Nonstate Warfare

The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias

🎙️ Comps Prep (Oral Comprehensive Exam)

• If you assume “nonstate = guerilla,” then you will misread enemy behavior and misbuild forces, because state and nonstate methods overlap along a Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum. So what for strategy: plan for midspectrum nonstate opponents, not categories. (PDF pp.29–30)

• When a nonstate actor faces a materially lethal battlefield and usable inferiority, then more Fabian methods become optimal, because war making balances the firepower needed to control territory against the cover needed to survive. So what for strategy: estimate that tradeoff before predicting “irregular.” (PDF p.45)

• When institutions are weak and stakes are limited, then nonstate actors tend to default toward simpler, often more Fabian behavior (or execute midspectrum poorly), because midspectrum warfare demands training and specialist interdependence their politics can’t reliably sustain. So what for strategy: treat organization/internal governance as a decisive variable in IW. (PDF p.64)

• This book supports Kalyvas’s focus on control/collaboration by reframing “how actors fight” as a product of organizational capacity and stakes, and it complicates Maoist assumptions of inevitable progression by making movement along the spectrum contingent on politics and technology. (PDF p.64)

Online Description

Biddle examines how nonstate armed groups actually fight—and argues that treating “conventional” state war and “guerilla” nonstate war as distinct categories is misleading. The book explains variation in nonstate military methods using a deductive theory and historical case studies that emphasize material constraints and (especially) internal politics such as institutions and stakes. (PDF pp.11, 45, 64)

Author Background

TBD

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60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences): Nonstate actors’ military methods vary along a spectrum from Fabian (irregular) to Napoleonic (conventional), and this variation is best explained by the interaction of material incentives and internal political constraints (institutions and stakes), not by stereotypes about “guerillas,” materiel alone, or “tribal culture.” (PDF p.18; PDF p.64)

• Causal logic in a phrase: Firepower–cover tradeoff (numbers/technology) × political feasibility (institutions/stakes) → where an actor can fight on the Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum. (PDF pp.45, 64)

• Why it matters for IW / strategic competition (2–4 bullets):

  • Nonstate actors can be midspectrum and “state-like,” producing serious tactical/operational challenges (e.g., Hezbollah). (PDF pp.107–108)

  • Partner capacity and adversary threat are often constrained less by weapons than by internal politics and ability to coordinate specialists. (PDF pp.64, 138)

  • Technology diffusion widens the range of plausible enemy methods; US force design should avoid optimizing for one narrow type of war. (PDF p.223)

• Best single takeaway (1 sentence): Stop assuming “nonstate = irregular”—diagnose institutions, stakes, and technology to predict how an armed group will actually fight. (PDF pp.21, 64)

Course Lens

• How does this text define/illuminate irregular warfare?

  • Treats “irregular/guerilla” as the Fabian extremum on a continuum of military methods, not a distinct “type of war.” (PDF p.22; PDF p.29)

  • Fabian characteristics (as framed here): refusal to hold ground via decisive engagement, dispersion, civilian intermingling for concealment, reliance on coercion, and light weapons suited to concealment. (PDF p.22)

• What does it imply about power/control, success metrics, and timeline in IW?

  • Control is central: even “wars of profit” still require shaping collective choices of populations over power/resources. (PDF p.31)

  • “Success” is not just attrition; it’s achieving political effects via military methods that can credibly coerce, protect, or control populations/territory—sometimes requiring holding ground (midspectrum/Napoleonic tendencies). (PDF pp.45, 106)

  • Timeline depends on feasible methods: actors constrained to Fabian approaches may accept protraction; actors capable of midspectrum methods may seek faster territorial effects—but feasibility is political as well as material. (PDF pp.64, 81)

• How does it connect to strategic competition?

  • Predicts a wide future distribution of enemy methods as advanced weapons proliferate and internal politics continue to vary—raising the premium on adaptable forces and accurate threat diagnosis. (PDF p.223)

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Seminar Questions (from syllabus)

• What does Biddle define nonstate warfare? Key characteristics vs traditional state-centric warfare?

• What assumptions about wartime behavior is he countering? Does it need to be made?

• What drives nonstate actors toward irregular warfare?

• How do technology/materiel affect whether actors fight irregularly?

• Does Biddle help us understand state actors and IW?

• Are his policy recommendations convincing?

✅ Direct Responses to Seminar Questions

• Q: What does Biddle define nonstate warfare? Key characteristics vs traditional state-centric warfare?

  • A:

    • Scope: explains the military behavior of nonstate actors in warfare involving numerically superior state opponents since 1900. (PDF p.21)

    • Nonstate actor (definition): any entity other than a sovereign state as defined by the Montevideo Convention (includes insurgents, separatists, warlord militias, PMFs, extremists, criminal syndicates, etc.). (PDF p.21)

    • Warfare (definition): organized violence exceeding 1,000 total battle deaths, with at least 100 deaths on each of at least two sides. (PDF p.21)

    • Key move vs “traditional” state-centric warfare: “state” vs “nonstate” is an actor identity, not a reliable predictor of methods; methods are better understood along a Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum with substantial overlap. (PDF p.29; PDF p.22)

    • Operational distinction: irregular (Fabian) vs conventional (Napoleonic) is defined behaviorally (holding ground, dispersion, distinguishability, etc.), not by legal sovereignty. (PDF p.22)

• Q: What assumptions about wartime behavior is he countering? Does it need to be made?

  • A:

    • Counters the assumption that state and nonstate war making are mutually exclusive categories (“conventional” vs “guerilla/irregular”), even when a “hybrid” category is added. (PDF p.29)

    • Counters the idea that the “guerilla” model is the natural/necessary method for nonstate actors; he calls this intuition a fallacy because many nonstate actors do not conform. (PDF pp.29–30)

    • Counters “tribal culture” as a sufficient explanation of nonstate methods: “neither materiel nor tribal culture offers an adequate explanation” for observed patterns. (PDF p.18)

    • Does the assumption need to be made? The book argues no—because it obscures the real causal drivers (material incentives + internal politics), and can mislead policy/force design. (PDF pp.11, 64)

• Q: What drives nonstate actors toward irregular warfare?

  • A:

    • Material logic: When the battlefield and relative capabilities make survival difficult, more Fabian approaches become attractive because actors must trade firepower for cover/concealment. (PDF p.45)

    • Political feasibility logic: Even when midspectrum behavior is militarily advantageous, actors may default to simpler (often more Fabian) methods if institutions and stakes don’t support the training, coordination, and specialist interdependence required. (PDF p.64)

    • Stakes mechanism: leaders invest and accept sacrifice for military capability when outcomes are perceived as more important (higher “stakes”). (PDF p.81)

    • Institutions mechanism: institutional capacity affects the “span of trust,” monitoring/enforcement, and ability to solve collective action dilemmas that complex warfare creates. (PDF pp.64, 78)

    • Empirical illustration: Hezbollah could exploit midspectrum advantages; the JAM could not due to internal politics. (PDF p.138)

• Q: How do technology/materiel affect whether actors fight irregularly?

  • A:

    • Technology shapes the materially optimal point on the spectrum by altering the tradeoff between firepower (needed to control territory) and cover (needed to survive). (PDF p.45)

    • Over time, technology change shifts incentives: early 20th-century optimal nonstate behavior was “highly Fabian,” but technology has moved the optimum “toward the middle” for more than a generation. (PDF p.45)

    • Nonstate actors can field sophisticated systems, sometimes approaching state enemies (book provides examples of advanced weapons held/used by nonstate forces). (PDF p.54)

    • Technology is not determinative: the SNA had TOW missiles but made no recorded use of them, indicating organizational/political constraints can override matériel opportunity. (PDF p.166)

    • Period effects: Vietcong 1965–68 were especially Fabian (0.2 on the six-point scale), consistent with a different technological/systemic environment than 2000s-era conflicts. (PDF p.213)

• Q: Does Biddle help us understand state actors and IW?

  • A:

    • Yes, by arguing for the possibility of a unified theory of state and nonstate war making grounded in shared material realities and variation in institutions and stakes. (PDF p.226)

    • His framework makes “irregular warfare” intelligible as one end of a broader continuum of methods—useful for states as well as nonstates, especially where states employ proxies or adopt more Fabian tactics themselves. (PDF p.29; PDF p.226)

    • He explicitly notes that states vary in institutions and stakes too—raising the question of whether similar relationships hold for state methods. (PDF p.226)

• Q: Are his policy recommendations convincing?

  • A:

    • His central policy warning is convincing on its own terms: future enemy methods may span the spectrum, so optimizing narrowly against one subset raises risk of mismatch. (PDF p.223)

    • He argues a future “modal” opponent implies a force that looks more like the 2001 legacy force than extreme alternatives—an argument grounded in anticipated enemy variation and complex terrain requirements. (PDF p.224)

    • Limits (as inference): the persuasiveness depends on whether his assumed drivers (proliferation + persistent political variation) remain dominant relative to other strategic shifts (e.g., maritime/air-centric contests outside his scope). (PDF pp.21, 223)

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Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 1: Introduction (PDF p.14–28)

• One-sentence thesis: Variation in nonstate military behavior is not well explained by materiel or tribal culture; a theory integrating technology and internal politics better accounts for observed methods. (PDF p.18)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Frames the problem: common stereotypes treat nonstate warfare as inherently guerilla/irregular, with major implications for policy and scholarship. (PDF p.11)

  • States core empirical claim: “neither materiel nor tribal culture” adequately explains observed nonstate war making patterns. (PDF p.18)

  • Defines scope: nonstate actors vs numerically superior states since 1900; warfare >1,000 battle deaths; continental focus. (PDF p.21)

  • Establishes unit of analysis and boundaries: excludes many low-scale violences; includes some “terrorism”/“criminal” conflicts when they meet the violence threshold. (PDF p.21)

  • Lays out method: deductive theory + leverage-maximizing historical case studies, acknowledging rationalist assumptions and likely learning/selection processes. (PDF p.24–25)

  • Roadmaps book: chapters 3–4 theory (materiel then internal politics), chapters 5–9 cases, appendix formalization. (PDF p.28)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Scope definitions (nonstate actor; warfare threshold). (PDF p.21)

  • Dependent variable framing (Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum). (PDF p.22)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Lays out five case-study campaigns (Hezbollah; JAM; SNA; Croatia; Vietcong) and the logic of case selection. (PDF pp.25–28)

  • Research base includes extensive interviews and field observation (methodological grounding appears in preface). (PDF p.11)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Warns that wrong typologies (“nonstate = guerilla”) can distort threat assessment and force design. (PDF p.11)

  • Provides definitions and scope rules usable for comparing IW cases consistently. (PDF p.21)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “My central findings are that neither materiel nor tribal culture offers an adequate explanation for the observed pattern of nonstate war making…” (PDF p.18)

Chapter 2: The Fallacy of Guerilla Warfare (PDF p.29–44)

• One-sentence thesis: The dominant categorical typology (conventional vs guerilla/irregular vs hybrid) is misleading; warfare methods are better understood as positions along a continuum between Fabian and Napoleonic archetypes. (PDF p.29)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Critiques discrete categories as implying different “underlying causal dynamics” rather than differences of degree. (PDF p.29)

  • Argues “hybrid” literature still preserves categorical thinking by adding a third box rather than a continuum. (PDF p.29)

  • Clarifies strategic intent: war aims are fundamentally political across actors; even “profit” wars require controlling population decisions. (PDF p.31)

  • Introduces the Fabian vs Napoleonic archetypes and argues most real militaries fall between them (“midspectrum”). (PDF p.22)

  • Defines key behavioral markers (e.g., willingness to hold ground; civilian intermingling; coercion vs brute force; heavy weapons). (PDF p.22)

  • Provides historical illustrations showing “rear areas,” urban terrain, and intermingling are not exclusive to either state or nonstate war. (PDF pp.33, 35)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Fabian and Napoleonic archetypes; “midspectrum” blending. (PDF p.22)

  • Political purpose of war (control of collective decisions). (PDF p.31)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Uses illustrative examples (e.g., urban warfare, rear-area vulnerability) to show overlap across state/nonstate behavior. (PDF pp.33, 35)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Reframes irregular warfare as a method (Fabian end of spectrum), not a distinct ontological category. (PDF p.22)

  • Provides a common language for comparing insurgents, militias, and state forces in the same analytic frame. (PDF p.29)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “In an important sense, the commonplace intuitive picture of nonstate ‘guerilla’ warfare is thus a fallacy.” (PDF pp.29–30)

Chapter 3: Materially Optimal Behavior (PDF p.45–63)

• One-sentence thesis: Material conditions generate a militarily optimal point on the Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum, driven by a firepower–cover tradeoff; technology has moved that optimum toward the midspectrum over time. (PDF p.45)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Introduces four independent variables: numerical imbalance, technological sophistication, institutionalization, stakes. (PDF p.45)

  • Argues material conditions create a “militarily optimal” behavior, but politics may prevent implementing it. (PDF p.45)

  • Core tradeoff: controlling territory requires firepower; surviving requires cover; different settings yield different optimal compromises. (PDF p.45; PDF p.49)

  • Claims time trend: early 20th-century optimal nonstate behavior was highly Fabian; technological change has pushed both state and nonstate incentives toward the middle. (PDF p.45)

  • Shows nonstate sophistication can approach state levels in key weapon categories; technological parity in some systems is plausible. (PDF p.54)

  • Uses modern battlefield logic (dispersion/force-to-space ratio) to show why complex coordination becomes harder as lethality rises. (PDF p.58)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • “Materially optimal behavior” under lethal modern conditions. (PDF p.45)

  • Force-to-space ratio / dispersion as systemic. (PDF p.58)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Historical/analytic discussion of the modern system and examples of nonstate advanced weapons. (PDF pp.54, 58)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Technology diffusion can enable nonstate actors to contest territory in ways resembling state defense/offense. (PDF p.54)

  • Predicting “irregular” requires understanding the material environment, not just actor identity. (PDF p.45)

• Links to seminar questions: Q3, Q4

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “the materially optimal nonstate behavior is determined by the competing demands of the firepower needed to control territory and the cover needed to survive.” (PDF p.45)

Chapter 4: Politically Achievable Behavior (PDF p.64–86)

• One-sentence thesis: Internal politics—institutions and stakes—determine whether nonstate actors can implement complex midspectrum methods that material incentives may favor. (PDF p.64)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Argues technology’s push toward midspectrum increases demands on training and coordination, making internal politics more consequential. (PDF p.64)

  • Emphasizes training: midspectrum warfare demands more extensive training than simple Napoleonic or Fabian methods. (PDF p.64)

  • Emphasizes specialization: midspectrum warfare depends on interdependent specialists, amplifying collective action dilemmas. (PDF p.64)

  • Develops an institutional taxonomy adapted from North/Wallis/Weingast and adds an “informal natural order” category common among nonstate groups. (PDF p.78)

  • Defines stakes: perceived importance of war outcomes for leadership; higher stakes motivate greater sacrifice for capability. (PDF p.81)

  • Predicts feasible method choice: immature institutions/limited stakes constrain actors toward simpler methods; mature institutions/high stakes support midspectrum. (PDF pp.64, 81)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Institutions (natural orders; open access order) and “informal natural order.” (PDF p.78)

  • Stakes (expected utility framing). (PDF p.81)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Conceptual/theoretical argument; prepares the comparative logic for case studies. (PDF p.64)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Shifts assessment of IW actors from ideology/identity to organizational capability and incentive structure. (PDF p.64)

  • Suggests partner-building and coercion strategies must account for internal political feasibility. (PDF pp.64, 78)

• Links to seminar questions: Q3, Q5

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “I argue that midspectrum war fighting demands much more extensive training than do simpler Napoleonic or Fabian methods.” (PDF p.64)

Chapter 5: Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon Campaign (PDF p.87–114)

• One-sentence thesis: Hezbollah’s 2006 campaign demonstrates a nonstate actor can fight in a coherent, state-like midspectrum manner—especially in defense—when institutions/stakes and technology support complex behavior. (PDF p.108)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Uses Hezbollah as a key test case against stereotypes of guerilla irregularity. (PDF pp.87–88)

  • Interprets observed behavior as consistent with an intent to hold/delay in defense rather than pure Fabian attrition; accepts decisive engagement in selected places and times. (PDF p.107)

  • Links strategic logic to coercion: delaying an invasion helps sustain a rocket campaign against Israeli cities. (PDF p.106)

  • Shows Hezbollah relied heavily on cover from terrain/structures rather than extensive civilian intermingling. (PDF p.108)

  • Notes high distinguishability: most fighters wore uniforms and looked “remarkably similar” to state militaries in equipment/clothing. (PDF p.108)

  • Emphasizes coherent, preprepared defensive works and rocket launch infrastructure enabling a theater-level campaign despite surprise escalation. (PDF p.108)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Midspectrum nonstate defense as a feasible (and dangerous) method. (PDF p.108)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Tactical vignettes and behavioral indicators (counterattacks, posture, uniforms, concealment source). (PDF pp.104, 108)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Nonstate actors can contest territory and impose operational delay costs; “irregular” cannot be assumed. (PDF p.107)

  • Civilian protection/ROE dynamics interact with opponent’s concealment choices—but concealment may be terrain-based, not population-based. (PDF p.108)

• Links to seminar questions: Q2, Q3, Q4

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “In 2006, the great majority of Hezbollah’s fighters wore uniforms.” (PDF p.108)

Chapter 6: The Jaish al Mahdi in Iraq, 2003–8 (PDF p.115–138)

• One-sentence thesis: Compared with Hezbollah, the JAM’s weaker internal politics constrained its ability to implement midspectrum methods, producing more Fabian behavior and a worse fit between material opportunity and practical performance. (PDF p.138)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Constructs a controlled comparison with Hezbollah (similar region/weapon access; different internal politics). (PDF p.115)

  • Summarizes operational history: uprisings, sectarian violence, and final sustained fighting in Sadr City ending with cease-fire/disbandment. (PDF p.124)

  • Evaluates tribal culture and materialist predictions; finds they cannot explain the observed difference with Hezbollah on their own. (PDF p.124; PDF p.138)

  • Shows JAM’s behavior on spectrum dimensions lay between pure Fabian and state practice but was “much more Fabian” than Hezbollah. (PDF p.138)

  • Mechanism: JAM internal politics limited collective action and skill development, driving default to simpler, lower-risk methods. (PDF p.138)

  • Notes prediction vs observation: functional form predicts 0.9 (“very Fabian”); observed score 1.3—suggesting partial divergence and potential suboptimality. (PDF p.138)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Controlled-comparison logic; predicted vs observed spectrum scores. (PDF p.138)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Baghdad/Sadr City operational sequence; spectrum coding and theory predictions. (PDF pp.124, 138)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Internal militia politics can block tactical “professionalization” even in the presence of weapons, training opportunities, and external threat. (PDF p.138)

  • Partnered operations face ceiling effects if partner institutions cannot sustain specialist interdependence. (PDF p.64)

• Links to seminar questions: Q3, Q4

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Whereas Hezbollah’s stakes and institutions enabled it to exploit the military advantages of midspectrum warfare, the JAM’s internal politics did not.” (PDF p.138)

Chapter 7: The Somali National Alliance in Somalia, 1992–94 (PDF p.139–167)

• One-sentence thesis: The SNA case challenges “tribal culture” determinism by showing behavioral change linked to stakes and puzzling non-use of sophisticated weapons, suggesting internal politics matters more than culture or materiel alone. (PDF pp.165–166)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Uses SNA as a best-case for culturalist explanations and for expectations of extreme irregularity. (PDF p.139)

  • Shows predictions diverge: tribal culture expects extreme/stable Fabianism; materialism expects increasing Fabianism after US intervention; new theory expects movement toward holding ground after stakes increase for leadership. (PDF p.165)

  • Finds change in direction consistent with new theory: after Aug 1993, increased effort to hold key territory (a move toward Napoleonic) despite worsening material balance. (PDF p.165)

  • Highlights technology is not enough: SNA possessed TOW missiles but made no recorded use; found cached at cantonment sites. (PDF p.166)

  • Notes theory mismatch: appendix predicts very Fabian scores (0.1 pre-Aug; 1.1 post-Aug), but SNA acted more Napoleonic than predicted; heavy casualties suggest they may have been militarily better served by more Fabian behavior. (PDF pp.166–167)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Stakes shift via targeted capture strategy; “non-use” of capability as organizational/political signal. (PDF p.165–166)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • TOW inventory/non-use, casualty comparison, observed shift toward holding key terrain. (PDF pp.165–167)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Advanced weapons in a militia’s inventory do not guarantee advanced behavior; capability can be politically “banked” rather than used. (PDF p.166)

  • Stakes escalation (targeting leadership) can push militias toward more territorial behaviors even under unfavorable balances—raising escalation and civilian risk. (PDF p.165)

• Links to seminar questions: Q2, Q3, Q4

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The SNA, however, made no recorded use of these missiles…” (PDF p.166)

Chapter 8: The ZNG, HV, and SVK in the Croatian Wars of Independence, 1991–95 (PDF p.168–194)

• One-sentence thesis: Croatia shows nonstate actors can attempt highly “state-like” methods, but institutional maturity and stakes drive proficiency and operational-level coordination—sometimes determining strategic outcomes. (PDF p.192)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Frames conflict setting with multiple actors and evolving state structures, enabling comparison of methods and proficiency. (PDF pp.168–170)

  • Contrasts nationalist vs Serb perceptions and institutions: Serbs expected protection by the JNA; institutions were less mature and more factional. (PDF p.192)

  • Finds attempted methods were similar: both scored 4.9 on the index—midrange and “more Napoleonic… than some state militaries.” (PDF p.192)

  • Key variation was proficiency and coordination: ZNG developed skills for competent execution (especially tactically); theater-level coordination exceeded nonstate capacity. (PDF p.192)

  • Explains Serb failures via internal politics: limited stakes and weak institutions reduced trust and motivation for coordinated action. (PDF p.192)

  • Shows how outside assistance interacts with institutions: more stable orders can exploit external skills without turning them into existential internal threats, improving theater-level cooperation. (PDF p.192)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Proficiency vs intended method choice; institutions shaping ability to absorb outside assistance. (PDF p.192)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Index score (4.9) and comparative claims about proficiency and institutional context. (PDF p.192)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Partner-force improvement depends on internal political order and trust; outside training is not a universal fix. (PDF p.192)

  • “State-like” methods can be attempted by nonstates; execution quality is a strategic variable. (PDF p.192)

• Links to seminar questions: Q3, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “both actors’ behavior corresponded to a value of 4.9…” (PDF p.192)

Chapter 9: The Vietcong in the Second Indochina War, 1965–68 (PDF p.195–213)

• One-sentence thesis: The pre-Tet Vietcong were the most Fabian actor in the study (0.2 on the scale), supporting the claim that systemic technological conditions and material incentives can push even organized movements toward highly irregular methods. (PDF p.213)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Positions Vietcong as archetypal guerilla case and thus a key test for theories. (PDF p.195)

  • Contrasts theoretical expectations: culturalist theory would expect VC to be more conventional than SNA; materialism and the new theory expect irregular methods but for different reasons. (PDF p.213)

  • Finds VC “most Fabian” among cases: score 0.2 on six-point spectrum; acknowledges Tet as a major departure and that VC are not pure Fabian even pre-Tet. (PDF p.213)

  • Details that irregular can be complex: VC ambush design involved specialized elements (lead, assault, blocking, rear) with high interdependence and flexible command in contact. (PDF p.211)

  • Uses case to underline period effects: midcentury technological environment shaped what “materially optimal” looked like for a weaker actor. (PDF p.213)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Complex irregular tactics; systemic vs dyadic material explanations. (PDF pp.211, 213)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Ambush organization and planning; spectrum score. (PDF pp.211, 213)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • “Irregular” methods can be highly coordinated and specialist-dependent at the tactical level. (PDF p.211)

  • Technology era matters for how IW looks; analogies across eras should be cautious. (PDF p.213)

• Links to seminar questions: Q3, Q4

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “the Vietcong score a value of 0.2—substantially more Fabian than even Mohammed Farah Aideed’s Somali National Alliance.” (PDF p.213)

Chapter 10: Conclusion and Implications (PDF p.214–228)

• One-sentence thesis: The book’s findings imply future opponents will span a wide range of methods; policy should avoid narrow force optimization and scholarship should pursue a unified theory of state and nonstate war making rooted in material reality and internal politics. (PDF pp.223, 226)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Synthesizes evidence: new theory generally outperforms materialist and culturalist explanations across cases. (PDF p.18; PDF p.223)

  • Predicts future distribution: variation in internal politics + proliferation of advanced weapons → enemy methods spanning NS1 to S1 and beyond. (PDF p.223)

  • Warns against optimizing US military for only one subset of that distribution; increases risk of facing an ill-suited force. (PDF p.223)

  • Argues “modal” future opposition implies a force resembling the 2001 legacy force more than extreme alternatives. (PDF p.224)

  • Extends to state actors: proposes possibility of unified theory since states also vary in institutions and stakes. (PDF p.226)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • NS1–S1 distribution framing; unified theory agenda; force design “alternatives.” (PDF pp.223–226)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Uses aggregate inference from cases plus theoretical implications for US posture. (PDF pp.223–226)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Treats IW as a spectrum problem with strategic-competition implications (proxies, militias, and partner forces). (PDF p.223)

  • Centers organizational diagnosis for both adversaries and partners. (PDF p.64)

• Links to seminar questions: Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Persistent variation in internal politics… is likely to create a future distribution of enemy methods spanning the entire range…” (PDF p.223)

Appendix: Coding the Fabian-Napoleonic Spectrum (PDF p.229–242)

• One-sentence thesis: Formalizes how to measure the dependent variable and specify the functional form linking materiel and internal politics to predicted behavior along the spectrum. (PDF p.229)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • States purpose: operationalize dependent/independent variables and functional form; provide comparative statics. (PDF p.229)

  • Defines dependent variable: military behavior of a nonstate actor in conflicts involving numerically superior state opponents. (PDF p.229)

  • Clarifies scope boundaries for operationalization (e.g., excludes WMD; excludes war at sea; focuses on continental conflict). (PDF p.229)

  • Provides coding logic for independent variables (numbers, technology, institutions, stakes). (PDF p.229)

  • Underpins predicted vs observed scores used in cases (e.g., JAM and SNA predictions). (PDF pp.138, 166; PDF p.229)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Operational definitions; functional form; comparative statics. (PDF p.229)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Illustrative use of coding scheme and predictions applied in main chapters. (PDF pp.138, 166)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Offers a repeatable way to translate qualitative assessments (institutions/stakes/tech) into expectations about military method choice. (PDF p.229)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1–Q4

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD

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Theory / Framework Map

• Level(s) of analysis:

  • Primarily organizational (nonstate actor internal politics) interacting with systemic/material battlefield conditions. (PDF pp.45, 64)

• Unit(s) of analysis:

  • Nonstate actor behavior in warfare involving numerically superior states (case-based, operationalized in appendix). (PDF p.21; PDF p.229)

• Dependent variable(s):

  • Military behavior on the Fabian–Napoleonic spectrum (including midspectrum variation). (PDF p.22; PDF p.45)

• Key independent variable(s):

  • Material: numerical imbalance, technological sophistication. (PDF p.45)

  • Politics: institutionalization, stakes. (PDF p.45; PDF p.81)

• Mechanism(s):

  • Material conditions define a militarily optimal compromise between firepower (control) and cover (survival). (PDF p.45)

  • Institutions and stakes determine whether complex midspectrum behavior is politically achievable, via training capacity, specialist interdependence, and collective action solutions. (PDF p.64; PDF p.78)

• Scope conditions / where it should NOT apply:

  • Applies to warfare (as defined) since 1900; excludes war at sea and WMD use; not dispositive for all purely inter-nonstate warfare. (PDF p.21; PDF p.229)

• Observable implications / predictions:

  • Over time, technology shifts material incentives toward midspectrum, but internal political variation ensures wide dispersion of observed methods. (PDF pp.45, 223)

  • Mature institutions + high stakes → greater ability to implement complex midspectrum methods; weak institutions/limited stakes → simpler (often more Fabian) behavior or poor execution. (PDF pp.64, 81, 138)

Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

• Nonstate actor

  • Definition: any entity other than a Montevideo Convention sovereign state. (PDF p.21)

  • Role in argument: sets scope of “nonstate warfare” and separates actor identity from method.

  • Analytical note: broad category—requires additional variables (institutions/stakes/tech) to predict behavior.

• Warfare

  • Definition: organized violence exceeding 1,000 battle deaths with at least 100 on each of two sides. (PDF p.21)

  • Role in argument: excludes low-scale violence and focuses on national-security-relevant wars.

  • Analytical note: scope boundary matters—many “terrorism” cases qualify if violence threshold met. (PDF p.21)

• Fabian methods

  • Definition (archetype): unwillingness to defend ground via decisive engagement; dispersion; concealment via civilian intermingling; coercion; preference for light weapons. (PDF p.22)

  • Role: one pole of dependent-variable spectrum (irregular extreme).

  • Analytical note: “Fabian” ≠ always low skill; can still demand complex tactical coordination (e.g., VC ambush). (PDF p.211)

• Napoleonic methods

  • Definition (archetype): insistence on decisive engagement to seize/hold ground; local concentration; uniformed forces separated from population centers; brute force; preference for heavy weapons. (PDF p.22)

  • Role: other pole of spectrum (conventional extreme).

  • Analytical note: even nonstate actors can attempt (and sometimes approximate) Napoleonic behavior. (PDF p.192)

• Midspectrum

  • Definition: behavior between pure Fabian and pure Napoleonic; most real war is “interpenetrated” compromise between lethality and survivability. (PDF p.49)

  • Role: explains why “hybrid” is better treated as continuous variation.

  • Analytical note: midspectrum behavior is often hardest to execute, creating selection on institutions/stakes. (PDF p.64)

• Materially optimal behavior

  • Definition: the militarily optimal choice of methods given numerical imbalance and technological sophistication. (PDF p.45)

  • Role: baseline prediction before politics constraints.

  • Analytical note: emphasizes usable advantages, not just raw inventory.

• Politically achievable behavior

  • Definition: feasible behavior given internal political constraints that can prevent implementing the militarily optimal method. (PDF p.45; PDF p.64)

  • Role: explains why similar matériel can yield different methods (Hezbollah vs JAM). (PDF p.138)

  • Analytical note: useful for diagnosing partner limitations and adversary weaknesses.

• Institutions (institutionalization / “natural order” taxonomy)

  • Definition: formal/informal mechanisms for rules, enforcement, monitoring, and managing violence; includes “informal natural order” category common among nonstates. (PDF p.78)

  • Role: shapes span of trust and capacity for coordinated specialization.

  • Analytical note: operationalizable via observable governance and command/control features (appendix). (PDF p.229)

• Stakes

  • Definition: “absolute value of the perceived expected utility… of the war’s potential outcomes” for senior leadership. (PDF p.81)

  • Role: links perceived importance to willingness to invest/sacrifice for capability.

  • Analytical note: can shift over time (e.g., targeted capture making stakes existential). (PDF p.165)

• Dispersion / force-to-space ratio

  • Definition: modern lethality and need for cover systematically drive dispersion and expansion of battlespace. (PDF p.58)

  • Role: helps explain why complex coordination is increasingly demanding.

  • Analytical note: dispersion raises command/control and logistics burdens—key for comparing actors’ institutional capacity.

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Key Arguments & Evidence

• Argument 1: The “nonstate = guerilla” category is a fallacy; methods vary continuously and overlap across state and nonstate actors.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Explicit critique of categorical thinking and “hybrid” as another box. (PDF p.29)

    • Hezbollah’s “state-like” features (uniforms; coherent theater design). (PDF p.108)

    • Croatia: nonstate actors’ index value 4.9, “more Napoleonic… than some state militaries.” (PDF p.192)

  • So what:

    • Strategic diagnosis and force design must be spectrum-based, not identity-based.

• Argument 2: Material conditions create a militarily optimal method choice via a firepower–cover tradeoff, and technology change pushes incentives toward midspectrum over time.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Core tradeoff statement and time-trend claim. (PDF p.45)

    • Nonstate access to sophisticated weapons categories. (PDF p.54)

    • Vietcong 1965–68 as especially Fabian (0.2) in a different technological era. (PDF p.213)

  • So what:

    • Technology diffusion changes IW’s “character”—and can produce nonstate forces that fight more like armies.

• Argument 3: Internal politics (institutions and stakes) determines what’s politically achievable, explaining why similar matériel can yield different behavior.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Midspectrum demands training and specialist interdependence; collective action problems are sharper. (PDF p.64)

    • Hezbollah vs JAM divergence tied to internal politics; explicit statement of mechanism. (PDF p.138)

    • SNA TOW missiles cached, not used—suggesting politics/organization overrides inventory. (PDF p.166)

  • So what:

    • Partner-building, deterrence, and coercion must incorporate internal political diagnosis.

⚖️ Assumptions & Critical Tensions

• Assumptions the author needs:

  • A rationalist logic: in “steady state,” most combatants will approximate militarily optimal behavior; those who don’t “should suffer” for failure. (PDF p.24)

  • The spectrum operationalization captures meaningful variance in methods (appendix coding). (PDF p.229)

• Tensions / tradeoffs / contradictions:

  • The theory expects “optimal” choice, yet cases show actors sometimes choose methods beyond their proficiency (e.g., SVK; SNA), requiring explanation as suboptimality or omitted variables. (PDF p.192; PDF p.167)

  • Technology may be available but politically unusable (weapon caching; control concerns), complicating “proliferation → capability” assumptions. (PDF p.166)

• What would change the author’s mind? (inference)

  • Robust cases where institutions/stakes are weak/limited yet actors reliably implement complex midspectrum warfare without strong external scaffolding, or where mature institutions/high stakes still systematically produce extreme Fabianism in modern tech settings.

Critique Points

• Strongest critique:

  • External validity risk: scope focuses on warfare vs numerically superior state opponents; may not generalize cleanly to all inter-nonstate wars or sub-threshold IW. (PDF p.21; PDF p.229)

• Weakest critique:

  • “Tribal culture” competing explanation may be under-specified as an alternative causal model (depends on how culture is measured/operationalized in cases). (PDF p.18)

• Method/data critique (if applicable):

  • Heavy reliance on qualitative process tracing and coding; replication depends on transparency and agreement with coding choices (appendix mitigates but cannot eliminate subjectivity). (PDF p.229)

• Missing variable / alternative explanation:

  • External patronage and sponsor control might mediate “institutions” and “stakes” more directly than the framework captures (inference; the book discusses PMFs and external training effects, but scope for deeper treatment remains). (PDF p.192)

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Policy & Strategy Takeaways

• Implications for the US + partners:

  • Expect a wide distribution of enemy methods (from very irregular to very state-like) as advanced weapons spread and internal politics varies. (PDF p.223)

  • Force design should avoid narrow optimization; “modal” future opposition implies capabilities closer to the 2001 legacy force than extreme “alternatives.” (PDF p.224)

• Practical “do this / avoid that” bullets:

  • Do: build analytic diagnostics for institutions + stakes + tech before predicting tactics or advising partners. (PDF pp.64, 81)

  • Do: assume some nonstate actors can execute coherent theater designs and disciplined defense in complex terrain. (PDF p.108)

  • Avoid: equating weapons possession with operational competence; inventory can be unused or misused for political reasons. (PDF p.166)

  • Avoid: building doctrine solely around “COIN light infantry” or “standoff precision” as universal solutions. (PDF pp.223–225)

• Risks / second-order effects:

  • Targeting leadership can shift stakes and induce behavioral change (potentially more territorial fighting), with escalation and civilian harm risks. (PDF p.165)

  • Training/advising can fail if partner institutions cannot absorb specialist interdependence—risking wasted effort or factional capture. (PDF pp.64, 192)

• What to measure (MOE/MOP ideas) and over what timeline:

  • Institutional indicators: command/control robustness, internal enforcement/discipline capacity, factionalism and “span of trust.” (PDF pp.64, 78)

  • Stakes indicators: leadership threat perceptions, willingness to accept casualties, mobilization and investment behaviors. (PDF p.81)

  • Method indicators: willingness to hold ground, distinguishability/uniforming, reliance on coercion vs brute force, functional differentiation in theater. (PDF p.22; PDF p.229)

⚔️ Cross‑Text Synthesis (SAASS 644)

• Where this aligns:

  • Simpson (war as politics/narrative): Biddle’s insistence that even “profit” war is about shaping collective decisions echoes war’s political nature (means–ends framing). (PDF p.31)

  • Kalyvas (control/info/violence): Biddle’s institutions/stakes variables help explain when armed groups can plausibly hold/control territory—preconditions for many Kalyvas-style patterns of collaboration and violence (alignment as inference).

• Where this contradicts:

  • Strong-form “irregular as default” readings of IW (including simplistic Maoist caricatures): Biddle argues that guerilla/irregular is not the inevitable form of nonstate fighting; many nonstates operate midspectrum. (PDF p.29; PDF p.108)

• What it adds that others miss:

  • A military-methods spectrum plus an explicit political-feasibility mechanism (institutions/stakes) that bridges “battlefield tactics” and “internal governance.” (PDF p.64)

• 2–4 “bridge” insights tying at least TWO other readings together:

  • Biddle + Ladwig: If conditionality aims to change partner behavior, Biddle suggests you’re fighting internal politics/institutional limits; inducements may fail if they don’t change the “span of trust” and enforcement capacity needed for complex operations. (Inference anchored in Biddle’s institutions argument; PDF p.64)

  • Biddle + Mao + Kalyvas: Mao’s political mobilization and Kalyvas’s control logic become operationally meaningful only if institutions can translate mobilization/control into coordinated military method; Biddle gives the “organizational capacity” missing link. (Inference; PDF p.64)

  • Biddle + Patterson (IW in strategic competition): Competitors using proxies can field nonstate actors across the spectrum; Biddle’s warning about wide future method distributions implies strategic competition planning must cover “state-like” proxy defense as well as classic insurgency. (Inference anchored to Biddle’s future distribution claim; PDF p.223)

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❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• If institutions/stakes are central, what are the best leading indicators (observable early) that an armed group is moving toward midspectrum methods?

• How should strategists weigh external sponsorship: does patron support substitute for internal institutions, or does it just mask (and later expose) institutional weakness?

• When leadership targeting increases stakes (Somalia), is that an intended lever or an escalation trap that drives more territorial fighting?

• What’s the practical boundary between “midspectrum” and “Napoleonic” in modern conflict—does precision standoff make everyone partly Fabian in some dimensions?

• If the US designs for the “modal opponent,” how do we hedge against tail risks (rare but catastrophic extremes) without reverting to over-specialization?

✍️ Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “To treat state and nonstate military methods using categorical distinctions of kind is an oversimplification with potentially serious consequences for policy and scholarship.” (PDF p.11)

• “My central findings are that neither materiel nor tribal culture offers an adequate explanation for the observed pattern of nonstate war making…” (PDF p.18)

• “In an important sense, the commonplace intuitive picture of nonstate ‘guerilla’ warfare is thus a fallacy.” (PDF pp.29–30)

• “the materially optimal nonstate behavior is determined by the competing demands of the firepower needed to control territory and the cover needed to survive.” (PDF p.45)

• “I argue that midspectrum war fighting demands much more extensive training than do simpler Napoleonic or Fabian methods.” (PDF p.64)

• “In 2006, the great majority of Hezbollah’s fighters wore uniforms.” (PDF p.108)

• “Whereas Hezbollah’s stakes and institutions enabled it to exploit the military advantages of midspectrum warfare, the JAM’s internal politics did not.” (PDF p.138)

• “both actors’ behavior corresponded to a value of 4.9… in the middle range of the Fabian-Napoleonic spectrum.” (PDF p.192)

• “the Vietcong score a value of 0.2—substantially more Fabian than even Mohammed Farah Aideed’s Somali National Alliance.” (PDF p.213)

• “Persistent variation in internal politics… is likely to create a future distribution of enemy methods spanning the entire range from NS1 to S1…” (PDF p.223)