The Landmark Thucydides

by Thucydides

Cover of The Landmark Thucydides
complete 760 pages
History
Added: June 18, 2025 Updated: June 18, 2025

Reading Questions Day One

1. What are the causes of the Peloponnesian War?

Thucydides famously claims that the truest cause of the war — though not stated openly — was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this inspired in Sparta (Book 1.23). This structural explanation aligns with modern theories of power transition and the security dilemma. However, immediate causes included disputes over Corcyra, Potidaea, and economic sanctions on Megara. These flashpoints exposed the brittle diplomatic framework of the Greek world and revealed deep-seated tensions between democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta. Thucydides presents both proximate events and underlying fears as part of a comprehensive causal model, emphasizing how power, pride, and perceived injustice interact to precipitate war.

2. How would you assess the elected Athenian leader, Pericles, as a strategist? The Spartan king, Archidamus?

Pericles stands out as a strategic realist: he understood Athenian strengths — naval power, economic might, and imperial cohesion — and crafted a defensive strategy built on avoiding pitched battles with Sparta. His “Periclean Strategy” aimed to preserve Athenian power by protracting the war and avoiding overextension. Thucydides praises Pericles’ vision, suggesting that had Athens followed his counsel throughout, it might not have lost. In contrast, King Archidamus II is portrayed as cautious and deliberative, advocating restraint in the face of popular Spartan agitation for war. While not charismatic, he is sensible, recognizing the economic and logistical challenges of defeating a maritime empire like Athens. Both leaders embody prudence, but their more aggressive successors ultimately drive escalation.

3. How does a combatant dominant in one domain battle an opponent dominant in a different domain?

Thucydides’ history presents a classic asymmetric contest: Athens excels at naval operations and economic projection, while Sparta dominates on land with its hoplite armies and Peloponnesian League allies. Each side attempts to leverage its strengths while exploiting the other’s vulnerabilities. The Athenians avoid pitched land battles and use their fleet for raiding and containment; the Spartans ravage Attica and encourage revolts in Athenian-controlled regions. Success in such a conflict depends on adaptability, logistics, and maintaining cohesion across different theaters. Thucydides shows that when one side ventures into the other’s domain — as Athens does disastrously in Sicily — the results can be catastrophic.

4. What is Thucydides’ purpose in writing this book?

Thucydides explicitly states that he wrote the History of the Peloponnesian War as “a possession for all time,” not just for contemporary readers. His goal was to capture the underlying truths of human nature, politics, and conflict, rather than merely chronicling events. By emphasizing cause and effect, speeches, and the behavior of states and individuals under pressure, he creates a rigorous analytic history grounded in rationalism. Thucydides aspires to reveal how fear, honor, and interest drive international affairs — insights meant to endure long after the particulars of his era have faded. In this sense, his work is both a history and a political science treatise.

5. What is “The Thucydides Trap”?

“The Thucydides Trap” is a modern concept popularized by political scientist Graham Allison, drawn from Thucydides’ insight that rising powers create fear in established ones, leading to war. The idea suggests that when a dominant power (like Sparta) is challenged by an emerging rival (like Athens), the structural stress makes conflict likely — even if neither side desires it. While not a term Thucydides himself used, the “trap” reflects his diagnosis of the war’s deeper causes and has become a lens through which contemporary geopolitical rivalries (e.g., U.S.–China) are analyzed. It underscores the enduring relevance of Thucydides’ analysis in explaining how great power transitions can destabilize international systems.

Reading Questions Day Two

1. What is the significance of the Melian Dialogue?

The Melian Dialogue (Book 5) is a dramatic and philosophical centerpiece of Thucydides’ History, where Athenian envoys coldly justify the subjugation of neutral Melos by appealing to power rather than justice. It represents a stark exposition of realpolitik: the Athenians argue that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” stripping diplomacy of its moral pretense. Thucydides uses this episode to expose the contradictions within Athenian imperial ideology and to interrogate the ethical limits of power. The dialogue’s form — a stylized debate — heightens its theatricality and detachment, underscoring the moral vacuum that emerges in a system governed solely by fear and expediency. Ultimately, it serves as a warning about the corrosive effects of empire on both the oppressed and the oppressor.

2. Why does Athens go to war with a fellow democracy, Syracuse? What is the cause of the fateful outcome of the Sicilian expedition?

Athens’ campaign against Syracuse in Book 6–7, despite Syracuse being a fellow democracy, reflects the expansive logic of Athenian imperialism rather than ideological opposition. Thucydides suggests that ambition, fear of losing influence, and internal demagoguery — particularly from Alcibiades — drove Athens to overreach. The Sicilian Expedition ends disastrously due to poor strategic planning, the recall and defection of Alcibiades, internal factionalism, and underestimation of both Syracuse and its Spartan allies. The Athenians’ logistical failures, compounded by a lack of naval retreat options and the psychological demoralization of their forces, culminate in total annihilation. This defeat marks a turning point, draining Athens of manpower, ships, and prestige — a prelude to its eventual collapse.

3. Why does Athens lose the Peloponnesian War? How does Sparta win?

Athens loses the Peloponnesian War because it overextends its imperial reach while simultaneously facing internal political instability, plague, and attrition. Thucydides shows how Athens’ reliance on aggressive maritime power could not be sustained against protracted land-based resistance and shifting alliances. Sparta, traditionally conservative and land-based, adapts under the leadership of Lysander, embracing naval warfare and securing Persian financial support — a critical pivot. Sparta’s victory at Aegospotami in 405 BC, made possible by superior logistics, internal Athenian exhaustion, and external funding, breaks Athenian supply lines and forces surrender. Thucydides’ narrative suggests that Athens was not defeated solely by Sparta, but by the cumulative pressures of war, internal dissent, and hubris.

4. Why did George Marshall say that understanding the Peloponnesian War is essential to understanding modern international issues?

George Marshall’s invocation of the Peloponnesian War reflects Thucydides’ enduring relevance as a foundational thinker on power politics, war, and the fragility of democracy. The war encapsulates perennial tensions in international relations: the security dilemma, the dangers of overreach, the role of alliances, and the moral compromises of great powers. Thucydides does not merely chronicle events but provides a framework for analyzing how fear, honor, and interest drive conflict — insights that resonate in the bipolar world of the Cold War and beyond. Marshall likely viewed the fall of Athens not just as a historical tragedy, but as a cautionary tale for any liberal power tempted to sacrifice principle for expediency. Studying the Peloponnesian War, then, is a means of cultivating strategic wisdom grounded in historical precedent.

Online Description

Chronicles two decades of war between Athens and Sparta.

🔫 Author Background

📒 Sections

Chapter 1: Book 1

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book1 #PeloponnesianWar #Historiography #Causality #Athens #Sparta #Corinth

The Historian’s Purpose and Method (1.1-1.23)

Thucydides begins by stating his intention to write a history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, which he believed would be the greatest war in history246. In a section often called the “Archaeology,” he argues that ancient Hellas was weak and decentralized, and that even the famed Trojan War was a minor affair compared to the Peloponnesian War252, 288, 326.

He then outlines his Historical Method, emphasizing his commitment to accuracy. He claims to have based his account on his own observations and on reports he verified with “the most severe and detailed tests possible”398. Regarding the Thucydidean Speeches, he admits they are not verbatim but are composed to reflect the “general sense” of what was said and what the situation demanded398.

Finally, Thucydides identifies two levels of causation for the war. While specific disputes served as pretexts, he states the “real cause” was a matter of Realpolitik:

The real cause… was the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, which in his view, “made war inevitable”404.

This concept of Spartan Fear is central to his entire history.

First Pretext: The Affair of Corcyra (1.24-1.55)

The first dispute arose from a civil conflict in Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra406. When Corcyra (itself a Corinthian colony) refused to help, Epidamnus appealed to Corinth414. Corinth, resenting Corcyra’s arrogance and independence, agreed to intervene414.

This led to a naval battle where Corinth was defeated461. Fearing retaliation, the Corcyraeans abandoned their isolationist policy and appealed to Athens for an alliance478, 480. This prompted a debate in the Athenian assembly:

  • The Corcyraeans argued that war with the Peloponnesus was unavoidable and that Athens needed Corcyra’s powerful fleet483, 497.
  • The Corinthians warned that an alliance would violate the Thirty Years’ Peace and force a state of war508, 512.

Athens chose a compromise: a purely defensive alliance (epimachia)530, 532. At the subsequent Battle of Sybota, the small Athenian fleet intervened to prevent a Corcyraean collapse579. Thucydides concludes that this intervention was the “first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians”596.

Second Pretext: The Affair of Potidaea (1.56-1.66)

Immediately after, Athens grew suspicious of Potidaea, a Corinthian colony that was also a tribute-paying member of the Athenian Empire597. Fearing a rebellion backed by Corinth and King Perdiccas of Macedonia, Athens demanded Potidaea tear down its walls597. After receiving a secret promise of support from Sparta, Potidaea revolted610. Corinth sent aid, and Athens responded by laying siege to the city in the Siege of Potidaea614, 645, 657, creating another major grievance653.

The Debates at Sparta and the Vote for War (1.67-1.88)

Corinth and its allies convened at Sparta to accuse Athens of breaking the Thirty Years’ Peace663. This led to a series of foundational speeches defining the conflict:

  • The Corinthians rebuked Sparta for its slowness, contrasting it with the innovative, expansionist nature of Athens675, 678.
  • Athenian envoys defended their empire, arguing it was acquired justly after Sparta abandoned the Persian Wars. They claimed they maintained it out of Fear, Honor, and Interest, and warned that Sparta would be just as oppressive if given the power688, 700, 701, 705.
  • King Archidamus of Sparta advised caution, warning that a war against the wealthy, naval-savvy Athens would be long and difficult. He urged diplomacy and preparation715, 716, 719.
  • The ephor Sthenelaidas gave a short, sharp speech rejecting deliberation and demanding an immediate vote for war to defend Sparta’s allies and honor733.

The Spartan assembly, moved by Sthenelaidas, voted for war736. But Thucydides reiterates that they voted “because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians”745.

Final Negotiations and Pericles’ Counsel (1.139-1.146)

Sparta sent several embassies with escalating demands, culminating in an ultimatum to “let the Hellenes be independent”923. In the final Athenian assembly, Pericles gave his decisive counsel:

  • He argued for a firm policy of no concessions, stating that yielding on a small point would only invite greater demands923, 924.
  • He advised the Athenians to rely on their financial strength and Athenian Naval Supremacy.
  • If necessary, they should abandon the land of Attica to invaders and fight the war from the sea, a strategy of asymmetrical warfare926.

Following his advice, Athens rejected the ultimatum but offered arbitration, as stipulated by the treaty927. Sparta refused, and both sides understood war was now imminent927.

Chapter 2: Book 2

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book2 #PeloponnesianWar #Pericles #PlagueinAthens #FuneralOration #NavalWarfare

The Outbreak of War at Plataea (2.1-2.6)

The Peloponnesian War begins with a surprise attack by Thebes on its Athenian-allied neighbor, Plataea. Acting with a pro-Theban faction, 300 Thebans enter the city, breaking the Thirty Years’ Peace. The Plataeans, realizing the small size of the force, launch a coordinated counterattack, moving undetected by digging through the walls of their houses. They capture 180 prisoners. Despite promising their safe return, the Plataeans execute all the captives after a larger Theban relief force withdraws. This brutal act sets the tone for the war’s ferocity.

First Invasion of Attica and Pericles’ Strategy (2.7-2.24)

With war now openly declared, Sparta’s King King Archidamus leads a large Peloponnesian army to invade Attica. In Athens, Pericles convinces the citizens to adopt the Periclean Strategy:

  • Abandon the countryside and bring all property and people inside the city’s Long Walls8.
  • Avoid a pitched land battle with the superior Spartan army at all costs.
  • Rely on Athenian Naval Supremacy and financial reserves for victory.

The Peloponnesians ravage Attica and encamp at Acharnae, enraging the Athenians, who demand to fight. Pericles holds firm, refusing to call an assembly and instead dispatches a fleet of 100 ships to raid the Peloponnesian coast. After 40 days, the invaders withdraw.

Pericles’ Funeral Oration (2.34-2.46)

At the public funeral for the first year’s war dead, Pericles delivers the famous Funeral Oration. Instead of simple eulogy, he praises the society for which the soldiers died.

Athenian Democracy

He extols Athens’ unique constitution, which “favors the many instead of the few” and provides equal justice for all. Advancement is based on merit, not wealth or class.

Athenian Character

He describes Athenians as balancing freedom with civic duty, tolerant in private but obedient to public law. He contrasts the open, versatile, and naturally courageous Athenian spirit with the rigid, secretive, and laborious military training of Sparta.

A City Worth Dying For

He concludes that Athens is “the school of Hellas,” a city whose power and glory make it worthy of the ultimate sacrifice. He comforts the families, urging them to find solace in the honor their loved ones earned.

The Plague in Athens (2.47-2.54)

In the war’s second summer, the devastating Plague in Athens strikes the overcrowded city. Thucydides, a survivor, provides a clinical, detailed account of its symptoms and extreme deadliness. The plague’s effects are magnified by the population density caused by the Periclean Strategy. He observes a complete moral collapse:

Thucydides observes a catastrophic breakdown of social and moral order, as citizens, facing imminent death, abandon all fear of “gods or law of man” and live only for the pleasure of the moment.

The Leadership of Pericles and Phormio’s Victories (2.55-2.103)

Under the dual pressures of plague and a second Spartan invasion, the Athenians blame Pericles. In a final speech, he chastises their weakness, reminding them that the Athenian empire is a “tyranny” that cannot be safely surrendered and that their naval power ensures ultimate security. Persuaded, they recommit to the war but fine him personally.

Pericles dies soon after. Thucydides delivers his famous assessment that under Pericles, Athens was a democracy in name but in reality was a rule by its first citizen. He argues Pericles’ successors lacked his foresight, leading to the city’s eventual ruin.

Meanwhile, in the west, the Athenian admiral Phormio, with only 20 ships at Naupactus, twice defeats a much larger Peloponnesian fleet in the Gulf of Corinth. He uses brilliant Naval Tactics, including superior knowledge of local winds and a sudden, decisive maneuver, to rout fleets of 47 and 77 ships, respectively.

Chapter 3: Book 3

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book3 #PeloponnesianWar #MytilenianDebate #Stasis #Cleon #Diodotus #Demosthenes

The Revolt of Mytilene and the Athenian Response (3.1-3.35)

In the war’s fourth year, the city of Mytilene on Lesbos revolted from Athens. This was a grave threat, as Lesbos was a rare ally that still contributed ships to the Athenian Empire, not just money. The Mytilenians argued at Olympia that Athens had turned the Delian League into a tyranny and their rebellion was an act of liberation.

Sparta accepted Lesbos into its alliance but was stunned by Athens’ decisive response995. Despite the plague, Athens blockaded Mytilene and simultaneously raided the Peloponnesian coast, demonstrating shocking naval capacity. The Athenian general Paches completed the siege. A Peloponnesian relief fleet under the admiral Alcidas arrived too late; Mytilene had already fallen.

The Mytilenian Debate in Athens (3.36-3.50)

The starving common people of Mytilene, newly armed by their oligarchs, forced a surrender to Paches. In Athens, the enraged assembly, on the motion of Cleon, voted to execute the entire adult male population and enslave the women and children.

The next day, a second assembly was called to reconsider this “horrid cruelty,” leading to the famous Mytilenian Debate.

Cleon’s Speech

Thucydides describes Cleon as “the most violent man at Athens.” Cleon argued that the empire was a despotism and that justice demanded a harsh punishment to deter future rebellions. He claimed that showing pity or “softness of heart” was a weakness fatal to empire.

Diodotus’s Speech

Diodotus countered that the debate was not about justice but about Athenian self-interest. He argued an extreme penalty would make future rebels fight to the death, making sieges more costly. By sparing the common people (the demos), who had surrendered the city, Athens could use them as allies against oligarchic factions in other cities.

Diodotus’s argument won by a narrow margin. A second trireme was sent, arriving just in time to stop the massacre. The 1,000 Mytilenians deemed most responsible were still executed, and Athens confiscated the city’s land and walls.

The Fall of Plataea (3.20-3.24; 3.52-3.68)

The Siege of Plataea reached its grim conclusion. After a daring winter escape by some of the garrison, the starving remainder surrendered to the Spartans. The Spartans held a sham trial, asking only if the Plataeans had served Sparta in the current war. The Plataeans appealed to their heroic service during the Persian Wars, while the Thebans accused them of betrayal and murder. The Spartans executed every man—over 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians—and allowed Thebes to raze the city.

Civil War in Corcyra and Thucydides’ Analysis of Stasis (3.70-3.85)

The Corcyrean Civil War erupted when oligarchs, released by Corinth, returned to assassinate democratic leaders. The city descended into brutal street fighting between oligarchs and democrats (“The People”). The arrival of an Athenian fleet under Eurymedon secured a democratic victory, which was followed by a savage, seven-day massacre of their opponents.

Taking this as his paradigm, Thucydides offers a profound analysis of the pathology of Stasis (Civil War).

In such conflicts, “words had to change their ordinary meaning,” with “reckless audacity” being called courage and “prudent hesitation” being called cowardice. Party loyalty replaced family ties… He attributes this breakdown of society to the “lust for power arising from greed and ambition”.

Demosthenes’ Campaigns in Western Greece (3.94-3.114)

The Athenian general Demosthenes launched an ill-advised invasion of the rugged region of Aetolia. His army of heavily armed hoplites was no match for the local Light-Armed Troops and was decisively defeated. To capitalize, Sparta sent an army under Eurylochus to attack the key Athenian base of Naupactus.

Demosthenes, however, redeemed himself by saving Naupactus with reinforcements from Acarnania. Later, at the Battle of Olpae, he used a clever ambush to defeat a Peloponnesian army. He then ambushed a second army of Ambraciots at Idomene, inflicting what Thucydides calls the “greatest disaster” to befall any single Greek city in the war.

Chapter 4: Book 4

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book4 #PeloponnesianWar #Pylos #Sphacteria #Brasidas #Cleon #Demosthenes #BattleofDelium

The Campaign at Pylos and Sphacteria (4.2-4.41)

In the seventh year of the war, the Athenian general Demosthenes, aboard a fleet bound for Sicily, persuaded the soldiers to fortify the harbor of Pylos in Messenia. The Spartan army, then invading Attica, immediately withdrew to attack the new fort.

The Spartans landed 420 hoplites under Epitadas on the island of Sphacteria, which commands the harbor, intending to blockade the Athenians. However, their assault on the fort at Pylos failed, despite the bravery of Brasidas. The Athenian fleet then returned, defeated the Peloponnesian ships, and trapped the Spartan force on the island.

This unexpected disaster caused panic in Sparta. They sued for peace, offering an alliance for the return of their men. The Athenians, urged on by the demagogue Cleon, made excessive demands, and the negotiations failed.

The siege of Sphacteria dragged on. In Athens, Cleon deflected blame by rashly promising to capture the Spartans within twenty days. When his rival, the general Nicias, called his bluff, Cleon was forced to accept the command.

At Pylos, a fire providentially cleared the island’s woods. Demosthenes then landed his army, using a new tactic: thousands of Light-Armed Troops (archers, slingers) harassed the Spartan hoplites with missiles, refusing to engage in close-quarters Hoplite Warfare. Worn down and unable to close with their mobile enemy, the Spartans retreated and were surrounded. The survivors, including about 120 elite Spartiates, surrendered—an unprecedented event. Cleon returned to Athens in triumph.

Thucydides remarks that “nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this”.

Brasidas’s Campaign in Thrace (4.78-4.88; 4.102-4.116)

To retaliate, Sparta sent its most dynamic general, Brasidas, overland to the Thracian region. His mission was to use a small army of Helots and mercenaries to encourage Athens’s allies to revolt.

His campaign was a stunning success. At Acanthus, he used a combination of persuasive rhetoric (presenting Sparta as the Liberator of Hellas) and implied threats to incite a revolt. His greatest prize was the vital Athenian colony of Amphipolis, which he captured by a surprise attack.

The Athenian relief fleet, commanded by the historian Thucydides (stationed at nearby Thasos), arrived too late to save the city. This failure resulted in Thucydides’ Exile, during which he wrote his history. Brasidas’s moderate conduct and success inspired many other cities, like Torone, to revolt.

The Battle of Delium (4.89-4.101)

The Athenians attempted a complex invasion of Boeotia, which failed in its main objectives. However, an Athenian army under Hippocrates did occupy the temple at Delium. As they retreated, the Boeotian army, led by the Theban Pagondas, attacked.

At the Battle of Delium, the Boeotians were victorious. Their use of a Deep Phalanx on their right wing proved decisive, and a surprise cavalry charge routed the Athenians, who suffered nearly 1,000 casualties. The Boeotians later used a unique flame-throwing device in their final assault on the fortified temple.

The One-Year Armistice and Continued Conflict (4.117-4.135)

Shaken by their defeat at Delium and worried by Brasidas’s successes, Athens was now more inclined toward peace. The Spartans, desperate to recover the prisoners from Sphacteria, were equally eager.

In the spring of 423 BC, they agreed to a One-Year Armistice (423 BC) to negotiate. Thucydides provides the full text of the agreement. However, the truce was immediately strained when the city of Scione revolted to Brasidas just after it was sworn. Mende soon followed, leading to renewed fighting in Thrace as Athens sent an army under Nicias to besiege the rebellious cities.

Chapter 5: Book 5

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book5 #PeloponnesianWar #PeaceofNicias #BattleofMantinea #MelianDialogue #Realpolitik #Alcibiades #Nicias

The Deaths of Cleon and Brasidas at Amphipolis (5.1-5.13)

In the tenth year of the war, the Athenian leader Cleon led an expedition to Thrace to recapture Amphipolis from the Spartan general Brasidas. Seeing the Athenian army in disarray, Brasidas launched a surprise attack. In the ensuing Battle of Amphipolis (422 BC), both commanders were killed. The Athenians were decisively defeated. The people of Amphipolis buried Brasidas within their city and worshipped him as their new founder.

The Peace of Nicias (5.14-5.24)

The deaths of Cleon and Brasidas, the primary war hawks on both sides, created momentum for peace. Athens, demoralized by recent defeats, and Sparta, desperate to recover the prisoners from Pylos, were both eager for a settlement. Led by Nicias of Athens and King King Pleistoanax of Sparta, they negotiated the Peace of Nicias, a fifty-year treaty based on returning all conquests.

However, the peace was flawed from the start:

  • Key Spartan allies—notably Corinth, Boeotia, Megara, and Elis—refused to ratify it.
  • The Spartan commander at Amphipolis, Clearidas, refused to hand the city over to the Athenians, creating an immediate point of contention.

An Unstable Peace and the Argive Alliance (5.25-5.56)

Thucydides argues this period was not a true peace but merely an Unstable Peace within a single, continuous war.

  • Corinth’s Defection: Angry with Sparta, Corinth turned to Argos, a major democratic power that had been neutral.
  • The Quadruple Alliance: Argos began forming a new democratic coalition, joined by Mantinea and Elis. In Athens, the brilliant and ambitious Alcibiades, a rival of Nicias, championed this movement. By exposing Spartan duplicity, Alcibiades skillfully persuaded Athens to abandon its new alliance with Sparta and join the Argive coalition.

The Battle of Mantinea (5.57-5.75)

This new alliance led to direct conflict in the Peloponnesus. The Spartan King King Agis mobilized the largest Peloponnesian army in generations. Near Mantinea, the Spartan-led forces confronted the army of Argos, Mantinea, and Athens.

The Battle of Mantinea (421 BC) was the largest hoplite battle of the war. Though their left wing was initially broken, the superior discipline of the Spartan center and right, led by King Agis, secured a complete victory. The Argive alliance was shattered, and Sparta’s military prestige, damaged since the disaster at Pylos, was fully restored.

The Melian Dialogue and Conquest of Melos (5.84-5.116)

In the sixteenth year of the war, Athens sent an expedition to the small, neutral island of Melos, a Spartan colony, and demanded its submission. This led to the famous Melian Dialogue.

Athenian Position: Might Makes Right

The Athenians set aside all arguments of justice, stating the core tenet of Realpolitik:

“The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

They argued it was in Athens’s interest to subjugate Melos to demonstrate their power, and in Melos’s interest to submit to avoid annihilation.

Melian Position: Hope and Honor

The Melians refused, appealing to justice, the favor of the gods, and their hope that their Spartan kin would come to their aid out of honor.

The Athenians dismissed their hopes as foolish. When the Melians refused to yield, Athens laid siege to the city. After a blockade of several months, Melos surrendered unconditionally. The Athenians executed all the adult men, sold the women and children into slavery, and colonized the island themselves, an act of utter brutality that became infamous throughout the Greek world.

Chapter 6: Book 6

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book6 #PeloponnesianWar #SicilianExpedition #Nicias #Alcibiades #Syracuse #Hubris

The Decision to Invade Sicily (6.1-6.8)

In the sixteenth year of the war, Athens resolved to launch the massive Sicilian Expedition.

Thucydides notes that most Athenians were dangerously ignorant of the island’s vast size and population, undertaking a war “not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians”.

The formal pretext was an appeal from their ally, Egesta, which was at war with Selinus, an ally of the powerful city of Syracuse. The Egestans deceptively promised substantial funds to finance the war. The assembly voted to send a fleet under three generals: Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus.

The Great Debate at Athens (6.9-6.26)

At a second assembly, a great debate took place over the wisdom of the expedition.

Nicias’s Argument Against

Nicias, chosen to command against his will, argued passionately against the enterprise. He warned that Athens was leaving powerful enemies at home, the empire was not yet secure, and Sicily was too large and distant to conquer. He accused Alcibiades of seeking personal glory and profit at the state’s expense.

Alcibiades’s Argument For

Alcibiades countered, defending his right to command and arguing his personal magnificence brought glory to Athens. He portrayed the Sicilian cities as weak and divided, and claimed that an empire must constantly expand or risk decline. He asserted that with its powerful navy, Athens could project power in Sicily without significant risk from Sparta.

Nicias’s Gambit

Swayed by Alcibiades, the assembly was set on war. In a last-ditch effort, Nicias tried to deter them by demanding a massive force of over 100 triremes and 5,000 hoplites. His plan backfired spectacularly; instead of being frightened by the cost, the Athenians “became more eager for it than ever,” and voted to give the generals full powers.

Sacrilege and the Departure of the Fleet (6.27-6.52)

As the fleet prepared to sail, a shocking act of sacrilege occurred: the Mutilation of the Hermae. This was seen as a terrible omen and part of a conspiracy to overthrow the democracy. The investigation expanded to include accusations of the Profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries, with Alcibiades named as a key culprit. His enemies arranged to postpone his trial until after he had departed, fearing his popularity with the army.

The fleet that departed from the Piraeus was “by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city”. Upon arriving at Rhegium, the generals discovered the Egestaean deception—they had only thirty talents1178. They debated their next move:

  • Nicias advocated a limited demonstration of force.
  • Alcibiades proposed building a broad coalition before attacking Syracuse.
  • Lamachus argued for an immediate, all-out assault.

Alcibiades’s more cautious plan was adopted.

The Recall of Alcibiades and First Engagements (6.53-6.105)

While establishing a base at Catana, the state ship arrived to recall Alcibiades for trial. Knowing he would be condemned, Alcibiades fled, eventually making his way to Sparta to offer his services to the enemy.

Now under the command of Nicias and Lamachus, the Athenians lured the Syracusan army away and landed unopposed near the Olympieum. In the first major battle, the Athenians were victorious, though the superior Syracusan cavalry prevented an effective pursuit.

Rather than press their advantage, the Athenians withdrew to Catana and Naxos for the winter to await reinforcements. This strategic delay gave Syracuse crucial time to prepare. They sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta for aid. At Sparta, Alcibiades revealed Athens’s ultimate ambitions and persuaded the Spartans to:

  1. Send a Spartan general, Gylippus, to lead the Syracusan defense.
  2. Establish a permanent fort at Decelea in Attica.

This advice would prove devastating to Athens.

Chapter 7: Book 7

Tags: #Thucydides #BookSummary #Book7 #PeloponnesianWar #SicilianExpedition #Nicias #Demosthenes #Gylippus #Syracuse #Tragedy #MilitaryDisaster

The Arrival of Gylippus and the Turn of the Tide (7.1-7.8)

The eighteenth year of the war began with the arrival of the Spartan general Gylippus in Sicily. Nicias, now in sole command after the death of Lamachus, held Gylippus’s small force in contempt and failed to stop him from entering Syracuse over the Epipolae plateau.

Gylippus’s arrival immediately reversed the course of the Siege of Syracuse. He captured the Athenian fort at Labdalum and began building a Counter-wall to cut off the Athenian line of Circumvallation. In a key engagement, Gylippus captured the Athenian forts on the Plemmyrium promontory, a massive strategic blow that made the Athenian naval position in the Great Harbor precarious.

Nicias’s Letter and the Second Athenian Expedition (7.9-7.19)

With his army now effectively the besieged, Nicias sent a desperate letter to Athens. He detailed the arrival of Gylippus, the loss of Plemmyrium, and the crumbling state of his fleet. He concluded that Athens must either recall the expedition or dispatch a second armament of equal size. He also asked to be relieved of command due to a severe kidney disease.

The Athenians refused to relieve Nicias but voted to send a second powerful fleet and army under their most energetic generals, Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

The Fortification of Decelea and Naval Battles in the Harbor (7.19-7.35)

While the second expedition prepared, Sparta, acting on Alcibiades’s advice, established a permanent fortified post at Decelea in Attica. Thucydides notes this was a principal cause of Athens’s eventual ruin, enabling year-round devastation and encouraging the mass desertion of skilled slaves.

In Syracuse, buoyed by their success, the Syracusans challenged Athens at sea. In a series of naval engagements in the Great Harbor, while not decisively beaten, the Athenians lost their psychological edge as the Syracusans gained experience and confidence.

Demosthenes’ Arrival and the Night Attack on Epipolae (7.36-7.50)

The arrival of Demosthenes with 73 ships and 5,000 hoplites temporarily crushed Syracusan morale. Seeing the dire situation, Demosthenes argued for immediate, bold action and planned a complex Night Attack on Epipolae to recapture the plateau.

The attack was a catastrophe. The Athenians initially succeeded but fell into disorder in the darkness and confusion. Panicked by a Boeotian counterattack on unfamiliar terrain, the army was routed. In the chaotic flight down the steep cliffs, men were killed by the enemy, their own comrades, or by falling to their deaths.

The Final Battles and Annihilation of the Athenian Army (7.51-7.87)

After the disaster, Demosthenes argued for an immediate withdrawal. Nicias, however, refused, fearing the Athenian assembly and holding a secret hope of betrayal within Syracuse. This delay proved fatal.

When Nicias finally agreed to retreat, an eclipse of the moon occurred. A deeply superstitious man, Nicias insisted on waiting the prescribed 27 days before departing, an example of Superstition in War with devastating consequences. The Syracusans seized the opportunity. They attacked by land and sea, defeating the Athenian fleet in the Final Battle in the Great Harbor and killing Eurymedon. They then blocked the mouth of the harbor, trapping the entire Athenian armament.

Desperate, the Athenians staked everything on one final breakout attempt, which was completely defeated as the army watched in horror from the shore.

The only option left was the Athenian Retreat from Syracuse by land. Over 40,000 men began a desperate march, harassed continuously by the enemy. The division led by Demosthenes was surrounded and surrendered. Nicias’s division was trapped at the Assinarus River, where, crazed by thirst, the men were slaughtered. Nicias surrendered to Gylippus.

The generals Nicias and Demosthenes were executed. Thousands of Athenian and allied prisoners were sent to die of exposure and starvation in the Stone Quarries of Syracuse.

Thucydides concludes: “they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army—everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home.”

Chapter 8: Athens in Crisis & the Rise and Fall of Oligarchy

📌 Shock and Revolts (8.1–5)

  • Following the Sicilian disaster, Athens falls into deep despair, yet refuses surrender.
  • Sparta and its allies, buoyed by Persian funding, initiate widespread revolts among Athens’ tributary allies (e.g., Chios, Miletus, Lesbos).
  • Athenians redirect all revenues from the Delian League to fleet and defense rebuilding.

Alcibiades & Persian Intrigue (8.5–18)

  • Alcibiades resurfaces as a key schemer, shifting allegiances between Athens, Sparta, and Persian satrap Tissaphernes.
  • He urges revolts in Chios and other Ionian cities, then brokers Spartan–Persian cooperation.
  • Persia’s tactic: fund both sides to perpetuate the war and weaken both powers.

Coup and Counter‑Coup at Athens & Samos (8.18–35)

Naval Battles & Reclaimed Momentum (8.36–55)

  • A naval clash at Cynossema (in the Hellespont) yields an Athenian victory, boosting morale.
  • Euboea revolts successfully; Athens’ position starts to stabilize.

Alcibiades Returns & Oligarchic Unravelling (8.55–75)

  • Alcibiades returns to Samos, is reintegrated as general, and tries to steer Persian policy for Athens’ benefit.
  • The Spartan admiral Astyochus is replaced after fractious relations with Persia; Mindarus replaces him.
  • Internal disputes among oligarchs and defection of allies lead to the partial collapse of the 400.

Final Collapse & New Democracy (8.90–109)

  • Soldiers and sailors at Samos press Athens to abandon oligarchy; democracy is restored as the “Government of the 5,000.”
  • The Spartans regroup, but Athenian sea victories continue to raise hope.
  • The unfinished narrative concludes abruptly around 411 BC — Thucydides’ account stops mid-action.

🔍 Analysis & Context

  • Geographical shift: Focus moves from Sicily to the central Greek world—especially Attica, Euboea, the Hellespont, Samos, Chios, and Ionia.
  • Alcibiades emerges as a Machiavellian figure, swinging between power centers, driving revolts, diplomacy, and policy manipulation.
  • Persian strategy evolves: Sparta secures funding, but Tissaphernes plays both sides against each other.
  • Political turmoil: The oligarchic experiment is short-lived; democratic forces mobilize from the fleet and army to restore civic governance.

🔍 Analysis & Context

  • Geographical shift: Focus moves from Sicily to the central Greek world—especially Attica, Euboea, the Hellespont, Samos, Chios, and Ionia.
  • Alcibiades emerges as a Machiavellian figure, swinging between power centers, driving revolts, diplomacy, and policy manipulation.
  • Persian strategy evolves: Sparta secures funding, but Tissaphernes plays both sides against each other.
  • Political turmoil: The oligarchic experiment is short-lived; democratic forces mobilize from the fleet and army to restore civic governance.

🥰 Who Would Like it?

  • Everyone!

📚 Related Books

  • Everything in SAASS

☠️ Agree, Disagree, or Suspend

Strengths

  • It’s hard not to say it is great.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
— Book 5, The Melian Dialogue

A chilling expression of realpolitik during Athens’ confrontation with the neutral island of Melos.

“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”
— Book 1, Section 23

Thucydides’ foundational statement of his theory of war causation — still widely cited in international relations theory.

“In peace, sons bury their fathers. In war, fathers bury their sons.”
— Book 3, Pericles’ Funeral Oration (reported indirectly)

A somber reflection on the cost of war and the reversal of nature’s order.

“We secure our friends not by accepting favors but by doing them.”
— Book 2, Pericles’ Funeral Oration

Captures the Athenian ethos of power through generosity — and the expectations that come with it.

“War is a violent teacher.”
— Book 3, Section 82

A terse but profound observation on how conflict reshapes human behavior and morality.