Reading Questions

How did his personal experiences in government service influence Iklé’s argument?
- He saw the protracted nature of the Vietnam War while living through the Cold War. Both impacted his views of how states struggle to end conflict.
How did the time in which he wrote shape his conclusions?
- He was lived through the type of war he was writing about in the book.
Does he offer any insights that might apply to current hostilities in Gaza? Ukraine?
- Analogies aren’t always great, but the ideas he presented, stemming from his views on Vietnam, can be tied to both Gaza and Ukraine. The difference is that the US is not directly involved in either conflict. This leads to the question: Is it better for the US to support countries that appear to have no hope of achieving peace, but whose fighting benefits the US, or should the government attempt to push all parties involved toward a peace built on shaky grounds?
Think back to Richard Overy’s “Why War?”, which we read on Day 2 of the class. Is there an interpretive or conceptual arc between Overy’s discussion of how wars occur and Iklé’s views on how they might be brought to a close?
- Yes. Just like Overy presents why wars start as a multi-variable problem, Ikle does the same for the conclusions of wars. Both authors note that these algorithms haven’t yet been solved, and their work focuses on a subset of the variables necessary to understand why humans go to war and how they find peace during conflict.

Online Description

“Every War Must End” analyzes the many critical obstacles to ending a war — an aspect of military strategy that is frequently and tragically overlooked. Ikli considers a variety of examples from twentieth-century history and examines specific strategies that effectively “won the peace.” In the new preface, Ikli explains how U.S. political decisions and military strategy and tactics in Iraq have delayed, and indeed jeopardized, a successful end to hostilities.

🔫 Author Background

Fred Charles Iklé was a Swiss-born American defense strategist and political scientist who served in key roles within the U.S. government, including Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Reagan administration. Having witnessed the protracted and politically fraught end of the Vietnam War, Iklé became deeply concerned with how democracies struggle to terminate wars effectively. His academic background in sociology and his work at the RAND Corporation exposed him to the bureaucratic, psychological, and strategic barriers to ending conflicts. Iklé was influenced by the Cold War climate, where nuclear deterrence and great power rivalry made the stakes of prolonged war termination even more consequential. Every War Must End emerged from this context as a cautionary analysis of the institutional and cognitive failures that prevent rational war-ending decisions.

📒 Sections

Chapter One: The Purpose of Fighting

Tags: #Military planning #End of war #Japan #Attack on Pearl Harbor

Key Idea: War plans are often “plans without an ending”. Leaders focus on how battles translate into a favorable and stable peace.
Main Evidence: The book uses Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a case study. The Navy Chief of Staff admitted ending the war was an “incredibly murky prospect.”
Sub-arguments:
- Once a war begins, its purposes often change and expand, justifying goals far more ambitious than pre-war aims.
- The internal structure of government shifts during war, emphasizing military campaigns over the political task of termination.

Chapter Two: The Fog of Military Estimates

Tags: #Fog of war #Germany in World War I #Finland during World War II

Key Idea: The information required to decide how to end a war is inherently uncertain and often misinterpreted.
Main Evidence:
- Resource Miscalculation: Germany twice underrated the impact of its unrestricted submarine warfare, and intelligence often overrated Japan’s remaining productive capacity.
- Uncertainty of Outside Help: Finland’s 1941 decision to align with Germany underestimated the possibility that the USSR might ultimately prevail in the larger conflict.
- Misjudging Coercive Effects: Britain’s World War II bombing campaign failed to break civilian morale, illustrating flawed assumptions.
Critique Point: Aggregating diverse data is difficult, allowing both “hawks” and “doves” to find evidence that supports their pre-existing biases.

Chapter Three: Peace Through Escalation?

Tags: #Escalation #Strategic bombing #World War II

Key Idea: Escalation that falls short of total victory may harden an enemy’s resolve and widen the gap to settlement.
Main Evidence: The case study of British bombing in World War II shows that increased bombing made Britain less likely to make peace, undermining the efficacy of escalation.
Sub-arguments:
- Proponents of escalation often overlook better options, such as negotiation on revised goals.
- The mere threat of escalation can be more persuasive than its execution.

Chapter Four: The Struggle Within: Patriots Against “Traitors”

Tags: #Bureaucratic politics #Austria-Hungary #Finland

Key Idea: Internal political struggles label peace advocates as “traitors” and glorify hawkish adventurism, impeding war termination.
Main Evidence:
- Austria-Hungary in WWI: Leaders feared charges of treason more than military defeat, choosing honor over realistic peace terms.
- Finland in WWII: Finland avoided disaster by acknowledging harsh realities, with leaders willing to accept painful concessions.
- The “Hero’s Peace”: Charismatic leaders (e.g., Charles de Gaulle) can steer a nation to negotiate a peace viewed as a betrayal by some.

Chapter Five: The Struggle Within: Search for an Exit

Tags: #Germany in World War I #Korean War armistice talks #Benito Mussolini

Key Idea: Facing defeat or stalemate, governments often suffer a paralyzing “failure of nerve” rather than engage in candid discussions on concessions.
Main Evidence:
- Germany in 1918: High command debates avoided painful choices, delaying armistice discussions.
- Korean War Negotiations: Armistice talks dragged on for years, reflecting reluctance to face the cost of peace.
- Mussolini’s Fall: Mussolini was paralyzed by the reality of Italy’s defeat, unable to pursue a negotiated exit.

Epilogue: Ending Wars Before They Start

Tags: #Cuban Missile Crisis #Nuclear war #Suez Crisis

Key Idea: Preventing war requires coherent planning for the endgame, especially in the nuclear age.
Main Evidence:
- The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates successful crisis management through endgame planning.
- The Suez Crisis and other mid-century conflicts stemmed from failures to envision post-war settlements.

Scholarly Analysis

Tags: #Thesis #Bureaucratic politics

Thesis and Central Question

Nations go to war with detailed plans for victory but neglect planning for how wars will end, leading to prolonged conflicts and national disaster.
Why do governments that plan carefully for the start of war fail to plan for its end, trapping themselves in costly conflicts?

Key Premises

Initial war aims become distorted to justify escalating sacrifices.
Uncertain military estimates are interpreted to fit competing political agendas.
Escalation often hardens enemy resolve as much as it deters them.
Internal labeling of “hawks” vs. “doves” creates political barriers to peace.
Planning for war termination is as essential as planning for its execution.

Supporting Evidence

Japan’s entry into WWII; Germany’s 1918 armistice debates; Allied-Austrian peace overtures in WWI; Korean War armistice talks; Japan’s 1945 surrender.

Assumptions and Critiques

Operates from a bureaucratic politics framework, emphasizing agency conflicts.
Assumes fear of betrayal overrides rational national interest calculations.
Distinction between “hawks” and “doves” may oversimplify political dynamics.
Offers limited practical guidance beyond advocating realism and caution.

Author’s Larger Aim

To improve statecraft by compelling leaders to consider how wars will end, thereby preventing unnecessary conflicts.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“The more distant the prospect of peace, the less willing nations are to think clearly about how to end the war.”
“To plan for war termination is not an act of defeatism; it is an act of prudence.”
“Every war will end — the problem is whether it ends before or after it ruins the nations involved.”
“The stronger the emotional commitment to victory, the harder it becomes to recognize the limits of what war can achieve.”
“A nation’s failure to plan for how a war should end is as dangerous as its failure to prepare for how a war should begin.”