Winning Without Fighting

Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition in the 21st Century

Online Description

A framework for U.S. grand strategy built around irregular warfare (IW)—understood as below–major-war competition aimed at expanding influence and legitimacy while weakening adversaries. The authors argue that today’s competition is also an “era of crises,” so effective strategy must integrate military, economic, and information tools with resilience, and it must include a way to visualize and measure progress across these domains.

Author Background

• Rebecca D. Patterson

  • Professor of Practice + Associate Director, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University

  • Retired US Army lieutenant colonel

  • Former economist, World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group; former deputy director, Office of Peace Operations, Sanctions, and Counterterrorism (State Department)

  • PhD (George Washington University); BS (US Military Academy)

  • Life member, Council on Foreign Relations

• Susan Bryant

  • Executive Director, Strategic Education International

  • Adjunct professor (Georgetown); visiting lecturer (Johns Hopkins); visiting research fellow (National Defense University)

  • Retired US Army colonel; overseas assignments include Afghanistan, Jerusalem, and South Korea

  • Doctorate (Georgetown); master’s degrees (Yale University; Marine Corps University)

  • Publications include Military Strategy in the 21st Century and Resourcing the National Security Enterprise

• Jan “Ken” Gleiman

  • Professor of Practice, Arizona State University’s Future Security Initiative

  • Retired US Army colonel; served as a Green Beret and Strategist; first US Army Goodpaster Fellow

  • PhD (Kansas State University); graduate degrees (Georgetown; School of Advanced Military Studies)

  • President, Army Strategist Association; non-resident fellow (New America); runs a strategy consulting business

• Mark Troutman

  • Educator, consultant, retired colonel; CEO, Strategic Education International

  • Has taught business and national security economics (Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, University of Maryland, George Mason University)

  • Former director, GMU Center for Infrastructure Protection; former dean, Eisenhower School (National Defense University)

  • MPP (Harvard); PhD Economics (GMU); SAMS + Army War College graduate

  • Coeditor, Resourcing the National Security Enterprise

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60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences):

  • The outcome of today’s strategic competition will be decided less by major conventional war than by persistent IW and by how states navigate an age of crises—so the U.S. needs a grand strategy that integrates military, economic, information, and resilience tools (not just DoD).

• Causal logic in a phrase:

  • Integrated statecraft + resilience → greater relative power/influence/legitimacy → adversary weakened & partners attracted → win without fighting.

• Why it matters for IW / strategic competition (2–4 bullets):

  • Reframes IW as grand-strategy level competition (not a niche SOF/COIN problem) and ties it to strategic competition’s long duration.

  • Forces a whole-of-government / whole-of-society approach: resilience and domestic cohesion become strategic advantages (or vulnerabilities).

  • Provides a practical way to think in dependent variables (power, influence, legitimacy) rather than tool-worship (platforms, programs).

  • Argues for measurement as a strategic competency: competition is long, so you need feedback loops, not vibes.

• Best single takeaway (1 sentence):

  • Treat IW as the default mode of strategic competition and run it like strategy—integrated tools, explicit objectives (power/influence/legitimacy), and a dashboard to measure progress over time.

Course Lens

• How does this text define/illuminate irregular warfare?

  • Rejects a violence-only definition: “The sole focus on violence as a necessary condition for IW is not appropriate.” (p. 10)

  • Adopts IW as activities short of conventional and nuclear war aimed at expanding influence + legitimacy and weakening adversaries (p. 11).

  • Pulls IW upward: from tactics/operations to grand strategy, spanning military, economic, information, and resilience domains.

• What does it imply about power/control, success metrics, and timeline in IW?

  • Power/influence/legitimacy are the core lenses for IW outcomes (power = coercion; influence = convince; legitimacy = collective belief something is rightful) (p. 14).

  • Control is treated implicitly (especially via legitimacy, information control, and resilience), but the emphasis is on competition for perceptions and alignment, not simply territorial control.

  • Success metrics must be relative and longitudinal; grand strategies can last decades, so measurement against “final victory” is often infeasible (pp. 194–196).

  • Timeline: strategic competition is persistent and long-term; “Strategic competition is not war.” (p. 37)

• How does it connect to strategic competition?

  • Defines strategic competition as a long-term struggle among adversaries pursuing incompatible interests, often without armed conflict (p. 8).

  • Positions IW as a primary way states pursue those interests below the threshold of major war, especially under nuclear shadow + high costs of near-peer war.

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Seminar Questions (from syllabus)

Questions:

• What does Winning without Fighting offer for understanding IW, evaluating adversaries, and preparing for future conflict?

• How are competitors/adversaries incorporating IW into their strategies?

• How well equipped is the US to counter these strategies?

Podcast (“Cold War Lessons…”):

• What distinctions exist between IW and great power competition/strategic competition?

• How should DoD allocate resources to prepare for future conflict?

• When/where are we likely to see IW during great power competition?

✅ Direct Responses to Seminar Questions

• Q: What does Winning without Fighting offer for understanding IW, evaluating adversaries, and preparing for future conflict?

  • A:

    • A widened IW definition that treats below–major-war competition as a central strategic arena, not a peripheral “irregular” side show (pp. 10–11).

    • A clear set of strategic outcomes to optimize for: power, influence, legitimacy (pp. 14–15), rather than equating progress with activity (operations executed, dollars spent, tweets posted).

    • A practical grand strategy framework: integrate military statecraft, economic statecraft, information statecraft, and resilience—explicitly beyond DoD (Book overview, pp. 16–19).

    • A competitor-focused lens that treats adversary behavior as coherent (culture + tools), not random “gray zone” incidents (Ch. 3; Ch. 2).

    • A persistent warning: strategy must fit a long competition—“Strategic competition is not war.” (p. 37)

    • A push toward measurement discipline (dashboard logic) to avoid strategic drift in a decades-long contest (Ch. 9).

• Q: How are competitors/adversaries incorporating IW into their strategies?

  • A:

    • China and Russia integrate multiple IW tools to build influence and legitimacy while weakening rivals—often below the threshold of open conflict (Ch. 3).

    • China:

      • Employs military-adjacent “gray” tools (e.g., maritime militia) to press territorial claims while preserving plausible legitimacy (p. 50).

      • Uses information statecraft through frameworks like “Three Warfares” (public opinion, psychological, legal) to shape perceptions and justify actions (pp. 56–57).

      • Builds resilience through “holistic national security” and surveillance; pairs resilience with economic planning to reduce dependence (“dual circulation”) (pp. 60–61).

    • Russia:

      • Uses “active measures” traditions and rejects neat war/peace boundaries, increasing risk acceptance and blending tools (Ch. 3).

      • Uses proxies and plausibly deniable actors (e.g., Wagner) for influence and resource access—but with blowback risks (pp. 52–53).

      • Leverages economic coercion (notably energy) and adapts to sanctions; complements with domestic repression and narratives to sustain regime resilience (pp. 54–55, 61).

    • Both exploit vulnerabilities of open societies (especially in the information environment) and seek wedges among alliances (Ch. 3 conclusion).

• Q: How well equipped is the US to counter these strategies?

  • A:

    • The U.S. has major strategic culture headwinds: preference for overwhelming force, binary war/peace thinking, and a bias for action/tech solutions that can misfit persistent IW competition (Ch. 2; see also p. 37).

    • DoD and national security institutions have struggled with definitions and scope—narrow, violence-centered conceptions of IW can misdiagnose the competition (p. 10; Ch. 1).

    • U.S. strengths exist (alliances, economic scale, legitimacy potential), but they require integration across agencies and society; the authors argue DoD alone is insufficient (Ch. 1; Ch. 10).

    • Key gaps the book highlights:

      • Information statecraft fragmentation (multiple actors; inconsistent strategy) (Ch. 7).

      • Economic statecraft tradeoffs (coercion tools can erode legitimacy and accelerate adversary adaptation) (Ch. 6).

      • Resilience underinvestment: “exquisite” military technology can be irrelevant against crises like pandemics and extreme weather (p. 219).

      • Measurement: weak feedback loops produce strategic drift (Ch. 9).

• Q: What distinctions exist between IW and great power competition/strategic competition?

  • A:

    • In this book’s framing, strategic competition is the overarching context: a persistent long-term struggle among adversaries pursuing incompatible interests (p. 8).

    • IW is a major mode of action within that competition: activities short of conventional/nuclear war to expand influence/legitimacy and weaken adversaries (p. 11).

    • Practical distinction:

      • Strategic competition = the game

      • IW = how the game is usually played (below major war), especially when major war is too costly (Ch. 4 arguments; Ch. 1–3).

    • The authors’ culture critique reinforces the distinction: “Strategic competition is not war.” (p. 37)

• Q: How should DoD allocate resources to prepare for future conflict?

  • A:

    • Maintain credible warfighting deterrence, but accept that conventional military capabilities alone are insufficient for prevailing in the coming era (p. 224).

    • Invest more deliberately in non-kinetic military statecraft (security cooperation, partner capacity, posture, presence, institutional relationships) rather than treating them as secondary to “real war” readiness (Ch. 5).

    • Reduce organizational friction so capability can move at the pace of competition: reform acquisition/PPBE and close the “valley of death” between innovation and fielding (Ch. 5).

    • Treat resilience as strategy enabler:

      • DoD should plan for crises (pandemics, extreme weather) that can directly degrade readiness and legitimacy (Ch. 8; p. 219).

    • Resource allocation implication (from the book’s logic):

      • Shift some marginal dollars from exquisite platforms toward campaigning capacity: security cooperation, information support, resilience of bases/logistics, and interagency integration.

• Q: When/where are we likely to see IW during great power competition?

  • A:

    • “Below-threshold” competition where states can gain advantage without triggering open war—especially in information, economic, and gray military arenas (Ch. 3; Ch. 7).

    • Regions and issue areas where competitors can pressure without clear casus belli (examples used in the book include maritime coercion/territorial pressure, energy leverage, and influence operations) (Ch. 3).

    • During crises (natural disasters, pandemics, economic shocks) that create openings for influence and legitimacy competition—hence the centrality of resilience (Ch. 8; Ch. 10).

    • In and around allied/partner states—especially those geographically adjacent to competitors—where building resistance and resilience can deter aggression (Ch. 8 conclusion).

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Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 1: Introduction (pp. 1–20)

• One-sentence thesis: The U.S. faces strategic competition in an “age of crises,” so it needs a grand strategy centered on IW—integrating military, economic, information, and resilience tools beyond DoD.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Frames the strategic environment as two intertwined challenges: competitor rivalry and transnational crises.

  • Argues the U.S. needs a grand strategy for winning without fighting—because major war with near-peers is catastrophic and competition happens mostly below war.

  • Critiques narrow IW definitions and insists IW must include nonviolent/non-kinetic competition (pp. 10–11).

  • Adopts a specific definition of strategic competition and explains why (p. 8).

  • Defines core dependent variables: power, influence, legitimacy (pp. 14–15).

  • Previews the book’s tool-based structure: military, economic, information, resilience (Book overview, pp. 16–19).

  • Introduces measurement as essential for long-term competition (sets up Ch. 9).

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Strategic competition (definition adopted from Joint Concept for Competing) (p. 8)

  • IW as activities below conventional/nuclear war (p. 11)

  • Power / influence / legitimacy as enduring foci (p. 14)

  • “Age of crises” + resilience as strategic variable (sets up Ch. 8)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • U.S. strategic documents and evolving DoD IW definitions

  • Contemporary shocks/crises as strategic context (pandemic, climate-linked disruptions, etc.)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Shifts IW from “how insurgents fight” to “how states compete.”

  • Builds a strategist’s vocabulary for non-war outcomes (legitimacy/influence).

  • Forces integration with resilience (IW can exploit crisis-driven vulnerabilities).

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q3; podcast distinctions (IW vs strategic competition)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The sole focus on violence as a necessary condition for IW is not appropriate.” (p. 10)

Chapter 2: American Strategic Culture (pp. 21–42)

• One-sentence thesis: U.S. strategic culture—especially preferences for decisive solutions and overwhelming force—creates blind spots for long-term IW competition.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Defines strategic culture and explains why it matters for strategy and state behavior.

  • Argues strategic culture changes slowly and is shaped by history/geography/institutions.

  • Describes American political traditions (Hamiltonian/Wilsonian/Jeffersonian/Jacksonian) and their strategic implications (p. 26).

  • Highlights U.S. tendencies: war/peace dichotomy, moral framing (“crusade”), optimism and a belief problems yield to effort/technology (p. 30).

  • Notes risks of American isolation and mirror imaging—misreading what others value and want (p. 32).

  • Emphasizes the mismatch between strategic competition’s persistence and U.S. preference for decisive outcomes.

  • Sets up why U.S. institutions over-privilege kinetic tools and under-privilege influence/legitimacy campaigns.

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Strategic culture (and how it shapes tool choice)

  • Mead’s four foreign policy traditions (p. 26)

  • Mirror imaging as analytic trap (p. 32)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Canonical thinkers and strategic culture scholarship

  • U.S. historical narratives (frontier optimism; war/peace conceptualization)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Explains why U.S. often struggles with “in-between” conflict and below-threshold competition.

  • Flags institutional/cultural constraints on implementing whole-of-government IW strategy.

• Links to seminar questions: Q3; podcast distinctions

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Strategic competition is not war.” (p. 37)

Chapter 3: Competitor Approaches to Irregular Warfare (pp. 43–66)

• One-sentence thesis: China and Russia employ IW as integrated statecraft rooted in strategic culture—mixing military, economic, information, and resilience tools to gain advantage below major war.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Explains how strategic culture shapes competitor preferences and risk tolerance.

  • China:

    • Strategic narratives (e.g., “Century of Humiliation”) and sensitivity to foreign influence; emphasis on winning without fighting.

    • Uses gray-zone military tools and partnerships to expand influence while preserving legitimacy (e.g., maritime militia) (p. 50).

  • Russia:

    • More risk-acceptant; less committed to war/peace separation; draws on traditions of “active measures.”

    • Uses proxies/separatists/private forces to pursue influence with deniability, but with blowback risks (pp. 52–53).

  • Maps competitor behavior across the four tool domains (military/economic/information/resilience).

  • Argues open societies are vulnerable to disinformation, while democracies retain offsetting advantages (innovation/economic dynamism).

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • China’s “Three Warfares” (public opinion, psychological, legal) (pp. 56–57)

  • National resilience as competitor tool (pp. 60–61)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • China: maritime militia, BRI-linked security influence, “Three Warfares,” surveillance and “dual circulation” (pp. 50, 56–57, 60)

  • Russia: Wagner/proxies, energy leverage, censorship/repression around Ukraine invasion, sanctions preparation (pp. 52–55, 61)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Provides a threat model: competitor IW is systematic, not episodic.

  • Shows how legitimacy/influence can be pursued through “nonmilitary” tools with military support.

• Links to seminar questions: Q2 (primary), Q1

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD (use chapter 3 primarily for cases; major definitional quotes appear elsewhere)

Chapter 4: The Past as Potential Prologue: Political Warfare during the Cold War (pp. 67–88)

• One-sentence thesis: Cold War political warfare illustrates how the U.S. can compete effectively below war via integrated tools—if it aligns strategy, domestic politics, alliances, and legitimacy.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Uses the Cold War as a comparative case to illuminate political warfare’s utility and limits.

  • Defines political warfare (via Kennan) and situates it within a broader IW taxonomy (p. 69).

  • Describes “multiple faces” of political warfare: overt alliances/economic measures/“white” propaganda and covert support/“black” operations (p. 69).

  • Highlights the importance of U.S. domestic opinion and legitimacy for sustaining long campaigns.

  • Discusses Reagan-era political warfare as broad, integrated competition leveraging alliances, economic strength, and ideological messaging.

  • Summarizes contemporary arguments for renewed political warfare capacity:

    • near-peer war is too costly,

    • adversaries are outcompeting the U.S. below war,

    • political warfare enables integrated grand strategy,

    • adversaries have vulnerabilities,

    • cyber operations are now necessary (p. 80).

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Political warfare (Kennan)

  • Cold War containment as long-duration competitive strategy

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Kennan’s policy conception

  • Cold War institutions and tools (alliances, economic measures, information and covert action)

  • Reagan-era campaign debates and contemporary “renewed political warfare” arguments

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Reinforces the “below-war” strategic logic: major war is catastrophic; competition happens in the seams.

  • Provides historic template for whole-of-government integration and legitimacy management.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1; podcast Cold War distinctions; Q3

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.” (p. 69, George Kennan)

Chapter 5: Tools of Military Statecraft (pp. 89–112)

• One-sentence thesis: Military power in strategic competition is more than combat; the U.S. must leverage non-kinetic military statecraft to build power, influence, and legitimacy—and modernize how it innovates and cooperates.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Argues the U.S. over-focuses on kinetic concepts and underuses the military as a statecraft tool.

  • Frames military tools against dependent variables: coercive power, influence-building, legitimacy signaling.

  • Organizes military tools into:

    • Interpersonal tools (engagements, education/exchanges, leader relationships).

    • Organizational tools (security cooperation, capacity building, arms sales/assistance, advising).

    • Systemic tools (force posture, deterrence architecture, modernization, alliance system).

  • Warns that competitors exploit seams; U.S. needs persistent campaigning with allies/partners.

  • Recommendations emphasize:

    • Employ the full spectrum of military statecraft

    • Reprioritize security cooperation

    • Reform acquisition

    • Spark defense innovation

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Military statecraft typology: interpersonal / organizational / systemic

  • Security cooperation as strategic tool (not peripheral program)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Examples of engagements, exchanges, and security cooperation mechanisms

  • Innovation pipeline challenges (“valley of death”)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Helps translate “IW competition” into concrete DoD-adjacent tools short of war.

  • Connects “campaigning” to legitimacy/influence outcomes rather than tactical outputs.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q3; podcast resource allocation

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD (chapter is tool-heavy; best concise quotables appear in Ch. 10)

Chapter 6: Tools of Economic Statecraft (pp. 113–140)

• One-sentence thesis: Economic statecraft is central to winning without fighting, but coercive tools (sanctions, controls) must be used carefully to avoid legitimacy loss and adversary adaptation.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Explains why economic tools are uniquely powerful in modern competition (interdependence, global finance, supply chains).

  • Distinguishes economic power vs influence and connects both to legitimacy costs/benefits.

  • Surveys key tool categories:

    • Trade-based tools and agreements

    • Export controls

    • Sanctions (trade and financial), asset freezes

    • Investment screening

    • Economic assistance

    • Domestic policies that shape competitiveness and resilience (industrial policy, critical tech, energy/commodities)

  • Highlights legitimacy risks: coercive tools can be seen as punishment/imperialism and can fragment coalitions.

  • Argues the U.S. must avoid self-defeating protectionism and preserve openness where it strengthens influence and legitimacy.

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Economic statecraft toolkit (coercive + inducement tools; domestic + international)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Longstanding Cuba embargo as legitimacy and effectiveness case (p. 120)

  • Sanctions adaptation examples and the importance of coalition alignment

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Re-centers economic tools as first-line IW instruments for coercion/inducement.

  • Highlights tradeoffs between coercive power and legitimacy/influence maintenance.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q3

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD

Chapter 7: Tools of Information Statecraft (pp. 141–166)

• One-sentence thesis: Information is contested terrain in strategic competition; the U.S. needs definitional clarity and a coordinated national approach to defend legitimacy and compete for influence.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Defines the information environment (physical/informational/cognitive dimensions) and why it matters.

  • Separates overlapping concepts: propaganda, disinformation/misinformation, influence operations, information operations, information warfare.

  • Argues “truth decay” dynamics degrade shared reality and increase vulnerability to IW.

  • Frames information tools through power/influence/legitimacy: coercion, persuasion, and credibility.

  • Proposes a U.S. approach requiring:

    • comprehensive national-level information strategy

    • coordination across government

    • engagement with private sector/tech platforms and civil society

    • alignment between domestic resilience and foreign influence efforts

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Lexicon for propaganda, mis/disinformation, influence operations

  • “Truth decay” as strategic vulnerability

• Evidence / cases used:

  • U.S. institutional landscape for countering foreign influence (e.g., coordination problems)

  • Competitor information concepts (cross-referenced to Ch. 3)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Sets up narrative/legitimacy as operational terrain (foreshadows Simpson).

  • Positions credibility/truth as strategic assets (and targets).

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3; podcast distinctions

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD

Chapter 8: Tools of Resilience (pp. 167–192)

• One-sentence thesis: Resilience is both shield and sword in IW: crises create openings for adversary influence, so resilience-building must be treated as a core strategic instrument.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Adopts resilience as “adaptive capacity”: ability to adapt while fulfilling core purpose (p. 169).

  • Makes key assumptions explicit:

    • resilience must be anticipatory + reactive

    • tactical + strategic

    • includes robustness and fragility (p. 169)

  • Connects resilience to power/influence/legitimacy (resilience supports credibility, capacity, and stability).

  • Argues the U.S. must:

    • monitor national resilience

    • make resilience a central pillar of national security strategy

    • build collective resilience with allies (p. 185–186)

  • Uses crises (climate impacts, pandemics) as empirical motivation and as predictors of IW vulnerability.

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Resilience as adaptive capacity (p. 169)

  • Collective resilience (NATO concept) (p. 186)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Climate-related cost estimates and infrastructure vulnerability (p. 185)

  • COVID-19 cost comparisons emphasizing prevention vs response (p. 186)

  • NATO collective resilience definition and logic (p. 186)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Expands IW terrain to include crises and domestic preparedness as strategic competition variables.

  • Suggests resilience-building can preempt adversary exploitation and reduce coercive leverage.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q3; podcast “where IW shows up” (crisis openings)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The ability to adapt to changed circumstances while fulfilling one’s core purpose.” (p. 169, quoted/adopted from Zolli & Healy)

Chapter 9: Measuring Success (pp. 193–212)

• One-sentence thesis: Winning without fighting demands measurement; the authors propose an IW dashboard to track relative power, influence, and legitimacy across domains over time.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Reviews why standard “end-state” measurement fails in long competitions (objectives shift; exogenous shocks; decades-long timelines) (pp. 194–196).

  • Uses power, influence, legitimacy as enduring dependent variables for measurement (p. 195).

  • Distinguishes measures of effectiveness (MOEs) from other assessment approaches and argues for iterative feedback loops.

  • Proposes a “Toward an Irregular Warfare Dashboard” model to visualize progress (p. 205).

  • States two principles for dashboard use:

    • metrics are relative

    • measurement should consider collective capability (p. 206)

  • Argues for a publicly accessible, government-wide measurement framework to support strategic discipline.

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Irregular Warfare Dashboard (p. 205)

  • Measurement principles: relative metrics + collective outcomes (p. 206)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Cold War containment timeline as measurement problem (p. 195)

  • Examples of indices/indicators used as proxies across domains

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Treats IW as campaignable and assessable—key for long-term strategic competition.

  • Creates common language for interagency coordination (power/influence/legitimacy measures).

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q3; podcast resource allocation (measure to manage)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “All metrics are relative.” (p. 206)

Chapter 10: Conclusion: An American Grand Strategy for Winning Without Fighting (pp. 213–232)

• One-sentence thesis: The U.S. needs a holistic, resilience-based grand strategy that embraces IW’s complexity, leverages whole-of-society power, and organizes tools around building relative power, influence, and legitimacy.

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Argues domestic vulnerabilities must be central to strategy (crises, finite resources, domestic consent and susceptibility to influence) (p. 218–219).

  • Emphasizes that “exquisite” military tech can be irrelevant against many dominant threats (pandemics, domestic terrorism, extreme weather) (p. 219).

  • Outlines a framework for grand strategy built around:

    • clear dependent variables (power/influence/legitimacy)

    • integrated tool employment (military/economic/info/resilience)

    • coalitions/teams at every level

  • Calls for a “whole-of-society” approach akin to Cold War mobilization (p. 222).

  • Warns against negative U.S. culture tendencies (mirror imaging, tech solutionism, binary thinking) and urges leveraging positive traits (optimism, entrepreneurship) (pp. 224–225).

  • Includes a role for “fight back when necessary,” but emphasizes punitive tools should be used cautiously and collectively to preserve legitimacy.

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Domestic vulnerabilities as strategic variables (p. 218)

  • Whole-of-society approach as competitive requirement (p. 222)

  • “Positive peace” as aspirational end condition (p. 225)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • COVID-19 as example of nonmilitary systemic shock undermining readiness/strategy (p. 219)

  • Cold War analogy for whole-of-society competition (p. 222)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Converts theory into a strategist’s “way ahead”: teams, coalitions, resilience as pillar, and multidomain integration.

  • Emphasizes legitimacy management and coalition cohesion as core operational constraints.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q3; podcast resource allocation; IW vs strategic competition

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Like during the Cold War, a whole-of-society approach is required.” (p. 222)

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Theory / Framework Map

• Level(s) of analysis:

  • Strategic / grand-strategic (statecraft), with strong attention to domestic foundations of national power (resilience).

• Unit(s) of analysis:

  • States (U.S., China, Russia) and coalitions/alliances; also domestic societies as enabling base.

• Dependent variable(s):

  • Power (coercive ability)

  • Influence (ability to convince)

  • Legitimacy (collective belief something is rightful) (p. 14)

• Key independent variable(s):

  • How states employ integrated toolsets:

    • military statecraft

    • economic statecraft

    • information statecraft

    • resilience-building

• Mechanism(s):

  • Coerce/convince/legitimate → shape alignment, deter/compel behavior, and weaken adversary cohesion → relative advantage in long competition.

• Scope conditions / where it should NOT apply:

  • Less suited as a primary lens for high-intensity conventional warfighting design (it is about winning without fighting).

  • Not a micro-theory of civil war violence or insurgent control dynamics (though relevant as context).

• Observable implications / predictions:

  • Competitors will increasingly prefer tools below major war due to catastrophic costs of near-peer conflict.

  • Campaigns that improve resilience should reduce openings for adversary IW exploitation during crises.

  • Overuse of coercive tools (esp. sanctions/info manipulation) can reduce legitimacy and coalition cohesion, weakening long-term influence.

Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

• Strategic competition

  • Definition: A persistent long-term struggle among adversaries pursuing incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict (p. 8).

  • Role in argument: Sets the environment—competition is ongoing; war is not the default.

  • Analytical note: Forces timeline discipline; favors metrics and campaigning, not episodic reactions.

• Irregular warfare (IW)

  • Definition: “Activities short of conventional and nuclear warfare…designed to expand…influence and legitimacy…[and] weaken…adversaries.” (p. 11, quoting Seth G. Jones)

  • Role in argument: Main “mode” of competition in today’s environment.

  • Analytical note: Expands IW beyond violence-centered COIN and toward multidomain statecraft.

• Power

  • Definition: Ability to coerce (p. 14).

  • Role in argument: One of three enduring outcomes for IW campaigns.

  • Analytical note: Observable via coercive leverage, capability, and credible threat; must be assessed relative to adversaries.

• Influence

  • Definition: Ability to convince (p. 14).

  • Role in argument: Central competitive currency below war.

  • Analytical note: Hard to measure directly; requires proxy indicators (alignment, partner policy choices, narrative uptake).

• Legitimacy

  • Definition: Collective belief among relevant population that something is rightful (p. 14).

  • Role in argument: Enables durable influence; constrains adversary options; affects coalition cohesion.

  • Analytical note: Often the binding constraint in IW—especially for democracies.

• Political warfare

  • Definition: “Employment of all the means…short of war, to achieve…national objectives.” (p. 69, Kennan)

  • Role in argument: Cold War precedent for integrated competition.

  • Analytical note: Useful bridge concept between IW and grand strategy; clarifies “means short of war.”

• Information statecraft

  • Definition: State use of information tools (sharing/manipulation/agreements) to pursue power, influence, legitimacy (Ch. 7).

  • Role in argument: Key terrain for legitimacy and persuasion competition.

  • Analytical note: Requires coordination across government and society; includes defense against disinformation.

• Resilience

  • Definition: Adaptive capacity—ability to adapt while fulfilling core purpose (p. 169, quoted/adopted).

  • Role in argument: Essential in an era of crises; reduces vulnerability to competitor exploitation.

  • Analytical note: Strategic variable, not “homeland” afterthought; spans infrastructure, governance, social cohesion, and institutions.

• Irregular Warfare Dashboard

  • Definition: Measurement framework to visualize progress across tools and outcomes (p. 205).

  • Role in argument: Enables strategic learning over long timelines.

  • Analytical note: Must be comparative and coalition-aware: “All metrics are relative.” (p. 206)

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Key Arguments & Evidence

• Argument 1:

  • Strategic competition will be won largely below the threshold of major war, through IW that builds influence and legitimacy while weakening adversaries.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Definition-driven reframing of IW (pp. 8–11, 14)

    • Competitor tool integration across domains (Ch. 3)

    • Cold War political warfare precedent (Ch. 4)

  • So what:

    • U.S. strategy must prioritize campaigning, alliances, legitimacy, and resilience—not just war plans.

• Argument 2:

  • U.S. over-militarized and culturally biased approaches create mismatches for long-duration IW competition.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • American strategic culture traits (Ch. 2; p. 37)

    • Whole-of-society requirement and crisis-driven vulnerabilities (Ch. 8; Ch. 10)

  • So what:

    • Reform is strategic: institutions, resource allocation, and narratives must support integrated statecraft.

• Argument 3:

  • Without measurement, long competitions drift.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Measurement problems in decades-long containment (pp. 194–196)

    • Dashboard principles (pp. 205–206)

  • So what:

    • Strategy needs feedback loops; otherwise the U.S. confuses activity for advantage.

⚖️ Assumptions & Critical Tensions

• Assumptions the author needs:

  • Influence and legitimacy are strategically decisive and can be shaped by deliberate policy (not just structural luck).

  • The U.S. can coordinate whole-of-government/whole-of-society action at scale despite polarization and bureaucracy.

  • Allies/partners will broadly align if offered credible benefits and shared resilience frameworks.

• Tensions / tradeoffs / contradictions:

  • Coercion vs legitimacy: many powerful tools (sanctions, information manipulation, covert actions) can degrade legitimacy if perceived as hypocritical or imperial.

  • Openness vs security: democratic openness is both strength and vulnerability; tightening controls may protect against IW but undercut legitimacy.

  • Measurement vs Goodhart’s law: once metrics drive decisions, actors may optimize the metric rather than the strategy (inference).

• What would change the author’s mind? (inference)

  • Evidence that influence/legitimacy are epiphenomenal and that major war outcomes (or sheer industrial/military capacity) dominate long-term competition regardless of IW campaigning.

  • Demonstrated inability of democracies to sustain whole-of-society campaigns without unacceptable domestic costs.

Critique Points

• Strongest critique:

  • Concept stretching risk: Defining strategic contests broadly as “IW” may blur useful analytic distinctions (IW vs general statecraft/competition), potentially weakening operational clarity.

• Weakest critique:

  • The Cold War analogy is used carefully (similarities noted, but differences acknowledged), so “it’s just the Cold War again” is not a fair read.

• Method/data critique (if applicable):

  • The dashboard logic is compelling, but influence/legitimacy indicators can be noisy and context-dependent; measurement may be contentious across agencies and allies.

• Missing variable / alternative explanation:

  • Structural economic and demographic trends (and domestic governance capacity) may dominate outcomes regardless of IW tool sophistication (partially addressed via resilience, but could be foregrounded more).

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Policy & Strategy Takeaways

• Implications for the US + partners:

  • Compete for alignment and credibility, not just battlespace advantage.

  • Treat resilience as a strategic capability on par with deterrence.

  • Build “teams” that go beyond alliances: economic, tech, governance, and resilience coalitions.

• Practical “do this / avoid that” bullets:

  • Do:

    • Use power/influence/legitimacy as the standard template for campaign design and assessment.

    • Coordinate coercive tools collectively with allies to preserve legitimacy and increase leverage.

    • Invest in pre-crisis resilience and partner capacity (reduce openings for adversary exploitation).

    • Build enduring information capabilities that emphasize credibility and institutional coordination.

  • Avoid:

    • Treating IW as a SOF-only or violence-only mission set (p. 10–11).

    • Assuming “more exquisite tech” equals advantage in a crisis-heavy era (p. 219).

    • Overusing coercive economic tools without legitimacy/collateral effects analysis.

• Risks / second-order effects:

  • Over-centralization of “information statecraft” can become domestic censorship creep (democracy legitimacy risk).

  • Sanctions and economic coercion can accelerate adversary alternative systems and fracture coalitions.

  • Partnering and resistance preparation can trigger escalation if perceived as regime-change (inference).

• What to measure (MOE/MOP ideas) and over what timeline:

  • MOEs (outcomes, relative):

    • shifts in partner alignment and coalition cohesion (influence)

    • trust in institutions / perceived legitimacy at home and abroad (legitimacy)

    • adversary coercive leverage reduction (power)

    • resilience indicators: preparedness, redundancy, recovery time from shocks (resilience)

  • MOPs (activities):

    • security cooperation depth/quality (not just count)

    • economic agreements and targeted controls implementation

    • information campaign reach and credibility measures

  • Timeline:

    • Track quarterly/annually, but interpret over multi-year windows; strategic competition is long-duration (pp. 194–196).

⚔️ Cross‑Text Synthesis (SAASS 644)

• Where this aligns:

  • Simpson (War From the Ground Up): war/competition as politics and narrative; this book operationalizes that via legitimacy/influence and information statecraft.

  • Kalyvas (Logic of Violence): both emphasize the centrality of civilian behavior and legitimacy/collaboration—but Patterson et al. stay at grand-strategic level.

  • Biddle (Nonstate Warfare): cautions against simplistic assumptions; similarly, this book warns against U.S. cultural/tool biases and “tech will solve it” instincts.

• Where this contradicts:

  • A narrower, violence-centered COIN/IW framing: Patterson et al. explicitly reject IW as necessarily violence-based (p. 10).

  • Any approach that treats “war” as the main determinant of strategic outcomes; the authors argue outcomes are largely decided short of war.

• What it adds that others miss:

  • A coherent statecraft toolkit + measurement frame: most IW texts argue what matters; this one argues how to integrate and assess it.

  • Resilience as a first-class strategic instrument in IW (Ch. 8), not an after-action domestic issue.

• 2–4 “bridge” insights tying at least TWO other readings together:

  • Patterson + Kalyvas: If legitimacy/influence drive strategic competition, then Kalyvas-style micro-dynamics (collaboration under control) become key measurement inputs for “legitimacy” proxies.

  • Patterson + Simpson: “Messaging” is not a bolt-on; information statecraft is a principal line of effort whose success conditions include credibility and institutional coherence.

  • Patterson + Mao: “Protracted” conflict logic: long timelines privilege endurance, adaptation, and political mobilization—mirrored here by resilience and whole-of-society emphasis.

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❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• If IW is defined this broadly, what useful distinctions remain between IW, statecraft, and strategic competition? Where should SAASS draw lines?

• Are influence and legitimacy truly controllable variables for democracies, or are they mostly byproducts of domestic performance and global structure?

• What is the “minimum viable” whole-of-government architecture for this strategy—what gets centralized, and what must remain distributed?

• How do we prioritize across domains (military/economic/info/resilience) under resource constraints without defaulting back to “hardware-first” culture?

• When does “fight back when necessary” in IW (covert action, cyber, proxies) create escalation risks that outweigh legitimacy gains?

• What are the best leading indicators that resilience investments are actually reducing IW vulnerability—before the next crisis tests them?

✍️ Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “Strategic competition is a persistent and long-term struggle…without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” (p. 8, quoting 2023 Joint Concept for Competing)

• “The sole focus on violence as a necessary condition for IW is not appropriate.” (p. 10)

• “Activities short of conventional and nuclear warfare…designed to expand a country’s influence and legitimacy…[and] weaken its adversaries.” (p. 11, quoting Seth G. Jones)

• “Strategic competition is not war.” (p. 37)

• “Political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.” (p. 69, George Kennan)

• “The ability to adapt to changed circumstances while fulfilling one’s core purpose.” (p. 169, quoted/adopted from Zolli & Healy)

• “All metrics are relative.” (p. 206)

• “Like during the Cold War, a whole-of-society approach is required.” (p. 222)

• “Conventional military capabilities alone—or even primarily—are as insufficient for the coming era as they proved to be for the last one.” (p. 224)

Exam Drills / Take‑Home Hooks

• Likely prompt 1: “Is strategic competition best understood as irregular warfare? Evaluate Patterson et al.”

  • Outline:

    1. Define strategic competition + IW (author definitions; scope implications)

    2. Show competitor practice (China/Russia multidomain tools) and why major war is unlikely/costly

    3. Critique: concept stretching, measurement challenges, and what the frame clarifies vs obscures

• Likely prompt 2: “Design a U.S. grand strategy to win without fighting: ends, ways, means, and measures.”

  • Outline:

    1. Ends: relative power/influence/legitimacy + resilience

    2. Ways: integrated statecraft across four domains; coalition “teams”; legitimacy-first sequencing

    3. Means & measures: rebalanced investments; dashboard metrics; timelines and feedback loops

• Likely prompt 3: “How should DoD rebalance for IW in great-power competition?”

  • Outline:

    1. Diagnose cultural/institutional bias (war/peace; overwhelming force)

    2. Prioritize military statecraft (security cooperation, posture, innovation) + resilience support

    3. Integrate with economic/info tools via interagency and allied coordination; measure outcomes

• If I had to write a 1500‑word response in 4–5 hours, my thesis would be:

  • The U.S. will prevail in strategic competition primarily by executing an integrated irregular-warfare grand strategy—building durable influence and legitimacy through whole-of-society resilience and multidomain statecraft—while measuring progress over time rather than chasing decisive battles.

  • 3 supporting points:

    1. Strategic competition’s long duration + catastrophic war costs shift advantage to below-war campaigns (political warfare logic).

    2. Competitors already exploit military/economic/information/resilience seams; the U.S. must integrate tools and fix cultural blind spots.

    3. Measurement discipline (dashboard) is necessary for long-term strategy under uncertainty and shocks.

  • 1 anticipated counterargument:

    • Broad IW framing dilutes analytical clarity and risks underpreparing for conventional war; “winning” may still hinge on hard power and industrial capacity.