tool choices can backfire if targets respond militarily.

Limits Map (mini):

Book is more about explaining why coercion is chosen than whether it achieves compliance; “does not attempt to evaluate whether China’s coercion has been effective.”

⸻

🧱 Limits Typology (Coercion-Specific)

1) Structural-economic limits (interdependence constraints)

Coercers risk “negative disruption” to their own markets/supply/capital.
Global supply chains and finance create second-order effects that can raise self-costs (sanctions boomerang; investor confidence; supply chokepoints).

2) Geopolitical backlash limits (coalition & escalation constraints)

Coercion can trigger balancing and alliance strengthening against China.
High-end tools risk immediate militarized escalation involving a great power.

3) Signaling & perception limits (credibility externalities)

Reputation is perception-based; coercion might not be interpreted as intended (especially gray-zone ambiguity).
Visibility varies; low-visibility challenges reduce reputational incentives to respond, potentially inviting misreads.

4) Instrument limits (tool-specific ceilings)

Diplomatic sanctions can cut communication and intelligence channels if too severe.
Military coercion signals commitment but is “expensive and risks escalation.”
Gray-zone coercion reduces alliance triggers but can still ratchet spirals via repeated friction and accidents.

5) Strategy limits (coercion is not automatic success)

Coercion “is not a magic bullet”; targets can respond militarily and escalate even if China uses nonmilitary tools.

⸻

📏 Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)

Book’s stance: The project explains when/why/how China coerces and explicitly does not attempt to evaluate effectiveness systematically.

MoE menu (useful for SAASS final papers):

Immediate compliance: Did target stop the status-quo-changing action (halt patrols, cancel meeting, suspend policy)?
Deterrence-by-example: Did bystanders reduce similar challenges afterward (supports “reputation for resolve” mechanism)?
Alliance/backlash effect: Did coercion strengthen balancing coalitions or deepen third-party commitments (a “cost” in Zhang’s framework)?
Economic net effect: Self-cost vs target-cost over time (markets, supply, capital).
Escalation outcome: Did coercion escalate to militarized incidents, crisis, or near-war (tool risk profile)?
Durability of outcome: Did coercion restore status quo temporarily or sustainably?

⸻

🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives (Strategic Empathy)

China (coercer)

Strategic goals: Defend perceived national security interests; bolster status quo; maintain credibility/resolve reputation.
Constraints: Economic growth as a core priority; interdependence creates self-harm risk.
Tool preferences: Often “middle path” (Goldilocks) and gray-zone under high backlash risk.

Targets

Philippines/Vietnam/Malaysia (SCS): Balance sovereignty/resource access vs economic ties; rely on external balancing differently.
Japan (ECS): High alliance linkage (US–Japan) → raises geopolitical backlash costs for China and shapes China’s instrument selection.
United States (Taiwan arms sales): Great-power involvement increases backlash and escalation risk; China’s responses weigh financial/economic exposure.
European/Australian leaders (Dalai Lama): Domestic values/politics vs economic exposure to China; China uses selective sanctions to deter receptions.

Bystanders / regional states

Interpret coercion as information about China’s resolve; may respond by hedging or balancing (a key “backlash” channel).

⸻

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

(Book’s core empirical period: post‑1990s across Taiwan/territorial/Tibet issues.)

1992: US arms sales to Taiwan; China constrained by high economic/financial exposure.
1994–1995: Mischief Reef episode; China used military coercion amid lowered backlash cost (“geopolitical vacuum”).
1995–1996: Taiwan Strait Crisis; China used military coercion given highest issue importance.
1996–2002 (Tibet anomaly window): Variation in coercion explained by economic development concerns.
2001: Scarborough Shoal incident; China abstained; linked to economic costs (WTO, ASEAN FTA).
2010: Senkaku/Diaoyu boat clash; China used diplomatic/economic/gray-zone coercion.
2012: Senkaku nationalization crisis; gray-zone + diplomatic + small-scale economic sanctions.
2012: Scarborough (Philippines) crisis; China used moderate coercion, especially gray-zone.
Post‑2008 onward: China used moderate coercion against US arms sales to Taiwan.

⸻

📖 Historiographical Context

Classic coercion tradition: Builds on Schelling’s compellence logic and extends coercion beyond force-centric definitions.
Coercive diplomacy debates: Echoes “limits” school by emphasizing that coercion can be costly and risky; but shifts focus from success conditions to decision selection.
Reputation/resolve scholarship: Explicitly uses a perception-based definition of reputation for resolve and operationalizes reputational pressure through visibility.
IPE and interdependence: Central move is “bring the economy back in” by treating globalization (supply chains/finance) as a coercion constraint.
Gray-zone literature: Clarifies conceptual boundaries; rejects expansive “gray-zone” definitions that fold in economic sanctions and military actions.

⸻

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

Research design

Dataset-first + case analysis: Creates a comprehensive coercion dataset since the 1990s and then uses issue-area chapters for structured explanation.
Operationalization: DV coded on coercion spectrum; IVs (resolve need, economic cost, backlash cost) coded high/low; issue importance treated as constant by issue.
Visibility measurement: Factiva searches of Reuters/AP/AFP and incident counts appear as chapter figures.
Sources: Leverages “primary Chinese documents and interviews with Chinese and foreign officials.”

Methodological contribution claim

Adds missing catalog of Chinese nonmilitary/gray-zone coercion.

⸻

🔄 Learning Over Time

China’s learning/adaptation (as implied by patterns and tool shifts):

Movement toward “middle path” tools (gray-zone/diplomatic/economic) as geopolitical backlash risk rises and interdependence deepens.
Declining reliance on military coercion “when it becomes stronger,” consistent with learning about escalation and backlash costs.
Time variation consistent with cyclical reputational pressure tied to incidents and visibility.

Targets’ learning (strategic adaptation):

As coercion becomes predictable and selective, targets may hedge: seek third-party backing (raising backlash costs for China) or reduce exposure to Chinese economic leverage (reducing future coercion effectiveness).

⸻

🧐 Critical Reflections

Endogeneity risk: Visibility is used as an indicator for resolve-reputation need; coercion itself can generate visibility, complicating causal direction.
Binary coding tradeoff: High/low coding simplifies comparisons but may hide meaningful within-category variation and interaction effects.
Belief vs reality: The model explains coercion choices as driven by reputation concerns; but whether reputations actually operate the way leaders believe is separable (and not fully tested here).
Tool boundary debates: Defining gray-zone strictly as civilian violent tools is analytically clean but may exclude borderline cases where military-adjacent actors (militia, paramilitaries) blur lines.
Effectiveness left open: The book largely does not evaluate coercion effectiveness; for SAASS papers, adding outcome measures could strengthen causal inference on coercion as strategy.

⸻

⚔️ Comparative Insights

Across issue areas

Taiwan: Highest issue importance enables militarized coercion under high reputational pressure despite high costs.
Maritime disputes (SCS/ECS): Typically lower issue importance and higher backlash risk → more gray-zone and nonmilitary coercion.
Tibet/Dalai Lama: High issue importance (core interest) but generally lower immediate militarized escalation risk → heavy diplomatic/economic coercion and selective targeting.

Compared to classic coercion literature

Where Zhang diverges:
- DV includes gray-zone and diplomatic sanctions as systematic coercion categories (not side notes).
- Causal focus is coercer self-costs and backlash risks, not only target suffering.
- Reputation logic is explicitly bystander-oriented.

⸻

✍️ Key Terms / Acronyms

(Selection from book list + seminar-relevant acronyms.)

AFP Agence France Presse
AP The Associated Press
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CICIR China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
CMC Central Military Commission
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operation
JCG Japan Coast Guard
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN Most Favored Nation
MID Militarized Interstate Dispute

⸻

❓ Open Questions (Instructor Focus Questions)

If reputations are perception-based, how durable is “reputation for resolve” across different issue areas (Taiwan vs maritime vs Tibet)?
Does gray-zone coercion really reduce escalation risk, or does it increase the probability of accidents/miscalculation over time?
Under what conditions do economic interdependence costs stop constraining coercion (e.g., decoupling, sanctions-proofing)?
How would the model predict coercion behavior for a state that is rational but less integrated into global finance (partial scope violation)?
Can “selective targeting” backfire by revealing patterns that allow targets to coordinate more effectively (raising backlash costs)?
What are the best outcome metrics to evaluate coercion effectiveness if the book does not?

⸻

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“China is a rational and calculating coercer.”
“Goldilocks choices… China’s gambits.”
Coercion is “not a magic bullet.”
Coercion as exemplar: “killing the chicken to scare the monkey.”
Coercion definition anchor: “use or threats of negative means to demand a change.”

⸻

🧾 Final-Paper Hooks

Extend Zhang’s dataset to 2021–present: test whether decoupling and technology sanctions change the economic-cost constraint and shift tool choice away from “Goldilocks” gray-zone strategies.
Outcome layer on Zhang’s model: Pair her decision theory with MoE (compliance, deterrence-by-example, backlash) to evaluate when cost-balanced coercion is strategically effective.
Alliance threshold research design: Compare cases where gray-zone coercion does/does not trigger alliance responses, testing the “defense treaty invocation” mechanism.
Belief-driven coercion: Use archival/interview evidence to test whether Chinese leaders explicitly reason in terms of reputational audiences and exemplar deterrence (beyond post hoc inference).
Cross-coercer application: Apply cost-balancing theory to another interdependent rising or revisionist power (e.g., Russia pre‑2022 vs post‑2022) and test scope conditions (interdependence level; economic-growth priority).
Issue-importance hierarchy test: Within one coercer, compare tool choice across “highest importance” issues (Taiwan/Tibet) vs lower-importance disputes to test the conditional switch logic.